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SUMMARY 
The lives of the Orang Asli have much to tell us about the workings of power in contemporary 
postcolonial nation-states.  Comprising the minority indigenous peoples of Peninsular Malaysia, 
the Orang Asli are seen and treated as a distinct group in various fields.  This has produced a 
sense of shared identification among geographically dispersed, disparate groups of people, of 
different languages, cultural systems and socio-economic practices, who are interpellated into a 
common socio-political identity.  Tracing historical and current developments in several discursive 
fields – politics, administration/ government, the law, and civil society – I illustrate the influence of 
particular events, texts, ideas, and practices on the social construction of the Orang Asli, and how 
these in turn become reflected in the habitus of Orang Asli along certain themes.   
 
Being identified as ‘Orang Asli’ sets individuals and groups apart in Malaysian society, with deep 
material and psychological implications.  It is on the basis of this identity that citizens lay claim to 
special privileges, rights, and provisions – but it is also on the basis of this identity that they suffer 
distinct psychosocial effects, such as racism, shame, and paternalism.  The discourses, practices 
and perceptions through which this identity is reconstructed in the Malaysian nation-state, 
recreates and maintains differentiated access to resources and social realities.  The social 
construction of Orang Asli, I hope to show, is neither a wholly consistent monolithic process, nor 
does it remain fixed and uncontested.  It is part of this project to uncover the dialectics behind this 
identity (re)negotiation, and to comment on how certain features of identity are continuously 
(re)inscribed, (re)worked, and resisted. 
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Figure 1:  Location of Orang Asli Ethnic Groups in the Peninsula 
 
 
Notes: This is a historically maximal map, which does not indicate the present-day distribution of the Orang Asli.  The 
‘Semang’, ‘Senoi’ and ‘Aboriginal Malays’ ethnic group divisions are not according to JHEOA classifications but to 
analytical anthropological writings cited in Benjamin (1985). 
Source:  Benjamin, G. (1985) In the Long Term: Three Themes in Malayan Cultural Ecology. In: K.L. Hutterer, A.T. 
Rambo, and G. Lovelace, eds. Cultural Values and Human Ecology in Southeast Asia, Michigan Papers on South and 
Southeast Asia: Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, Number 27, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. 
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 CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Claims over ‘indigenous’ identity have been of paramount importance in the construction of 
postcolonial Malay(si)a.  Dominant historical narratives of the nation-state celebrate the 
persistence, capabilities, and determination of the ‘natives’ in securing Independence from British 
colonial masters.  In these accounts, Malay(si)a is a postcolonial story of triumph; of ‘the 
colonized’ successfully wrestling self-determination and control back from ‘Western’ colonizers.  
These national narratives have been written powerfully into visions, policies, and procedures that 
guide and rationalize the ways in which the peoples of Malaysia are presently constituted within 
the nation-state.   
 
Since the Independence of Malaya in 1957, ‘indigenous’ identity has legitimized the distribution of 
economic and political benefits across groups in a ‘democratic’ society.  As a product of British 
and ‘native’ political negotiations, indigeneity became articulated in terms of ethnic/ racial identity, 
the dominant dimension of difference that guided colonial imaginations of the Peninsula.  This 
manner of defining indigeneity has been carried forward to the present – those who are presently 
‘indigenous’ in the Malaysian nation-state are those who fall within certain ethnic/racial 
boundaries, and those who are not are those who fall into other categories.  Genealogies in the 
land have become less relevant1.  This has become a normalized foundation, an indispensable 
cornerstone, upon which Malaysian politics, government, law, and civil society currently operate.   
 
Writers focusing on identity politics in postcolonial Peninsular Malaysia have focused on 
dynamics among ‘Malay’, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’ communities, as well as the heterogeneity within 
these ethnic categories and the blurring of boundaries between them2.  It is the first of these who 
have been officially identified as ‘indigenous’ or bumiputera (literally ‘sons of the soil’) in the geo-
body of the nation-state, while the latter two have been cast as ‘immigrant’ communities, or non-
                                                 
1 Some ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’ individuals for example, have ancestors who settled in the Peninsula as far back as 600 
years ago.  This is further back in time than many individuals of ‘indigenous’ ethnicity are able too trace. 
2 These three most numerically significant ethnic groups have been socially constructed in a mutually exclusive manner, 
despite the internal fractures, tensions, and plurality of the peoples encapsulated within these categories.  For further 
discussion on the social construction of these ethnic identities, see Alatas (1977), Tan (2000); Hirschman (1987; 1986), 
edited collection by Khan and Loh (1992), Lian (2001; 1997), Nagata (1974), Shamsul (2001; 1997; 1996a; 1996b). 
  - 1 - 
 bumiputera.  However, in this thesis, I examine the ways in which socio-political identities – 
particularly those related to notions of ‘indigeneity’ – are negotiated from the point of view of the 
Orang Asli (translated ‘original people’), otherwise known as the ‘aborigines’ of the Peninsula.   
 
More generally, my current study examines the pan-ethnic ‘groupness’ (Cornell, 2000) of Orang 
Asli identity formed in relation to the modern nation-state, and as such is different from detailed 
studies that have focused on the cultural uniqueness of particular Orang Asli ethnic groups or 
‘tribes’ (e.g. Ariffin, 1979; Baharon, 1973; Benjamin, 1967; Dentan, 1968; Hood, 1978; Howell, 
1989; Nowak, 1986; Omar, 1978; Tachimoto, 1967; Wazir, 1981)3.  This project is an attempt to 
deconstruct Orang Asli identity, that is, to examine the ways in which this identity is constituted, 
conceptualized, and (trans)formed over time.  In doing this, I interrogate common-sense 
conceptions of the Orang Asli, which is never just an intellectual exercise, for, as Edward Said 
(1995), Michel Foucault (1994), Frantz Fanon (1965) and others have demonstrated, it is 
precisely through taken-for-granted understandings of a ‘subject’ that power is exercised.  
Pointing out that the categorical identity of ‘Orang Asli’ is not as unitary, exclusive, stable, and 
unproblematically existing as it seems, I explore the ways in which discursive acts operate – 
sometimes in harmony, sometimes in conflict – to produce certain ideas of who the Orang Asli 
(essentially) are.  In this thesis I also examine how dominant imaginings of identity are 
internalized by Orang Asli actors, notwithstanding perceived intra-category differences (see 
Dentan, 1975; Howell, 2002; Nicholas, 2002).  
 
Re-presenting the ‘Orang Asli’ Subject:  Power/Knowledge in Contemporary Malaysia 
Perhaps because of the mysteries associated with their origins, magic and rituals, 
especially their purported expertise in the so-called ‘black-art’ most of them came to be 
thought of as being equivalent to what is known in the English Language [as] ‘primitive 
people…. 
Who are the Orang Asli,  
                                                 
3 In introducing a volume of essays concerned with ‘Being Tribal in the Malay World’, Geoffrey Benjamin (2003) argues for 
the recuperation of the term ‘tribal’, to refer to groups of people that include the Orang Asli.   
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 plaque on display at the Orang Asli Museum, Gombak 
 viewed December 2002 
 
A starting point for interrogating the construction of knowledge about the Orang Asli is to look at 
the ways in which they are represented in official government documents, statistics and museum 
displays.  In these representations, the Orang Asli are described as comprising exactly 18 clear-
cut aboriginal ethnic groups which are classified according to three broad ‘racial groups’ (see 
Figure 1.1).  They number around 132,000 people, are scattered across Peninsular Malaysia (see 
Map 1), and are described as speaking different languages and practicing different customs.   
 
Acts of describing the Orang Asli are practices of representation that carry meanings beyond the 
presentation of ‘objective facts’4.  One ‘truth’ communicated in these data is that the ‘race’ and 
‘ethnic-group’ classifications are unproblematic, eliding the creative processes that went into such 
categorization.  The specific genealogies of communities in the land are effaced, as are the 
presence and absence of other communities which could also be deemed ‘Orang Asli’5.   
 
Figure 2:  Orang Asli Aboriginal Ethnic Groups 





















Source:  Plaque on display at the Orang Asli Museum, Gombak, viewed December 2002 
 
It is possible to get a sense of how slippery these categories can be, if we consider the writing of 
some individuals who have had close interactions with Orang Asli groups.  Carey (1976a), for 
                                                 
4 As Tim Harper (1997) has demonstrated, for example, British conceptions of the ‘aborigines’ or ‘sakai’ became 
legitimizations for administrative action, military intervention, and the apportioning of resources (e.g. rights to land, and to 
mining for tin) under colonial rule.   
5 Benjamin (1974a) pointed out other ethnic groupings were missing from administrative data.  However, his comments 
were summarily dismissed as being a case of “academic hair-splitting” in Jimin et al (1983:4).  Lye (2001) suggests that 
there are between 17 to 25 indigenous ethnic minorities that may be considered Orang Asli.  Benjamin (2002) notes that 
some smaller groups are subsumed under other ethnic categories. 
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 example, notes that some individuals, known as being of the Jakun sub-ethnic group, with whom 
he had conversations, did not refer to themselves by that name and, in fact, “were of the opinion 
that the Jakun are a kind of wild people, and may be compared with the monkeys but whom they, 
themselves, had never met” (p.21).  More recently, Juli Edo notes in his PhD thesis concerning 
the ubiquitous term ‘Semai’,  
From the people’s point of view… the term ‘Semai’ is not their word and has no meaning, 
either good or bad.  They refer to themselves as Seng-oi, which means people.  Since 
the term ‘Semai’ has been introduced by the state without any specific meaning, this 
study will employ the term Seng-oi to refer to this people. (1998:17)6   
 
Howell (1989), in examining the origin of the term ‘Chewong’ (or Che Wong), concludes that this 
name was given by a British game warden, C.S. Ogilvie, on the basis of a misunderstanding with 
a Malay ranger, who gave his own name (Siwang) when asked for the name of the the aborigines 
at Kuala Gandah.  Nicholas (2002:125) describes his experience with Jahais as follows: “when 
meeting with the Jahais in Perak and Kelantan in 1993, the Jahais of Banun (Perak) emphatically 
denied that those in Jeli (Kelantan) were also Jahais.  Similarly, the Jeli Jahais strongly insist that 
they were the real Jahais.  This is despite both groups having similar physical features and 
linguistic affiliations”.7   
 
Nevertheless, in order to manage the Orang Asli population, it was necessary for both British and 
postcolonial administrators to determine exactly who constituted the aborigines/Orang Asli.  
Through the use of topographical maps, censuses, and ethnographic surveys, attempts were 
made to fix the location of each aboriginal group both spatially and socially.  The demographic, 
geographic, and ethnographic profiles produced through such investigative procedures now guide 
administrative policies that lend material reality to such imaginations of ‘race’ and ‘place’.  These 
representations also shape contemporary understandings that Orang Asli individuals have of 
                                                 
6 Also see Gomes (1988) for a discussion on the development of Semai ‘ethnic consciousness’. 
7 See Lye (2001:207-222) for further elaboration on the variety of names used to refer to Orang Asli groups. 
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 ‘their own people’8.  State articulations of who the ‘Orang Asli’ comprise have become 
internalized, fostering a sense of ‘groupness’ among peoples with different languages, lifestyles, 
social practices, and cultural beliefs (Carey, 1976; Nicholas, 2002). 
 
As Benjamin (2002) points out, there remains a strong emphasis on ‘race’ in descriptions about 
populations in the Peninsula (see also Rambo, 1988).  Specifically, groups are stratified 
according to ‘Negritoids’, ‘Veddoids’, Proto-Malays’ and ‘Deutero-Malays’, and explanations given 
about their migration patterns.  Referring to this racial approach as the “kuih lapis (layered cake) 
ethnology”, Benjamin notes that Orang Asli communities are presented “as if they occupied 
different steps on a culture-evolutionary staircase” (p.19).  The ‘Negritos’, as a whole, are thought 
be more ‘primitive’ than the ‘Senoi’, who were seen as less civilized than the ‘Proto-Malays’.   
These conceptualizations support common-sense notions that the Orang Asli are more 
‘backward’ or ‘primitive’ than other groups in the Peninsula, and that much about their culture and 
civilization can be explained by focusing on their racial origins.    
 
Descriptions about the Orang Asli often refer to their socio-economic position vis-à-vis other 
ethnic groups.  It is pointed out that majority of Orang Asli live below ‘the poverty line’, a point 
presented factually and often deployed ideologically9.  Their ‘poverty’, their ‘lack’, brings attention 
to Orang Asli communities and legitimization for the actions of others – including the State, civil 
society actors, corporate organisations, social service groups, and missionaries of various faiths – 
to act upon them, and for them.  In other words, “they are poor”, “they need help”, “they need to 
change”, are ways in which action on/for Orang Asli communities is justified.   
 
                                                 
8 ‘Semais’ in Perak, for example, think of the northern Peninsular groups as being ‘Orang Asli’, people strangely different 
(‘little negroes’ as a group of young Semai people said to me, not without some humour) but yet still ‘one of them’.   
9 I do not dismiss the social realities of poverty – such as malnutrition or economic disempowerment – but it is necessary 
to interrogate the ways in which the label ‘poverty’ is conceptualized, utilized, and deployed, particularly by other groups 
acting on – and for – the Orang Asli.   
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 Shifting Forms of ‘The Orang Asli’ 
[The Orang Asli are] a Malaysian community that is still backward in all areas (segala 
bidang) and who have their own cultural patterns.  
“Social Change among the Orang Asli” 
(“Perubahan social dalam masyarakat Orang Asli”)  
Berita Harian, 20th June 1985 
 
Stereotypes tend to homogenize all Orang Asli, producing normalized ‘ways of seeing’ (Scott, 
1998).  Orang Asli have been identified, sometimes in a derogatory manner, as being ‘aborigines’ 
and ‘sakai’ (Dentan, 1997).  They have been portrayed as ‘minority groups’ needing protection 
from cultural assimilation; as ‘indigenous people’ deserving of respect by virtue of being ‘original 
inhabitants’ of the land; or as ‘under-developed’ communities needing encouragement to ‘get with 
the programme’ (literally!).  They are sometimes represented as ‘jungle experts’, having innate 
understanding about the management of eco-systems.  Others see them as having romanticized, 
spiritual connections to land, peoples who are inherently ‘one with nature’, and for whom 
therefore, participation in eco-tourism is a logical rational business alternative.  Orang Asli 
communities have also been positioned as a “tourism product”, their ‘traditional’ way of life viewed 
as a potential “cultural attraction” (e.g. see Khairil et al, 1998:25). 
 
The Orang Asli have been – and are still – seen by some as backward, racially inferior, ‘dirty’, 
lazy, and ‘pagan’10.  They have also been conceptualised, not necessarily in intentionally 
nefarious ways, as in need of ‘protection’, ‘assistance’, and ‘enlightenment’.    They are valorised 
by some as being the ‘true’ bumiputera (literally ‘sons of the soil’), and yet they are also seen by 
many as not quite living up to the modern ‘indigenous’ Malay-Muslim ideal.  They struggle with 
hegemonic ideas that cast them as ‘weak’ and ‘helpless’, thus needing Federal administration in 
                                                 
10 This sometimes presented in an inverted, indirect form, for example, by saying that they are “increasing rational from a 
psychogynist [sic] perspective (di segi psykogonis), as a result of their engagements with people who are more culturally 
advanced” (“Ruangan Rabu”, Berita Harian, 26.06.85), that “most of them do not yet embrace a religion (masih belum 
menganut sebarang pegangan agama)… hence… efforts by authorities to bring them closer to the Islamic religion that is 
pure (suci)” (“Kebajikan Pasukan Senoi Praaq diutamakan”, Utusan Malaysia, 23.08.84), or highlighting that “[their] taboos 
that restrict development have long been thrown away” (“Pantang larang yang menyekat pembangunan sudah lama 
dibuang”, Berita Harian, 28.08.84).   
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 order to ‘survive’ the ‘onslaught’ of a fast changing world.  And while they have different ways of 
viewing themselves – simultaneously as Orang Asli and as members of their own ethnic and 
cultural groups – they grapple with homogenizing State definitions.   
 
Currently, Orang Asli identity pre-exists the individual.  From the event of their State recorded 
existence, that is, their official ‘birth’ on identity-fixing documents, individuals are noted as being 
of ‘Orang Asli’ descent.  This is repeated on certificates, census registers, identity cards, and 
various other administrative records that guide and sustain the use of this identity within the 
modern nation-state.  Within Malaysia, this identity has become a taken-for-granted indispensable 
label, used to refer to a range of peoples who can only exit from this category by ascription into 
another socio-political identity11. 
 
Taken as common sense, Orang Asli identity remains powerful, emotive, significant, relevant, and 
necessary.  Indeed, as I will emphasize in subsequent chapters, political, legal, social and 
personal decisions based on such social ideas have substantial material and psychological 
effects for the peoples to whom this ‘sign’ refers.  Unproblematized, commonsensical social ideas 
concerning the Orang Asli become the basis on which discriminating (and discriminatory) 
decisions are rendered unquestionable, for they are intimately entwined with the fixed ‘factual’ 
existence of the Orang Asli in the Malaysian social landscape.  The task I undertake in this thesis 
is to deconstruct this identity in contemporary Malaysia, and to trace the structures, processes 
and ideologies that contribute to producing meanings about the Orang Asli.  In doing so, I raise 
how fundamental notions such as ‘culture’, ‘race/ethnicity’ and ‘indigeneity’ are wielded powerfully 
in everyday practices in postcolonial Malaysia.   
 
Theorising Identity:  Contingency, Multiplicity, and Non-Essentialism 
Critiques of early Marxist discourses remind us that identities are produced through 
systematically formed bodies of ideas, or ideologies.  Through such belief systems, people are 
                                                 
11 In relation to this, ‘Malay’ is a legally and socially permissible, if not always desirable, option, a matter I discuss in 
subsequent chapters.   
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 placed in ‘foundational categories’ (Prakash, 1990) constituted in relation to other ‘groups’.  In 
examining the link between ideology and identity, Althusser (1971) pointed out the importance of 
the link between relationship and recognition; individuals discover themselves within their identity, 
by being recognized as such.  Through these identities, individuals conceptualise what is 
possible, acceptable and desireable12, which renders them subject to disciplinary mechanisms.   
 
The process of discovery, of finding out how one is constituted within a socially-constructed 
category, as Stephen Cornell (2000) notes, is part of the process of identity formation in the 
modern nation-state.  ‘Pan-ethnic’ identities, in particular, often emerge through modernist 
undertakings to classify individuals systematically, projects which tend to be executed by more-
powerful others for administrative reasons.  Cornell reiterates that identity formation is not a 
singular process and thus often results in inconsistencies, contradictions and slippages.  
Nevertheless, this is a matter of which social actors are oblivious.  The ‘discovery’ that takes 
place often occurs in very subtle ways, such that ideas concerning identity emerge quite 
frequently as essential, a-historical, and de-contextualised truths, with the ‘work’ of such 
construction effaced.  The identities most socially and political powerful are those whose 
meanings become ‘fixed’ and internalized by the people encapsulated within the categories 
themselves, for this demobilizes those who are well placed to be cognizant of the simplifications 
of these types of social ideas.   
 
Feminist writers have long argued the necessity to guard against various forms of essentialism.  
Not only are we cautioned not to presume that the essence of a subject, or any identity, can be 
reached, we are to be critical of the assumption that those who comprise the subjects of whom 
we speak all share the same experience, ideas, feelings, essentially located by ascription into a 
social identity.  bell hooks, for example, in speaking about black identity, points out the 
importance of providing space for alternative understandings, conceptualizations, and critiques, of 
                                                 
12 However, critics of Althusser point out the significance of agency and negotiation in the everyday practices of identity-
making, a matter I return to later on when discussing Bourdieu’s ideas. 
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 ‘the black experience’.  She argues that individuals should be given the freedom to be who they 
are within the identity of ‘blackness’, emphasizing that it is necessary to, 
critique essentialism while emphasizing the significance of ‘the authority of experience’.  
There is a radical difference between a repudiation of the idea that there is a black ‘essence’ 
and recognition of the way black identity has been specifically constituted in the experience of 
exile and struggle (2001:133). 
Thus, she argues for the treatment of experience without essentialism, and identity without 
homogenization. 
 
Realists or empiricists may claim that deconstructive work reveals that a particular cultural identity 
is ‘false’, an ‘invention’, or a ‘dishonest unity’ (to borrow the words of Jeremy Waldron (2000) who 
addresses their criticisms).  This assessment reveals their underlying philosophical assumption 
that ‘Real’ cultural identities exist, and that by default, they exist in essential, stable, and coherent 
forms.  It is thus necessary to point out that all cultural identities are similarly emergent and 
located in socio-historical processes, and upon which such discursive construction may thus be 
performed.  I treat Orang Asli identity as thus being no different than all other identities, whether 
established on the basis of ethnicity, race, sexuality, gender or class.   
 
Again, it is important to emphasize that the act of deconstruction does not ‘negate’ the identity, 
causing it to disappear or lose its everyday meaningfulness.  In relation to the indispensability of 
identity in the Malaysian and international context, the words of Stuart Hall (1996) are instructive.  
As he observes, the deconstructive, anti-essentialist critique of identity leaves us not with 
‘nothingness’, but with “idea[s] which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain 
key questions cannot be thought at all” (p.2, my emphasis)13.  Orang Asli identity has become 
                                                 
13 As Modood (2000) comments concerning Wittgenstein (1967)’s treatment of language – an observation I hold relevant 
here – “(t)he key point is that that one [does] not need an idea of essence in order to believe that some ways of thinking 
and acting [have] a coherence, and so the undermining of the ideas of essence [do] not necessarily damage the 
assumption of coherence…”.   
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 ‘essential’ in negotiating the socio-political landscape of Malaysia, and ‘essentialised’ in order to 
deal with ambiguities, as well as to legitimize claims and practices14. 
 
Structuring Discourse and Practice:  Fields, Authorities, Capital 
In order to study discourses, practices, and perceptions in a meaningful manner, it is important to 
consider how they are systematically structured – a matter Pierre Bourdieu theorized through his 
idea of fields (champ) and habitus.  He describes fields as ‘microcosms of social spaces’ – such 
as academia, art, science, religion, politics, law and economy – that impose requirements, rules, 
regularities and forms of authority which guide and constrain the production of discourses, 
practices and representations (Bourdieu, 1995).  Structures in the social world are ‘objective’ in 
that they exist independently of the consciousness and will of individual actors.  Those who intend 
to ‘succeed’ in these fields need to ‘play the game’ right – that is, to operate within the ‘general 
laws’ of the field.   
 
Bourdieu points out that each field is defined in specific ways.  Firstly, each field has its own 
stakes and interests, agents endowed with the habitus prepared to ‘play the game’, and various 
‘species’ of capital that are distributed in specific ways, over which struggles are waged (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992).  These struggles, Bourdieu explains, are about the “monopoly of the 
legitimate violence (specific authority) which is characteristic of the field in question” (1977:73).  
Those who have authority are inclined to conservation strategies, while those least endowed with 
capital tend to take on subversive strategies.  Contests do not merely focus around competing 
value systems, but agents resist and contend with the introduction of heteronymous standards of 
evaluation.   
 
                                                 
14 However, because there remains some ‘play’ (within limits) in the meanings associated with Orang Asli identity, it is 
possible for power to work in different ways, and therefore for resistance to these representations to be mounted through 
sometimes necessarily contradictory ways.  As I point out in Nah (2003), the social construction of Orang Asli identity 
occurs sometimes as an unintended effect of constructing other groups, such as the Malays, which can create 
unexpected binds for the latter, with concomitant ‘rebound’ effects on the way the Orang Asli are managed in postcolonial 
Malaysia. 
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 Likening this to a game, Bourdieu (1977:74) emphasizes that all agents uphold the legitimacy and 
existence of the field.  “Those who take part in the struggle help to reproduce the game by 
helping – more or less completely, depending on the field – to produce belief in the value of the 
stakes”.  According to Bourdieu, individuals are not on an level playing ground; different 
resources are available to actors, which affect their positioning within the field in question.  This 
‘capital’ he conceptualizes in four main forms – economic, cultural, social and symbolic – which 
contribute to identifying and placing individuals within social existences defined by difference, 
implicitly legitimizing hierarchies and inequalities.   
 
Rejecting the simplistic objectivism vs. subjectivism duality therefore, Bourdieu proposes that 
meaning is negotiated through unconscious cognitive and motivating structures developed 
through exposure to social conditions and conditionings.  This collectively, socially shared yet 
internalized framework he calls habitus, “the system of structured, structuring dispositions” 
(Bourdieu, 1990:53) which function as the principles of constructing objects of knowledge, that 
both generate and organize practices/ representations.  This system is “constituted in practice 
and is always oriented towards practical functions” (p.52).  That is, habitus is both structured, and 
has the capacity to structure practices, which in turn reproduces mental structures.  It involves the 
internalization of external constraints and possibilities, is shared by people with similar 
experiences, and is malleable within limits set by earlier experience.  Bourdieu’s habitus does not 
presuppose a conscious aiming at ends, or mastery of the operations necessary to attain them, 
but similar to Foucault’s idea of governing power, “can be collectively orchestrated without being 
the product of the organizing action of a conductor” (p.53).  Therefore, the ‘practical world’ is 
constituted in reference to the habitus, “a world of already realized ends – procedures to follow, 
paths to take” (p.54). 
 
In parallel to the oft-repeated individual-society dialectic therefore, Bourdieu proposes a 
relationship between habitus and field, the former informing actions ‘from within’, the external 
latter constructing possibilities and constraints with associated costs, profits and effects.  He 
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 argues that this relationship – between ‘mental structures’ and ‘social structures’ – need to be 
excavated in order to understand any social phenomena.  Congruencies between habitus and 
field lead to the reproduction of social phenomena, while discordances lead to crisis, innovation, 
and change. 
 
In this thesis, I borrow Bourdieu’s ideas concerning ‘microcosms of social spaces’, and set out in 
chapters 2 to 5 to address each field that I identify as being powerful in inscribing the ‘rules’ 
through which Orang Asli identity is constituted and transformed.  Thus, I focus upon four fields – 
politics, government/ administration, the law, and civil society – although others (such as 
academia, religion, literature and the ‘marketplace’) may be similarly addressed in a longer thesis.  
Bourdieu’s formulations of fields are complex, and can be used as analytical frames to address a 
number of issues.  This thesis, however, is specifically interested in the discursive acts and 
signifying practices that contribute towards (re)constructing Orang Asli identity, and, 
simultaneously, its position within the rationale of the nation-state.  In these fields, my main focus 
is on social change over time, and how these implicate the (re)constitution of the Orang Asli 
within the nation-state.  However, the issue of authority becomes salient as we look at these 
developments – authority that imbues actors and texts particular power in shaping ideas 
concerning the Orang Asli.  By focusing on four different fields at once, I also hope to show that 
there is both synchrony and dissonance between these specialized spheres, that the productive 
and regulatory forces in each field do not operate in isolation or with complete autonomy but are 
inter-related with that of other fields.  Synchronization of discourses and practices in these 
different fields reinforce the immutability of social ideas concerning whom the Orang Aslis are, 
and who they should be.  Challenges to these prevailing ideas have been and can be mounted, 
albeit with great difficulty.  A struggle over “the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social 
world” (Bourdieu, 2005:36) continues for the Orang Asli.  Before I proceed to discuss the 
structure of the rest of this thesis, I review methodological and writing considerations for this text. 
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 Fieldwork 
This thesis is a culmination of fieldwork and investigation that took me into different parts of the 
Peninsula over a one-year period.  ‘Pre-fieldwork’ – in which I first investigated initial questions 
concerning Orang Asli identity, spoke to key spokespeople on Orang Asli issues, and made first 
visits to Orang Asli kampungs – took place between August and December 2002.  This was 
followed by another five months from the end of April to July 2003, in which more systematic data 
collection was undertaken.  During these two periods, I took short trips to different locations in 
Pahang, Johor, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Kelantan and Selangor, in order to visit ‘Jakun’, 
‘Semelai’, ‘Temuan’, ‘Semai’, ‘Temiar’, ‘Orang Laut’ and ‘Mah Meri’ villages15.  The purpose of 
these trips was to establish context and to observe everyday realities.  Entrance into these places 
was not easy, and made possible only with the ‘sponsorship’ of gatekeepers who already had 
relationships with villagers in these locations. 
 
During this period, I also conducted extensive interviews with Orang Asli individuals and actors 
involved in Orang Asli matters.  These included spokespeople such as current- and ex-POASM 
(Peninsular Malaysia Orang Asli Association) leaders, members of the Orang Asli Graduates 
Club (KSOA), civil society actors, community development workers, lawyers, ‘missionaries’, and 
researchers.  In addition, as discourse analysis was an important method I had planned to utilize, 
I scoured archives and libraries in Kuala Lumpur, Selangor and Singapore, in order to obtain 
government documents, policy statements, administrative plans, text of speeches, 
correspondence and other historical material. 
 
Writing Considerations 
It is an impossible task to distil multiple social realities into one single text.  Attempts to do so 
inevitably create silences and simplification of unresolved matters.  By creating this particular text, 
the sequencing of ideas and events lie in my hands, as does the choice of what material to 
                                                 
15 I was, unfortunately, unable to meet with the more northern groups due to time constraints.     
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 include, whose opinions count, and how differing accounts are woven together to form some sort 
of coherent fabric.   
 
In this project, I have tried to be conscious of the ideological and problematic ways in which 
signifiers that point to identity are deployed.  Often, in writings concerning Orang Asli ‘ethnic 
groups’ – such as ‘Semai’, ‘Temuan’, or ‘Semelai’ – the people written about are taken as 
representatives of all the Orang Asli.  That is, they become a synecdoche of the Orang Asli 
whole, and vice versa.  This has already been demonstrated in many texts, and is a pothole that 
is difficult to avoid.  Certain phrases – such as “the Orang Asli (are/ believe…)”, “the Semai child 
(is)”, or “the Semelai (see themselves as)” – create a sense of homogeneity, and can be 
interpreted as essentialist statements about the peoples discussed.  Talking about a group of 
people in this fashion, was, for a time, accepted practice in anthropological writings, but has come 
under critique, for example by Geoffrey Benjamin (2002).  Using such phrases elides the social 
reality that many who are identified with – and identify themselves as – members of the same 
identity may disagree or have consciously ‘moved away’ from the position being articulated.  In 
this thesis, I have constantly tried to avoid such potential ‘epistemic violence’.  However, 
pluralizing the term Orang Asli is not an easy feat, and I would like to signal that when I have 
used the phrase “the Orang Asli” without qualification, it has been in a literal translation of “the 
aborigines”, which is inherently, in my mind, a plural concept. 
 
Writing processes, particularly ones that trace historical change, are problematic in various ways.  
Firstly, they tend to streamline events into coherent sequences, suggesting an over-inflated 
sense of logic to historical moments.  This tends to efface the time and anxiety actors spend 
unsure of their own actions, their inability to forecast the consequences of their decisions, and 
their unknowing reproduction of hegemonic social ideas.  This creates the conditions under which 
intention may be invalidly attributed to social practices.   
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 Secondly, actions, behaviours, thoughts, speech, and conversations, often contain slippages that 
do not fall nicely into grammatical sentences, although it is necessary for me to construct these 
narratives as such.  This inevitably happens despite all attempts to account for contradictions – 
within people, within communities, across documents, and between conversations with the same 
informants16.  Thirdly, there is some privileging of voices/ opinions – not only those which have 
become dominant historical accounts, but those ‘dominant-from-the-margins’– in particular, the 
same spokespeople of the Orang Asli who are repeatedly offered space to articulate their 
thoughts and concerns17. 
  
In addition, I acknowledge my fallibility as a human listener.  As social actors, we tend to hear 
selectively, despite our best intentions to being ‘recorders’ of what we see.  Our memories of 
encounters are also mediated – a matter that psychologists in particular have recognized for 
decades – and although I have written notebooks full of observations and interview data over the 
past months of research, there will be some unintended slippages and unconscious 
interpretations that I introduce.  Last but not least, the greatest challenge has been to select and 
edit the material I have in order to comply with the word limits set for a Masters thesis.  This has 
required me to refrain from pursuing many arguments and from including much more research 
data that would have made this thesis more insightful. 
 
Forthcoming Chapters 
The next four chapters trace developments in four fields – politics, administration, the law, and 
civil society.  In Chapter 2, which is organized historically, I examine the political field, reviewing 
how political control coalesced over the geographical terrain of the Peninsula.  I emphasize that 
British colonial policy mutually strengthened the power of British traders/ administrators and local 
                                                 
16 In trying to track down certain events, I found that single actors had different accounts of the same moment, and that 
these interpretations varied across their contexts of articulation.  This is unsurprising in itself, but creates the dilemma of 
choice – which opinion should I include if he/she speaks in different ways about the same matter?  These are important 
contradictions I am unable to express in this short thesis. 
17 Certain individuals I interviewed had already been interviewed many times over, and were, as I surmise, adept at 
producing certain types of narratives about the Orang Asli (particularly in relation to describing food taboos and rituals, or 
concerning the contemporary ‘problems’ faced by the Orang Asli), while appearing unsure about how to handle other less 
conventionally anthropological questions.   
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 Malay chiefs/ sultans, leaving certain geographically-specific communities and their leadership 
structures out of significant economic and political negotiations.  Structural (administrative, 
political and legal) as well as ideological British mechanisms of power were carried on into the 
present nation-state.  These shifts of power, I argue, tended to re-inscribe rather than displace 
the ‘rules’ by which the British Empire regulated its colonies, particularly with regard to the 
management of minority groups18.  ‘Indigenous’ identity has been a powerful argument for special 
privileges, taking most concrete form in bumiputera discourses over the past four decades.  This 
has created tensions between the majority, politically dominant Malays, and the minority, 
geographically scattered and politically disempowered Orang Asli, which has required 
accommodation, negotiation, and identity repositioning.   
 
In Chapter 3, also organized historically, I look at the administrative field – the ways in which 
government agencies at federal and state levels have articulated and grappled with Orang Asli 
identity.  I note how the exposure of different groups of people to the same administrative 
policies, rhetoric and developmentalist discourses has created social proximity and a shared 
sense of ‘otherness’ among those categorized as Orang Asli.  In the postcolonial state, 
administrative information – in the form of maps, statistics and measurements – has been used to 
bring the Orang Asli into comparison with other Malaysian citizens.  Such data carry a plethora of 
ideological notions – of distinct race/ethnicity, of comparability, of bounded membership, of total 
representation, and of their lack of ‘civilization’ and ‘progress’ – which are premised on modernist 
indicators.  This continues to legitimize efforts to foster their transformation into modern 
bumiputera subjects, so that they may take their ‘appropriate place’ in a ‘fully-developed’ 
Malaysia.   
 
In Chapter 4, I outline the legal field.  I first point out that the legal framework in Malaysia requires 
that identities be established before laws are interpreted as being relevant.  I point out that Orang 
                                                 
18 Nevertheless, subversions of these power-relations do occur, and the Orang Asli can be particularly threatening to the 
postcolonial Malay ‘Self’, as legitimizations of power waged by the latter construct their indigeneity as an unchallengeable 
argument for political and economic benefits (Nah, 2003). 
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 Asli individuals have been given special exemptions and rights in the modern nation-state, 
although these do not parallel those afforded to the ‘Malays’ or to the ‘natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak’.  This distinction creates space for the protection of ethnically-distributed ‘special 
privileges’, and becomes an incentive for individuals to assert Orang Asli identity.  More recently, 
specific court judgments have ruled in favour of Orang Asli interests, which demonstrate that 
individuals have found refuge in certain legislation precisely because of this socially constructed 
identity.  The Malaysian legal system also operates quite differently on Muslims and non-Muslims.  
As such, Muslim Orang Asli are subject to a different set of legal rights, an operation of judicial 
power that reifies differences between Muslim Orang Asli and non-Muslim Orang Asli.   
 
In Chapter 5, concerned with ‘civil society’, I examine some of the actions, initiatives and 
challenges faced by individuals who organize together either to work on Orang Asli issues or to 
work with Orang Asli communities.  I discuss two main types of voluntary associations, classified 
loosely according to their primary aims: firstly, groups that are more directly concerned with the 
civil, political and legal rights of the Orang Asli; and secondly, those whose chief aim is 
evangelistic/ proselytization activities among the Orang Asli19.  I discuss, in particular, the ways in 
which these activities are both constrained by, and actively (re)construct, socio-political 
conceptions of Orang Asli identity. The most significant development in recent years has been the 
rise of the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ in international discourses and I examine how these 
have been utilized in order to strengthen arguments for Orang Asli rights in the Malaysian 
context.   
 
In Chapter 6, I move away from the analysis of social structures to focus on the socio-
psychological accounts of ‘being’ Orang Asli.  I look at the narratives that Orang Asli individuals 
produce about their own identity, paying attention to their personal meanings of identity.  I 
examine how discourses and practices (outlined in previous chapters) have influenced the ways 
in which Orang Asli individuals realize and think of themselves, which involves the simultaneous 
                                                 
19 Research was done about civil society groups that focus on socio-economic development, but word constraints do not 
permit me to elaborate on this.  
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 embracing, resistance, and negotiation of these identity scripts.  I highlight key themes that 
emerged through interviews conducted with Orang Asli individuals: dealing with stereotypes that 
emerged when their Orang Asli identity is revealed to others; challenging mainstream ideas that 
cast them in specific ways; managing their body-coded identities; their views on the social, 
economic, and political problems facing the Orang Asli; and, finally, their experience of being 
administered, tracked, and managed by a federal agency in ways they realize no other category 
of Malaysians are.  It is in this chapter that I draw upon Bourdieu’s idea of habitus, examining how 
‘mental structures’ are formed in relation to ‘social structures’.   
 
In a final chapter, I outline the implications that developments in the four fields have for 
contemporary Orang Asli, and discuss the main issues they face as they negotiating Orang Asli 
identity in postcolonial Malaysia.  
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 CHAPTER 2:  IDENTITY POLITICS IN A MULTICULTURAL LANDSCAPE 
Contests for power in the Peninsula over the past century have shaped the way the Orang Asli 
presently negotiate their socio-political position in Malaysia.  In this chapter, I begin a discussion 
of the political field by reviewing early Malay-aboriginal relations as well as the spread of British 
colonial influence in the 18th and 19th century.  I discuss how British negotiations established the 
sovereignty of Malays, casting them as being ‘the’ indigenous people of the Peninsula.  Their 
interventions also contributed to the creation and imagination of a ‘race-d Peninsula’, which would 
indelibly influence negotiations of power in the postcolonial nation.   
 
In a second section, I examine British-led reformulation of political arrangements during the 20th 
century, which resulted in the sewing together of local patterns of rule into a Peninsula-wide 
entity.  I focus on how these negotiations, after some contestation, privileged the Malays yet 
again, and reified officially their claims to being the key indigenous people of the land.  In the 
formation of Independent Malaya, this was deployed in political negotiations, resulting in the 
Constitutional recognition of the ‘special position’ of the Malays in the nascent nation-state.  The 
‘aborigines’ were not granted such recognition.  It was only in the Emergency Period (1948-1960) 
that special attention was given to the previously-ignored ‘aborigines’ of the Peninsula.  However, 
such consideration was driven by tactical necessity to gain control over jungle areas – the terrain 
most familiar to aboriginal groups – rather than a desire to keep them politically included.  When 
Malaya joined with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore in 1963, the ‘special position’ reserved for the 
Malays was extended to the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, while the ‘aborigines’ were again, 
ignored. 
 
In a final section, after introducing Mahathir-ist nation-building goals of ‘Vision 2020’ and his 
purported intention of promoting civic nationalism in the form of Bangsa Malaysia, I look at how 
the Orang Asli have been reconstituted in current coalition politics.  I end with some discussion 
about how Orang Asli leaders have navigated the (disproportionate) electoral system and how 
some of their leaders imagine their future political involvements in ‘multicultural’ Malaysia.  
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Imperial Rule 
What must be remembered very clearly, despite the rough title ‘colony’ traditionally 
applied to Malaya, is that it was not as colonial conquerors that the British came to the 
country…. British rule was always based upon agreement with the sultans, the traditional 
and spiritual leaders of the Malays…. Because the British administrators appeared to pay 
heed to the sultans, the Malays became accustomed to a certain aura of privilege… it 
was still their country…. 
Barker (1969:247, my emphasis) 
 
British colonial policy in the 18th and 19th centuries dictated that colonies be established through 
negotiations with ‘native’ people.  By way of the Treaty of London in 1824 with the Dutch, the 
Peninsula was demarcated as being in the sphere of influence of the British alone, which allowed 
them greater autonomy in the way they exercised control in these territories (see Andaya and 
Andaya, 1982).  At the time of the acquisition of Penang in 1786, there were several sultanates 
on the Peninsula.  These polities, which sometimes comprised only a few thousand people, were 
led by a raja who had authority over certain subjects (Milner, 2002).  As Milner notes, there was 
no “supreme Malay sultanate” over the whole Peninsula (p.14), although the polities of Johor, 
Perak and Pahang were, in different ways, linked to the earlier Malaccan sultanate.  Through a 
series of engagements with authority figures, the British extended their influence across the 
whole Peninsula.  In 1826, Penang, Malacca and Singapore were declared a Crown Colony (the 
‘Straits Settlements’) and came under direct British administration.  Almost fifty years later, in 
1873, the first British Resident was ‘invited’ by a Malay Sultan in Perak to provide ‘advice’ 
concerning all general administration in his State, on the condition that his sovereignty as ruler 
was acknowledged, and autonomy maintained in matters concerning Malay customs and religion.   
 
Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were jointly administered after the Federation 
Agreement of 1895.  Over time, many of the powers held by the Malay rulers, British Residents 
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 and State Councils were gradually transferred to a central authority.  In this process, and with the 
introduction of British law and order, the absolute powers possessed by the Rulers under the 
feudal structure were held in check (Soenarno, 1966).  This more unified and direct control was 
seen as efficacious to colonial authorities in the light of economic downturns and developments at 
the turn of the century.  In 1909, the establishment of a Federal Council resulted in official transfer 
of powers from State to Federal Government.   
 
Further reforms introduced in 1927 meant that the Rulers no longer retained control over general 
policy and finance.  During this time, the numbers of immigrant groups increased significantly, 
and eventually Chinese, European and Indian ‘unofficial members’ were added to State Councils, 
to sit with Malay and British members, in order to broaden representation across the ‘races’ 
(Malayan Union, 1946).  This was, at least rhetorically, not aimed at undermining the sovereignty 
of Malay Rulers, although this was a repeated complaint voiced by some Malay subjects.  As 
High Commissioner Sir Hugh Clifford stressed to the Federal Council in the same year, the States 
were, and were to remain, Malayo-Muslim monarchies (Emerson, 1937 cited in de Vere Allen, 
1970, my emphasis).   
 
A different genealogy applied to what was later known as the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) – 
Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, and Johor – where significant Malay populations were to be 
found.  Advisors were duly appointed to each State between 1910 and 1923.  In these territories, 
State Governments held executive powers, with the participation of a substantial number of Malay 
officials under a Chief Minister (Mentri Besar).  British influence was substantially more limited, 
and the Governments of these States were “set out instinctively to preserve, as far as they could, 
the Malay way of life and the considerable degree of self-government which they had” (Malayan 
Union, 1946:4).  These Rulers consistently refused proposals for a Peninsula-wide union, seeing 
the management of the Federated States as having disregarded Malay interests.  This cohesion 
was not to happen until the British regained control of the Peninsula after World War II.  
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 While the Malay polities were the primary entities with which the British Empire held negotiations, 
it is important to note that these centres of influence were not established without the earlier 
support of tribal communities.  Tomé Pires, a Portuguese administrator writing between 1512 and 
1515, noted that certain communities such as the Celates, otherwise known as the Orang Selat – 
a fighting force to be reckoned with – contributed to the establishment of the royal houses of 
Malacca and Johor-Riau (Cortesaõ, 1944; also see Andaya, 1975).  Key positions in political 
hierarchies of Malay polities had also been held by people of tribal communities (Lewis, 1960, 
Newbold, 1971), including the historic Hang Tuah (Juli, 1990).  Some writers argue that early 
Malay polities were, in fact, legitimized by ancestors of the Orang Asli (e.g. Nicholas, 2000), 
although this type of influence waned over the course of time. 
 
In terms of economic contribution to the polities, the trade of the “strange and the precious” (Jacq-
Hergoualc’h, 2002:64) from the jungles depended in large part on the labour of tribal peoples 
(Dunn, 1975; Wheatley, 1961).  This ranged from rare and scented woods, rattan, gums, resins, 
wild rubber (jelutong) and camphor, to ivory, rhinoceros horns, decorative birds, tortoise and 
cowrie shells, monkeys and elephants (Wheatley, 1959).  These extractions were often 
exchanged with Malay or Chinese middlemen before being sent to entrepots, such as Malacca 
and Penang.   
 
In addition, the tribal communities were often labourers for local chiefs and European 
entrepreneurs.  Thompson (1875), for example, records that the Jacoons [Jakun] were used by 
the Temenggong of Johore to cut wood and clear routes, while Leech (1879) comments that the 
“Sakeis are the coolies here [in Slim and Bernam, Perak], in fact they take the place of elephants 
further North as beasts of burden” (p.41).  Slavery, too, was a means by which the aboriginal 
groups contributed to the establishment of Malay polities.  Newbold records in 1839 that 
“slavery… is invariably their condition” (1971, vol. II:106), and McNair, about forty years later, 
noted that “Sakais, or Jacoons are literally hunted down, captured, sold and made slaves” (1878, 
p. 193).  Iskander Carey noted that initial contacts between the Malays and aboriginal groups 
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 were “characterized by cruelty and mutual hostility”, the latter “often hunted and captured as 
slaves, to be sold to the ruling sultan as curiosities, in the same spirit as some people nowadays 
keep wild animals as pets.” (Carey, 1976b:53; also see Endicott, 1983 and Dodge, 1981).  The 
labour of aborigines, free and enslaved, contributed to the daily operations of the Malay kingdoms 
of old. 
 
A sense of difference was retained between settled, coastal communities of Malay-Muslims and 
groups of people living further inland, which has carried on into the present.  Writers such as 
Newbold (1971) and Favre (1848), observed that mid-19th century Malays on the Peninsula held 
themselves as being different from surrounding tribal communities, whom they collectively termed 
Orang Binua.  Both Europeans and Malays tended to view these groups as being relatively more 
‘primitive’ and ‘uncivilised’. “This was an age when small and supposedly savage minority groups 
were not regarded as human…” comments Carey (1976b:53).  He further suggested that 
“[historical enslavement] explain the… aborigines’ remarkable refusal, in view of their wide-
spread knowledge of Malay customs and language, to assimilate into the majority community” 
(p.53).  In summary, the relations between Malay communities and tribal societies have 
geographically and historically been quite varied, ranging from trading relationships, political 
incorporation, and military alliances, to slavery, cheating and exploitation (Couillard, 1984; Leary, 
1994).   
 
The Race-d Peninsula: The Rise of Bangsa Melayu and Other Races 
…the politics of ethnicity have their roots in modern times, not ancient history, and their 
shape has been largely determined by colonial policy. 
Anderson (1987:9-10) 
 
Milner (2002) argues that while Europeans were of the impression that the subjects of the main 
polities on the Peninsula constituted ‘Malays’ and were part of a large single community, many 
‘Malay’ individuals did not see themselves as members of a common ‘race’, even though they 
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 would describe themselves as being subjects of a ruler20.   However, the idea of ‘Malay’ being a 
bounded ethnic category – having unique origins, genealogy and language, and spanning land 
masses across the Archipelago – took predominance in European imaginings.  Reid (2001) 
suggests that Stamford Raffles was a key figure in projecting the idea of the unified ‘Malay’ race 
or nation, communicating this ‘scientific classification’ to both Europeans and Malays in his 
renaming of a classic Malay text as Sejarah Melayu (or ‘Malay Annals’), thus showing it to be a 
“story of a people” (p. 303).  Milner (2002) credits Munshi Abdullah (1797-1854) as being 
influential in shaping the way Malay intellectuals conceptualized their own bangsa.  In Hikayat 
Dunia, likely to have been authored by this respected teacher, a panoramic view was taken of the 
regions around the Peninsula21.  In this account, Milner points out, Malays were set out as being 
different from other races in the same geographical landscape, such as the Jakun of the 
Peninsula, the Rejang and Batak of Sumatra, and the Dayaks of Borneo.   
 
From 1870 to 1930, there was a sharp influx of economic immigrants, particularly in the 
Federated Malay States, sponsored by British colonial authorities and drawn primarily from India 
and China (Anderson, 1987).  This led to growing unease among ‘local’ communities.  Among the 
‘Malays’ who were culturally, linguistically and physically distinct from the fast-growing immigrant 
communities, new senses of ‘Self’ as being ethnically/racially different developed, mediated 
through a rise in printed materials such as Utusan Melayu (Milner, 2002).  As Milner states, Malay 
intellectuals began to talk about themselves as ‘a Malay race’ (bangsa), rather than as subjects of 
individual sultanates or as members of a wider Islamic community.  The ‘Chinese’ groups – who 
were economically successful in a number of industries – were seen as a ‘danger’ to them.  It was 
felt that the Malay bangsa had to unite together, across the geo-political boundaries of nation-
states, to defend their position in ‘their land’.  As a writer expressed in Pelita Malaya, the official 
publication of the Malay Nationalist Party (Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya, PKMM), using an 
analogy worthy of note, 
                                                 
20 For reviews of pre-colonial conceptions of Malay (Melayu) identity, see Milner (2002, 1982) and Reid (2001). 
21 Munshi Abdullah also served as an assistant to Raffles.  This relationship is likely to have contributed to his intellectual 
conceptualizations of ‘race’ and ‘place’. 
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 …if Malaya is not united with Indonesia in the future, then political and economic power 
will fall to the hands of foreigners (bangsa asing) and with this fall of political power, the 
Malays in Malaya will become left out in their own land (melukut di tepi gantung di tanah 
airnya sendiri), just like the fate of the Red Indians [sic] in the United States (Pelita 
Malaya, 31.03.1946, my translation). 
 
The ‘Aborigines’:  Differentiating the Marginal Native-Other 
In the racial language employed by administrators, scholars and travellers, the term ‘aborigines’ 
gained currency as signifier employed to refer to the ‘pagan races’ or ‘wild tribes’.  Interrogating 
the use of this signifier raises interesting questions, a matter brought up by Iskander Carey 
(1976b).  Pointing out that tribes in Thailand and Borneo are not called ‘aborigines’, he writes, 
Perhaps the clue to this problem lies in the fact that in this part of the world, the word 
‘aborigines’ is applied only to the Orang Asli of Malaysia and to the aboriginal population 
of Australia.  In both cases, we find a situation where the ‘aborigines’ do not only form a 
very small proportion of the total population, but they are also economically and socially 
backward when compared to the other races.  It is surely significant that in Australian 
New Guinea, the Papuans are not called aborigines, although they are racially similar to 
the aboriginal populations in Australia.  The reason for this difference in usage is due, 
undoubtedly, to the fact that in New Guinea the natives form the vast majority of the 
population, whereas in Australia, they constitute only a very small minority.  For similar 
reasons, the Borneo tribes are called ‘natives’, but never ‘aborigines’; there also, the 
mountain tribes make up a majority of the total population. (p.5) 
 
His comments point to a possible important ideological distinction between Malays and 
‘aborigines’, which, while seemingly arbitrary and interchangeable, may signal specific ways in 
which ‘indigenous’ groups were viewed in eyes of empire-builders in England.  To borrow 
Benedict Anderson’s phrase, these signifiers carry different “semantic load” (1991:122), with 
meanings and inferences specific to the groups represented through them.  In other words, 
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 aborigines were indigenous people of a certain sort, the kind of ‘primitive people’ different to the 
Malays whose ‘inevitable fate’, as H.D. Noone (1936) expressed, was cultural extinction22.  
 
Indeed, in the Malay Peninsula, the Malay sultanates were sufficiently established and influential 
enough to merit negotiation for colonial economic gain, unlike the small tribal communities who 
tended to stay deep in jungle areas or at the fringes of economically-driven settlements.  Both 
were treated differently, recognized as separate classes of people, but simultaneously 
understood as being people ‘indigenous’ to the land.  “The Malays have at least as much right to 
be regarded as the aboriginal people of Malaya as the English have to be called the aborigines of 
England”, Richard Windstedt declared (1948:16).  As de Vere Allen aptly summed up, indirectly 
signaling the resounding absences of the aboriginal groups, “political power in Malaya was the 
prerogative of the British administrators and the traditional Malay establishments alone” 
(1970:153).  In common usage, little emphasis was given to distinguish between the ‘original 
Malays’ and the ‘foreigner Malays’, which Geoffrey Benjamin (1966) notes, was a distinction 
recognized explicitly among the Temiar groups with whom he did fieldwork. 
 
The Question of Sovereignties and Subjects 
Were the aborigines subjects of the Malay Sultans?  Should the assumptions of the British 
Government in treating them as such be maintained?  These were questions raised by H.D. 
Noone (1936) when he outlined a policy for the administration of aboriginal peoples.   As he 
pointed out, concerning the Ple Temiar groups he studied in detail, they held themselves – and 
were held – as communities apart from the central polities.  The only authority they recognized, 
he wrote, was the hereditary offices of ‘mikong’ that had been disregarded by the British 
Government (p. 66).  He observed among them “a violent antipathy against becoming ‘Malays’” 
(p. 56), and narrated a story of how a particular group refused to comply with the wishes of a 
                                                 
22 Noone is careful to emphasise: “It is not peoples, but cultures, that may become extinct” (1936:72).   Numerous writers 
have already established that in the case of Australia, certain territories were treated as terra nullius, lands practically 
uninhabited, abandoned, or at the most, recognized as being inhabited only by ‘scattered unorganized tribes’, who were 
deemed unable to conduct negotiations with the Europeans (Frost, 1994).  These fragments of indigenous peoples, 
without significant political and social structures (read: ‘aborigines’), were seen as being unlikely to obstruct settlement, 
people likely to die out in the ‘natural’ progress of time. 
  - 26 - 
 Malay Ruler (whose help they desperately required) when he bid them to “…leave their jungles 
and come and settle down in the kampongs as Malays” (p.57).  If they were to be held as full 
subjects of the Rulers, he emphasized, they should be extended the same rights and benefits 
enjoyed by other subjects.   
 
Noone argued that this would be achieved through legal provisions that established parameters 
over the administration of the aborigines and their lands.  Noone’s ideas were finally implemented 
through the passing of the Perak Aboriginal Enactment in 1939 – the precursor to the present 
Aboriginal Peoples Act (see Chapter 4) – which was subsequently extended to the rest of the 
Federated Malay States of Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang.  The aborigines were thus 
officially treated by the colonial government as ‘subjects’ in the same way as other Malays, a 
recognition that came with some security over their own customary lands, whether or not they 
personally recognized themselves as subjects of the Sultans.  This status was officially extended 
to all the aborigines across the whole Peninsula when the Federation of Malaya Agreement was 
drawn in 1948 (discussed below)23. 
  
In summary, we can see that in the decades prior to the Second World War, the recognition of the 
sovereignty of particular rulers mutually re-enforced the supremacy of the ‘Malay’ peoples and the 
control of British administrators in the Peninsula.  The aborigines – insignificant demographically, 
economically and politically – were not included in discussions concerning the changing shape of 
the body politic.  Instead, they were constituted in vague terms as being subjects of the Rulers, if 
administrative decisions concerning them had to be made.  The British had other challenging 
political issues with which to concern themselves.  Not only was there a significant rise in anti-
colonial sentiments across various ethnic/racial communities, new forms of nationalism emerged 
with vigor (Roff, 1967).  In 1941 the British had their hands full with the Japanese assault in the 
Peninsula, a ‘hurricane’ that swept aside over a century of careful political negotiations. 
                                                 
23 Under these changes, however, they were still treated as “State subjects”, and had to be “administered on State lines”.  
See Letter from the Chief Secretary, Federal Secretariat, Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, dated 18th October 1950 to 
State Secretaries, Settlement Secretaries and British Advisors.  BA Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, National 
Archives of Malaysia, Call No: 1963/0000924. 
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The Rising Sun:  ‘Asia for the Asiatics’, and Into the Jungles 
The Japanese invasion of the Peninsula was swift and destructive.  Japanese leaders articulated 
their position as bringing ‘liberation’ to Asian countries from European colonial imperialism.  This 
was an argument that convinced some Malay nationalists, who saw them as a vector for 
advancing their visions of an independent nation-state (Said Zahari, 2001).  The Japanese 
interacted with the local populace in terms of racial difference, isolating in the process many 
Chinese communities whose members subsequently fled into the jungles to avoid their harsh 
pogroms.  Even for those who initially struck alliances with Japanese forces, enchantment with 
such ‘liberation’ did not last long.   
 
The fight against the Japanese necessitated previously-unthinkable partnerships among parties 
that had very different ideological platforms.  Although British intelligence officers had been wary 
of Communist groups prior to the outbreak of war (due to their open denunciations of British 
imperialism), they were now valuable allies against the new threat.  An alliance formed between 
the British and the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Party (MPAJA), the military arm of the Anti-
Japanese Union controlled by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).  Training of the anti-
Japanese soldiers commenced quickly and in December 1942, H.D. Noone was brought in to act 
as a liaison between the Communists and the aborigines (Holman, 1958).  Noone was 
responsible for establishing and maintaining aboriginal agents in settlements, so that messages 
could be passed without comprising security.  During this time, many Communists established 
trustworthy relationships with aboriginal groups in the jungles.  As the Chief Secretary of the 
Federal Secretariat later noted in an administrative document in 195024, the MPAJA rescued 
many of the aborigines from the terrors of the Japanese and bandit gangs, while the British 
government had mostly ignored them.   
 
                                                 
24 Chief Secretary, Federal Secretariat, to State Secretaries, Settlement Secretaries and the British Advisers, Federation 
of Malaya, dated 18th October 1950, FSY 1189/49 (in BA Selangor 70/1950). 
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 The Post-War Struggle for Sovereignty 
In the aftermath of the hostile Japanese takeover, British officials who returned to regain control 
saw an opportunity to decrease the complexity of managing multiple political entities.  They 
proposed a new form of government, known as the Malayan Union, which would integrate 
legislative and administrative arrangements across all the States on the Peninsula (with the 
exclusion of Singapore).  Their vision was for a “united nation” in which plural communities 
shared a “common Malayan outlook and purpose” (MacKenzie, 1951:7).  However, strong 
reactions arose against these proposals by Malay nationalists25.  Their chief objections were the 
manner in which the proposals were presented, the perceived loss of rights and powers of the 
Malay Rulers, and the inclusion of other races as equal citizens26.  It was felt that the Malay 
States would merely become a Crown Colony, with the sovereignty of the Rulers – along with the 
relative autonomy of States – lost.   
 
In response, the British capitulated to more collaborative efforts in defining a future body-politic in 
the Peninsula (Malayan Union, 1947).  A tripartite Working Committee was formed in July 1946 to 
critically examine possible constitutional arrangements.  This comprised representatives of three 
parties:  the British Government, the Rulers of the Malay States, and the vocal United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO).  Such an arrangement systematically privileged the voices of the 
Malays, and ensured some recognition of past feudal structures27.  Among the general principles 
followed by the Committee was, 
that, as these States are Malay States ruled by Your Highnesses, the subjects of your 
Highnesses have no alternative allegiance or other country which they can regard as 
                                                 
25 As historian Alex Healy writes, the British underestimated the extent to which ‘Malays would never have allowed their 
predominance to be jeopardised’ (1991:149). 
26 It is interesting to note that Temuan spokespeople were involved, along with UMNO, in the protests against the Malayan 
Union (UMNO, 1956).  In 1946, UMNO took 3 Orang Asli as representatives in a gathering aimed at calling for 
independence from British colonialism (see Memorandum Pembangunan Orang Asli dalam Konteks Wawasan 2020, 
Jawatankuasa Bekerja POASM/Senator Orang Asli, Kuala Lumpur, 1991). 
27 An important point of agreement was that the new Constitution would not be made by an by Order signed by His 
Majesty King George IV alone, but through an Agreement signed between him and the Malay Rulers as equal, contracting 
parties.  This principle of joint delegation of powers was important in signaling the recognition of the sovereignty of the 
Rulers.  Furthermore, the title chosen for the new federation, ‘Federation of Malaya’, had a strict translation of 
Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, a name acceptable to the Malay representatives.  One of the alternative titles, ‘Malayan 
Federation’ was rejected on the basis that ““Malayans” had come to mean people who had some association with Malaya, 
but did not include Malays, and that Malays took the strongest objection to being called or referred to as Malayans.” 
(Malayan Union, 1946:9).  These indicate the tensions that existed concerning whether Malaya was for the Malays, or for 
all the ‘races’ in the Peninsula (‘Malayans’). 
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 their homeland, and they occupy a special position and possess rights which must be 
safeguarded. (Malayan Union, 1946:7, my emphasis). 
 
In relation to discussions over citizenship, the anxieties of the ‘Malays’ were considered with great 
care.  Arguments surrounding the geographical imagination of ‘homeland’ were employed in 
securing the ‘Special Position of the Malays’.  As the Report outlines, 
In approaching the subject of Citizenship, it must be remembered that there is a very real 
fear on the part of the Malays that they may steadily become submerged in a country in 
which (except for the aborigines) they are the indigenous people…. the Malays have no 
alternative homeland, whilst the remainder of the population, with few exceptions, retain 
in varying degree a connection with their country of origin and, in very many cases, 
regard that country and not Malaya as the primary object of their loyalty and affection” 
(Malayan Union, 1946:23, my emphasis) 
 
The acquisition of citizenship, and what this meant, was a matter of great import in these 
discussions.  Some Malays had already expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposal that 
equal citizenship be extended to all who resided within the territories, thus erasing the difference 
between “indigenous” and “immigrant” groups.  The Committee agreed that all who “regard(ed) 
Malaya as their real home and the object of their loyalty” should be given citizenship (Malayan 
Union, 1946:24), but created a distinction between “citizenship by operation of law” and 
“citizenship by application”.  It was decided that “subjects of the Rulers” automatically be given 
citizenship (by operation of law), and that these included, inter alia, “(a)ny person who belongs to 
an aboriginal tribe resident in that State” and “any Malay born in that State or born of a father who 
is a subject of the Ruler of that State” (p.25)28.  This was incorporated into the 1948 Federation of 
Malaya Agreement (Federation of Malaya, 1952).  It was thus officially established that aborigines 
                                                 
28 “Malay” was also defined here as, “a person who (a) habitually speaks the Malay language; and (b) professes the 
Muslim religion; and (c) conforms to Malay custom” (Malayan Union, 1946.:25).  Automatic citizenship was also granted to 
certain other groups including “British subjects, born in a State or Settlement”, “second generation of persons born in 
Malaya” and “(c)hildren whose fathers are citizens at the time of their birth”, each category holding more specific caveats 
for qualification.  
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 would be constituted as Federal citizens.  Nevertheless, it was emphasized that citizenship “was 
not a nationality, neither could it develop into a nationality.” (Malayan Union, 1946:23).   
 
The centrality of indigeneity as a basis for privilege had already prompted some debate on the 
position of the aborigines in the body-politic.  This was sometimes merely dismissed as a strategy 
for disuniting the Malays.  As a writer for Utusan Melayu articulated in December of 1946 (the 
same month the Report of the Working Committee was released), “The people who pretend that 
Malaya belongs to the Sakais are trying to deny that Malaya belongs to the Malays” (cited in 
Harper, 1999:86).  Arguments concerning who the ‘true sons of the soil’ constituted continued to 
unfold, leading to the questioning of whether Malays should be privileged above all other 
ethnic/racial groups on the basis of indigeneity, including the aborigines29.   
 
The Communist Turn 
Yet, a serious threat still loomed on the horizon, in the form of nationalistic Communists.  
Previously allied with British forces against the Japanese, they now protested the deprivation of a 
promised Independence and took their war into the jungles of Malaya yet again.  This was 
necessary, as they were being hunted down and arrested in towns and villages for their 
subversive and violent acts.  The Communists rebuilt their relationships with the aborigines, 
seeking their help once again. Aborigines were persuaded (sometimes forcefully) to relay secret 
messages, to guide Communist soldiers through uncharted jungle territories, to gather 
intelligence about security forces, to give warning of the presence of troops, and to provide 
essential food supplies (Carey, 1979; Holman, 1958; Leary, 1989; Noone and Holman, 1972).  
 
In order to mobilize the aborigines, the Asal Co-Progressive Association was set up, which 
operated through a cell structure led by aboriginal headmen and Communist leaders (Miller, 
1972).  This choice of the term ‘Asal’ was significant, for it communicated to the wider public the 
                                                 
29 Harper notes that some Malay politicians took on the question of the socio-political position of the aborigines.  He 
records, citing a letter by Zainal Abidin bin Haji Abas to the Deputy Chief Secretary on 6th of April 1948, that “…the UMNO 
Secretary-General argued that the Orang Asli ‘have no one to plead their cause’, and argued for their rights as ‘the 
original inhabitants of the country’” (1997:17). 
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 recognition of the aborigines as ‘original people’ of the land, when they had not been given this 
official recognition before (Jimin et al, 1983, Carey, 1979).  In this organizational structure, each 
area was under the responsibility of an Asal organizer, who, assisted by experienced guerrillas, 
would recruit and train aborigines to form a unit of the Asal Protection Corps (Park, 1965).  
Through the Asal cells, the aborigines were provided with medical assistance, seeds, and 
valuable equipment.  They were also promised certain special benefits when the Communists 
took control of the nation-state (Holman, 1958).  According to Jimin et al (1983:38), “by 1951/52, 
almost the entire jungle population of about 20,000 Orang Asli came under effective control of the 
[Communist Terrorists]”.  The British Government quickly observed that without the help of the 
aborigines, the Communist fighters would not have been able to survive, much less fight, in their 
jungle environment.   
 
Early efforts at dealing with them, however, were clumsy and disastrous (elaborated in greater 
detail in Chapter 3).  For example, attempts made to resettle the aborigines to keep them away 
from the Communists resulted in demoralizing failures, with the tremendous loss of lives 
provoking enmity and despair (Carey, 1979).  Furthermore, air attacks (organized to flush out the 
Communists) dropped bombs into known aboriginal clearings, destroying valuable crops and 
homes.  Unsurprisingly, initial tactics such as these were not successful in winning aborigines 
over to the British Government.  A shift in policy was introduced in 1953, and for the first time in 
political history, the government placed the control of the aborigines on high priority30.   
 
Forging Postcoloniality: The Reid Commission 
When the Commonwealth Constitutional Commission (also known as the Reid Commission) was 
established in 1956 to make recommendations concerning a Constitution for the soon-to-be 
independent Malaya, its members were expressly charged to include provisions surrounding “the 
safeguarding of the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other 
communities” (Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1957:1), among other points of import.  
                                                 
30 Short (1975:443) notes that “by the beginning of 1951, control of the aborigines was third on the list of government 
priorities, and half a million dollars had already been set aside to supply resettled aborigines”.   
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 Consultation was undertaken with many different (political and civil society) groups, representing 
the needs of minority groups.  With reference to original treaties with the Malay States, they 
concluded that the special position of the Malays was to be recognized and safeguarded in 
relation to Malay Reservation land, and the provision of quotas.  They proposed that these 
preferences be continued, “but that in due course the present preferences should be reduced and 
should ultimately cease so that there should then be no discrimination between races or 
communities” (p.72).   
 
Consultations were held with various communities about the Constitution, and on such an 
occasion, Dr Haji Mohammed Eusoff spoke for the ‘aborigines’, recommending that they be 
considered along with other communities in terms of land rights, legal protection from 
missionaries, and representation on State and federal councils (Harper, 1999).  However, as a 
commentator of the times noted in the Singapore Standard, “…in this rush by the peoples of the 
federation to stake their claims in an independent Malaya, the aborigine – better known as the 
Sakai – has been left out in the cold.” (The News as it Strikes me Column, 28.8.56, in Nicholas et 
al., 1989).  This was true in certain respects.  The Constitution that shaped the form of 
Independent Malaya did recognize ‘the aborigines’ as being a separate group of citizens31.  
However, they (along with all other non-Malay communities granted citizenship) were not 
accorded the same level of special privileges that the Malays were under Article 153.  Tunku 
Abdul Rahman maintained that a difference existed between the concept of ‘citizenship’ and 
bangsa (‘nationality’).  Non-Malays could never be ‘nationals’ in the bangsa sense, as this meant 
that they belonged to the politico-cultural entity based on original sovereignty that was the ‘Malay 
nation’ (Harper, 1999).  However, they were given ‘citizenship’, which was “merely a legal 
guarantee of specified privileges” (p.350).   
 
                                                 
31 The final Constitution agreed upon differed from the version proposed by the Reid Commission.  Instead of instituting a 
specified time period for the special privileges of the Malays, as it recommended, these privileges would carry on without 
a time limit.   
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 In short, Malaya was still positioned as the land of the Malays (legally termed the “Malay 
Peninsula” in Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution) and their special position as indigenous 
people secured.  The Malay Rulers retained symbolic sovereignty of their individual States (now 
guided by State and Federal level Constitutions), of which one would be appointed every five 
years as the Supreme Head of the whole Federation, the ‘Yang Di-Pertuan Agong’.  State 
Governments, with attendant Legislative Assemblies, were given limited autonomy, with specific 
freedoms to legislate upon matters of religion (Islam) and land.  In relation to the primacy of 
Malay sovereignty and indigeneity as compared to other inhabitants of the Peninsula, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, was to say later,  
…there could be no doubt that the Malays were the indigenous people of this country 
because the original inhabitants did not have any form of civilisation compared with the 
Malays…. [These] inhabitants also had no direction and lived like primitives in mountains 
and jungles” (The Star, 6 November 1986, cited in Nicholas, 2002:122-123).   
 
In this nascent body-politic, it was Islam that was declared the religion of the Federation (Federal 
Constitution, Article 3(1)), and the Malay language given primacy (Article 152(1)), becoming the 
nationalist ‘emblems of nation-ness’ (cf. Anderson, 1991:133).    
 
Orang Asli in Postcolonial Malaya 
After the declaration of Independence in August of 1957, there was continued focus on the 
aborigines, as they were still a crucial part of the war against the Communists.  Federal budgets 
continued to support the programmes of the Department of Aborigines, and speakers at 
Parliament articulated their support of the aborigines as a ‘community’ to be given equal 
recognition with other communities.  At the Legislative Council on the 12th of December 1957, 
Mohamed Khir Johari said, 
It is the responsibility of the Government to protect the interests of the Aborigines and to 
introduce measures for their social, economic and cultural betterment.  They are one of 
the several communities which together make up the population of our country and our 
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 aim should be their progressive integration into the life of the country so that they will owe 
the same duties and loyalties to the nation as other communities and so that they can 
benefit equally with others from the rights and opportunities in this newly-independent 
nation (Federation of Malaya, 1959:4004-4005). 
 
In the same meeting, Tok Pangku Pandak Hamid appointed in 1957 as the first Orang Asli 
Senator, articulated: 
 
This is the first time that my community gets proper recognition which I think is 
appropriate to our national aspirations…. We are beginning to realize that we are not a 
minority scattered about as we thought it to be, each in his own way, but we are a 
community with the same aspirations as the others…. We now ask to be recognized as a 
community along with the others, who comprise the population of this country, with the 
same privileges and treatment as accorded to other communities (p.4020-4022). 
 
The idea of all tribal groups across the Peninsula being institutionally represented as a single 
Community had taken hold.  In years to come, the Orang Asli would be represented by series of 
appointed Senators, charged with the task of speaking up for their needs (See Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 3:  Orang Asli Senators from 1957 to the Present 
Year Orang Asli Senator 
1957 – 1983 YB Senator Tok Pangku Pandak Hamid bin Itam Jali  
Temiar 
1984 – 1991 YB Senator Hassan Nam  
Semelai 
1991 – 1996  YB Senator Itam Wali bin Nawam 
Semai 
1997 – 2003 YB Senator Dato’ Long Jidin 
Jakun 
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 Attempts to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the aborigines continued, with special efforts to 
communicate their inclusion in the body politic.  They were renamed Orang Asli in one of these 
measures, as Iskander Carey (1976a:3) explains,  
The Malaysian Government, some years ago, felt that the word ‘aborigines’ had certain 
pejorative connotations; it was associated with concepts such as backwardness, under-
development and primitiveness.  The Malay words ‘Orang Asli’, however, do not have 
these connotations.  The word ‘orang’ merely means ‘people’ and the term ‘asli’ comes 
from the Arabic word ‘asali’, meaning ‘original’, ‘well-born’ or ‘aristocratic’.  It was decided 
accordingly that the Malay term, ‘Orang Asli’, should be used even in English 
correspondence. 
 
Enter the ‘Bumiputera’:  The Birth of Malaysia and the Extension of Privileges 
When Sabah and Sarawak joined Malaya in 1963 (along with Singapore for a brief moment), 
Malays could not be the only ones accorded ‘special status’ on the basis of their indigeneity.  
Thus, the Federal Constitution was changed to include the ‘natives’ of these States, officially 
extending to them the same privileges given to the Malays.  A new term was introduced in 
political discourse – bumiputera – to denote these indigenous groups, who were ‘deserving’ of 
special rights.  The Orang Asli, however, were not included in this Constitutional change (see 
Chapter 4 for more detailed discussion). 
   
The contest between nationalist Malays and non-Malay communities in the Peninsula (primarily 
‘Chinese’ and ‘Indian’) continued.  Widening economic and political divides between ethnic 
groups exploded in the oft-narrated 13th May 1969 riots.  In response to this event, the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) was proposed and implemented, couched in terms that suggested the 
attainment of greater equality for all segments within Malaysian society.  Dubbed “one of Asia’s 
most ambitious social and economic programmes” (Insight, March 1979:3), the NEP was devised 
with two major goals: “to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty… irrespective of race”, and to 
“[accelerate] the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as 
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 to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function” (Malaysia, 
1971:1).  
 
It was through the implementation of the NEP that political recognition of groups as being 
bumiputera took on wide-scale material realities.  Bumiputera groups were seen as ‘lagging 
behind’, as being poorer and less-educated communities compared to the richer ‘immigrant’ 
Chinese.  What irked Malay leaders was that this comparative disempowerment meant that the 
‘true’ indigenous people did not have economic control in their ‘own’ lands.  With the aim of 
expanding bumiputera ownership of capital, specific programmes were introduced under the 
NEP.  This included facilitating bumiputera business development through the preferential 
distribution of licenses, concessions, contracts, and credit; requiring the restructuring of 
companies to include bumiputera partners and shareholders; and the generous provision of 
scholarships and local university places to bumiputera students.  A significant proportion of NEP 
activity was administered by federal authorities such as Federal Land Development Authority 
(FELDA), Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCRA), and the Rubber 
Industry Smallholders Development Authority (RISDA)32.   
 
Are the Orang Asli bumiputera, or are they not?33  This was a question I posed to Orang Asli 
individuals, who provided me with varied responses.  Some confirmed that they have been 
extended bumiputera privileges, for example, being included in bumiputera schemes such as the 
Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN) unit trusts, Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) scholarships, and 
poverty eradication programmes such as the Skim Pembangunan Kesejahteraan Rakyat 
(SPKR)34.   
 
However, other Orang Asli individuals were less convinced of this, stating that the Orang Asli 
have not been recognized in Article 153 of the Constitution as having special privileges.  The 
                                                 
32 FELDA is the agency responsible for the implementation of the National Agricultural Policy. 
33 See King (1995) for discussion on the Sarawak bumiputera groups. 
34 According to the Eight Malaysia Plan, the projects under the Integrated Development of Remote Villages Programme 
are targeted at addressing the extreme poverty among the Orang Asli (Economic Planning Unit, 2001:74).  
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 belief that they are not ‘bumiputera’ has also to do with the way in which the term has been used 
in political discourse.  As I suggested earlier, the idea of bumiputera was an extension of earlier 
ethno-nationalist arguments that Malaya belonged to the Malays, and as such, are sometimes 
logically surmised by Orang Asli individuals as not including them, even though they are 
acknowledged as being indigenous to the land.  This ambiguity has to do with slippages in 
meaning, which I explore in the next section of this chapter, before continuing further discussion 
on the political involvement of the Orang Asli in postcolonial Malaysia.  
 
Bumiputera Debates 
(T)here are Muslims who are neither Malays nor bumiputera (Indians, Arabs, Chinese, 
Burmese, etc.); Muslim Malays who are not bumiputera (Acehnese immigrants, for 
example); Malay bumiputera who are not Muslims (including certain asli groups and at 
least one recent convert from Islam to Christianity); bumiputera Muslims who are not 
Malays (such as the Melanau and similar peoples in the east Malaysian states); 
bumiputera who are neither Malays nor Muslims (which includes both ethnic Thais and 
also various asli groups on the peninsula as well as some of tribal populations in the 
eastern states); and Malays who are neither bumiputera nor Muslims (including various 
Javanese and Batak Christian immigrants).  What, for example, is the status of a 
(probably illegal) Bugis immigrant in Sabah?  A Muslim, but a Malay and bumiputera?  
The situation is by no means simple.  
Clive Kessler (1992:139-140) 
 
For the sake of conceptual clarity, in discussing a topic fraught with ambiguities and slippages, it 
is necessary to focus on three issues of import.  First, there have been debates concerning the 
appropriate recognition of individuals as bumiputera with attendant extension of special rights and 
privileges, what I term the recognition of bumiputera status.  This may be markedly different from 
the actual enjoyment of these rights and privileges, a second issue I raise as being worth 
examining.  Slippages between the two are related to a third issue concerning bumiputera 
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 discourses, that is, the loose use of the term bumiputera, which reinforces ambiguities and 
uncertainties and which have led to differentiated social, political and material realities.  
 
In relation to the latter, the loose use of the term bumiputera, the socio-political context and 
purposes of articulation lend specific and differential meanings to the signifier bumiputera.  In 
certain discourses, bumiputera is used interchangeably with ‘Malay’, particularly when used in 
reference to Peninsula Malaysia (Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981/1982).  However, in the Malay 
version of the Constitution, bumiputera has a specific and exclusive reference to the “natives of 
Sabah and Sarawak”, with no inclusion of both the ‘Malays’ and ‘aborigines’.  In other official 
blueprints, such as the Malaysia Plans, National Census Reports, and JHEOA official statements, 
‘bumiputera’ explicitly includes the ‘Orang Asli’ as well as the ‘natives of Sabah and Sarawak’ 
along with the ‘Malays’35.  
 
Who then, is recognized as having bumiputera status?  An answer was attempted by (then) 
Attorney General Tan Sri Abdul Kadir bin Yusof at Parliament on the 17th July 1974.  He stated, 
with some self-contradiction, 
The word “bumiputera” is not defined in any law, but this word is used to point out the 
Malays and also the natives of the Borneo states.  The words “Melayu” and “bumiputera” 
are each defined in Articles 160 [sic] and 161A of the Constitution….  [People] must fit 
this definition in order to be classed as bumiputera” (Dewan Rakyat, 1974:1691). 
 
He further clarified: “[people that] fit the definition of “Melayu” or “bumiputera” as defined in the 
Constitution, can be classed as bumiputera” (p.1691).  No mention is made of the Orang Asli in 
this specific instance, although they were included as being bumiputera in an earlier 
Parliamentary speech in 1969 (Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981/1982:674).  Datuk Hussein Onn, 
                                                 
35For example, the ‘Guidelines on the Development of the Orang Asli’ released by the JHEOA in 1978 states. “Orang Asli 
are a group of bumiputera that are the most backward (yang agak ketinggalan sekali) in social economic terms” (Ministry 
of Home Affairs, 1978).  Also see the 8th Malaysia Plan (Economic Planning Unit, 2001:60, 74).   
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 as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, was later to state that membership of an “indigenous race” was 
necessary for the qualification of “Malay-bumiputera” status36.   
 
Officially, two identity groups, whatever their ‘actual’ criteria for membership, clearly hold 
bumiputera status: the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak.  Privileges that come with 
this status are clearly provided for in Article 153 of the Constitution.  Although official documents 
produced by government agencies such as the JHEOA and the Statistics Department also 
recognize the Orang Asli as being bumiputera (see also Jimin et al, 1983), their rights and 
privileges have not been formally recognized in Article 153 the Constitution, as it has been for the 
Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak37.   
 
This must be differentiated from the actual enjoyment of bumiputera status.  On one hand, this 
has been extended selectively to certain minority groups falling outside the three bumiputera 
identity groups already mentioned, such as the Indian Muslims, Thais, and Portuguese-
Eurasians. For example, in the 1980s, some Thai individuals – while still officially designated 
‘non-Malay’ and ‘non-Muslim’ – were given access to a bumiputera-only investment scheme, the 
Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN), prompting other minorities, such as Portuguese Eurasians, to 
argue for such privileges on the basis of their genealogy in Malaysia and their claims to (non-
Muslim) Malayness (Goh, 2002).   
 
On the other hand, actual enjoyment is often dependent on other criteria, such as socio-economic 
resources and social capital, which can serve to preclude the involvement of certain groups such 
as the Orang Asli.  Bumiputera discounts on housing schemes are one such example.  Although 
Orang Asli individuals qualify for special discounts through such projects, they are often still 
unable to afford the already-expensive payments.  Another matter, as raised by POASM, is the 
fact that Orang Asli students often cannot qualify for special university quotas given on the basis 
                                                 
36 It may be that they are extended specific bumiputra privileges without being acknowledged as having bumiputra status. 
37 In its report entitled ‘The Human Rights of the Orang Asal’ released on the 11th of February 2004, The National Human 
Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) called on the Malaysian government to amend Article 153 of the Federal Constitution in 
order to include the Orang Asli as being bumiputera. 
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 of bumiputera status, for they find it difficult to compete with Malay students for these allocations.  
This is related, in no small part, to the differential quality of education experienced by Orang Asli 
children as compared with other ethnic groups.  This is in turn, related to psycho-social 
experiences of education, geographical location, as well differential quality levels of teaching and 
facilities in rural schools (Chong, 1995; Hasan, 1997; Nagata, 1995).  A third matter is 
participation in bumiputera economic endeavors, such as FELDA and FELCRA schemes, which 
are seen by some Orang Asli as being Malay-centric with few opportunities for Orang Asli small-
holders38.  Several individuals I interviewed during fieldwork alleged that bumiputera privileges 
tend to be extended preferentially to Muslim Orang Asli, a common everyday perception that 
merits further investigation. 
 
In summary, there are certain inconsistencies in the way this term in used, slippages which result 
in misunderstandings as well as disjuncture between status and enjoyment of bumiputera 
privilege.  Speaking wryly concerning such disparities, some have commented on there being 
different bumiputera ‘classes’, the ‘first class bumiputera’ being the wealthy Malays, who tend to 
emerge out of these confusions more privileged than other bumiputera groups (Devanesan, 
1997).    
 
Whatever the case, the Orang Asli are able to demonstrate extended histories in the land, have 
been recognized by administrative officials as being bumiputera, and should therefore be entitled 
to the rights and privileges distributed on that basis.  This has occurred for some individuals, 
although it does not extend to all Orang Asli.  This recognition, as elaborated earlier, does not 
necessarily link to enjoyment of privileges, as Orang Asli often find themselves systemically 
precluded from a full enjoyment of associated privileges depending on other factors.   
 
                                                 
38 FELDA and FELCRA have included the Orang Asli in some of their schemes, but access seems to be dependent on 
top-down decisions rather than individual application for privilege enjoyment. 
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 The Way Forward:  From Bangsa Melayu to Bangsa Malaysia 
In 1991, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad unveiled ‘Vision 2020’, a “roadmap” to a “fully 
developed country” by the year 2020 requiring the maturation of the nation “economically, 
politically, socially, spiritually, psychologically, and culturally” (Mahathir, 1992).  Emphasis (at 
least in principle) was placed on moving away from Malay-centricity to a more symmetrical 
pattern of multiethnic citizenship.  Listing nine central strategic challenges, Mahathir began by 
stating:  
(t)he first of these is the challenge of establishing a united Malaysian nation with a sense of 
common and shared destiny.  This must be a nation at peace with itself, territorially and 
ethnically integrated, living in harmony and full and fair partnership, made up of one Bangsa 
Malaysia with political loyalty and dedication to the nation (p. 1)   
 
In this proposed move away from the Bangsa Melayu of the past, he called for a time when 
“Malaysians of all colours and creeds [will be] free to practice and profess their customs, cultures 
and religious beliefs [while having the] feeling that they belong to one nation” (Mahathir, 1992:2).  
Ethnic-based discrimination was repositioned to having been a ‘temporary’ measure for the 
purposes of diffusing racial tensions, seen as a necessary but temporary stage of a longer 
journey towards national unity (Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, 1997).    
 
Mahathir’s calls for a more inclusive definition of nationality, while widely supported among non-
Malay communities, have been contradicted through some of his own later speeches.  For 
example, in September 1999, Suqui (a body representative of 2,095 Chinese organizations) 
urged the government to concretize the move towards Bangsa Malaysia through institutional and 
policy reform.  Mahathir’s responses were ambivalent, swerving from initial agreement in 
principle, to declaring in Parliament on 11th December 2000 that their demands were “tantamount 
to abolishing Malay rights, a move which will result in chaos and will paralyse the country’s 
progress” (Cheah, 2002:69).  Cheah pragmatically concludes that “Malay political primacy is likely 
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 to continue in Malaysia for a long time”, even as it is “ingeniously presented as bumiputera 
political primacy” (p.72)39. 
 
The Jagged Logic of Proportionality:  Orang Asli in Election Machinery 
In the political present, according to Bah Tony Williams-Hunt, “politics is a numbers game”, in 
which the Orang Asli, as ethnic/racial minorities in a plural landscape are immediately 
disadvantaged (Interview, 03.12.02)40.  As he states, “many do not see the Orang Asli as a 
people that have voice; they are scattered, their numbers are small.”  Indeed, in Malaysia’s 
political regime – still structurally and ideologically premised on ‘racial’ representation – 
communities continue to be obsessively enumerated according to their ethnicity/race and their 
numbers nervously compared in percentage terms.  Anxious attempts are still being made to gain 
race-based votes in territorialized constituencies41.  In the reasoning of such democracy, racial 
profiling is of more concern than political philosophy, exacerbated by historically-sedimented 
communal fears of being inadequately represented by ‘Others’.   
 
Yet, because of the uneven logic of the electoral machinery – particularly with its ‘first past the 
post’ system with state assembly and Parliamentary seats awarded according to specific 
constituency wins – it is still possible for the Orang Asli to gain some attention in regard to their 
social issues.  As Bah Tony pointed out to me, in several constituencies, Orang Asli votes are 
able to function as deciding votes, tipping fine balances and thereby contributing to ensuring final 
outcomes.  This is particularly evident during political crises when bumiputra votes are needed.  
In 1987 for example, a crisis within UMNO led to an internal split, with some of its members 
leaving to form another political party, Semangat 46, under the leadership of Tengku Razaleigh.  
                                                 
39 Cheah (2002) outlines the paradox that all Prime Ministers of Malay(si)a have faced in nation-building initiatives.  While 
their rise in power has always occurred through climbing the ranks of the Malay-centric party, UMNO, their legitimacy as 
leaders of a multi-ethnic nation must be secured after their appointment as Prime Ministers (Koo, 1996).  This requires 
‘reinventions’, if not pendulum swings, between their being ‘exclusivist’ Malay ethno-nationalists and ‘inclusive’ Malaysian 
civic-nationalists. 
40 This was a perspective raised by Iskander Carey when he talked about certain Orang Asli groups living in rapidly 
urbanised areas.  He states: “The trouble is that their numbers are so small, which means that they have no political clout.  
What “berhormat” [Member of Parliament] cares about a few hundred votes, when his only concern in life is to retain his 
lucrative position in parliament?” (1979:160). 
41 Talk among political parties, for example, still revolve around how a ‘Malay’ should be fielded in order to get the ‘Malay 
votes’, or a ‘Chinese’ to get the ‘Chinese votes’, depending on the racial profile of the constituency in question.  This was 
evident in the 2004 Elections. 
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 For legal and administrative reasons, UMNO was deregistered, and required to obtain over 
600,000 members to retain control over its assets.  In order to bolster its numbers, formal 
invitation to join the party was extended to the Orang Asli in March 1989 (Nicholas, 2000).  In the 
1990 General Election, efforts were made to woo Orang Asli voters in Gua Musang where 
Tengku Razaleigh ran as incumbent.  In order to keep Orang Asli sentiments on the side of 
UMNO, they were promised land-titles, visited by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, and their 
village-heads given increased annual allowances. “There was also talk of an annual Orang Asli 
public holiday, and the inclusion of blowpiping as a national sport” (Nicholas, 2000:159).  This sort 




In terms of party membership, Orang Asli are currently allowed to join UMNO, although this 
membership is denied to certain other non-Malay/Muslim communities, who have not mounted 
claims to indigeneity42.  While a number of Orang Asli have opted to become members of this 
party, there have been no significant changes in leadership that alters UMNO’s Malay ethno-
nationalist trajectory.  Some have commented that UMNO remains a channel that is not very 
effective for gaining ground on Orang Asli issues, although support of the government has been 
beneficial in certain respects.  As a POASM leader said to me: “By supporting UMNO, we support 
the government.  Some issues can be settled through UMNO, such as development.  But some 
cannot, such as land.”  Another person expressed his personal thoughts, saying: “[Di UMNO] 
Orang Asli tak bunyi langsung” (In UMNO the Orang Asli [can] make no direct sound).   
 
In mid-1999, there were efforts to start an Orang Asli political party (called Parti Orang Asli, POA).  
This was seen to be an efficacious way of articulating the needs of the Community, instead of 
having to depend on other existing channels, which have produced fewer results than desired.  
As formal registration of the party could not be secured before the 1999 Elections, individuals 
                                                 
42 When UMNO expanded into Sabah in February of 1991, non-Malay, non-Muslim bumiputras were also included in its 
membership, such as ‘bumiputra’ of Sino-indigenous and Portuguese descent (Harper, 1996; Goh, 2002). 
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 were fielded as independent candidates – Norya Abas for the state seat of Jelai, Pahang, and Arif 
Embing for the Parliamentary seat of Lipis.  Although Arif Embing was disqualified on technical 
grounds, Norya Abas was accepted for the Jelai seat (Nicholas, 2000)43.   
 
As Nicholas documents, Norya’s campaign arguments for Jelai included the need for the Orang 
Asli to have elected (rather than appointed) representatives in government44.  However, counter 
campaigns ensued with vigour, and included attempts to play on identity issues sensitive among 
the Orang Asli.  As Nicholas writes,  
(t)he Orang Asli voters were told not to vote for the Orang Asli independent candidate as 
he was not of the same ethnic subgroup and did not reside in the area.  There were even 
suggestions that… [he], going by his name, was a Muslim and so suspect in his motive 
for participating in the elections (2000:199). 
 
While Norya was unable to secure this seat, these efforts were unprecedented ways of thinking 
about Orang Asli political engagement.  Yet, strategies of gaining support on the basis of ‘supra-
tribal’ identity are not easy to mount, particularly when existing fractures within this Community 
can be employed as ways of demobilizing support.  
 
To date, Parti Orang Asli has still not been registered officially.  Speaking about this to me in April 
2003, Norya expressed the opinion that he no longer sees this as an effective means of 
foregrounding the needs of the Orang Asli community within the nation-state.  Instead, he has 
turned his attention to the leadership of Peninsular Malaysia Orang Asli Association (Persatuan 
Orang Asli Semenanjung Malaysia, POASM).  As a political party, he says, “you have to either 
support or be an opponent to the Government.  Now, as an Organisation [POASM], the Orang 
Asli are able to get help from both sides” (Interview, 27.4.2003).  Creating another political 
                                                 
43 One person to whom I spoke was quite pessimistic about fielding Orang Asli candidates through UMNO.  As he said: 
“There is already a long list of Malay contenders for each seat.  How can the Orang Asli have a chance?” 
44 The only representative so far has been the Orang Asli Senator, an appointed position at Parliament. Some are cynical 
of the effectiveness of this role in advancing the cause of the Orang Asli.  As a POASM leader pointed out to me, “if you 
ask him to keep quiet, he does.  He is a government servant.”  Voiced another individual, “the Senator is an appointed 
position, there is no political clout…. But, if he plays his role well, he can do something.  Now it is a coveted position.  Last 
time, people didn’t care about this role, but now many people want it because of the salary; the prestige.”   
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 channel, through establishing a party, may create further problems, he explains, resulting in a 
confusing plurality of voices for the Government.  By focusing on POASM, he expresses, the 
Orang Asli “remain solid, under one roof”.  Nevertheless, Norya emphasizes, participation in 
elections has drawn the attention of the ruling political parties, resulting in material gain (e.g. new 
roads) for constituencies where Orang Asli votes tip a balance.  As such, he expresses the hope 
that the Orang Asli may continue to field independent candidates in certain constituencies.  
Furthermore, he articulates, it may be possible for POASM to one day transform into a political 
party of strength.  
 
Conclusion 
“(M)inorities”, Benedict Anderson reminds us, “came into existence with majorities”, born of 
changes that established postcolonial nations (Anderson, 1987:318).  It is as minorities that the 
Orang Asli were imagined under colonial rule, and it is as minorities that they now negotiate their 
political position in the nation-state.  As reviewed in this chapter, British influence over the 
Peninsula entailed the recognition of local elites rather than their conquest or subjugation.  This 
resulted in the strengthening, consolidation and modification of specific power structures that 
were crucial for economic control, while eliding those inconsequential for such goals.  These 
moves formed the basis for discussions over the form of the postcolonial nation, resulting in the 
establishment of the ‘special position’ for Malays in Malaya.  This became the basis of bumiputera 
privileges in the reconstituted Malaysia, benefits which were extended constitutionally to the 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak while remaining withheld from the undeniably-indigenous Orang 
Asli.  Until now, enjoyment of bumiputera privileges remains ambiguous.   
 
Struggles to win the Orang Asli from the Communists during the Emergency Period led to their 
administration and affirmation as citizens of the State.  The Orang Asli were placed under the 
close supervision and control of the Jabatan Hal-Ehwal Orang Asli (JHEOA), a government 
department given wide powers to administer the affairs of the Orang Asli.  This close 
management continues to have powerful ideological impacts on the Orang Asli.  As I discuss in 
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 the next chapter, JHEOA programmes have required the systematic transformation of the Orang 
Asli psychologically, socially, economically and spiritually.  These are disciplinary mechanisms 
that work to transform them into ideal postcolonial indigenous subjects in the Malaysian nation-
state.  
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 CHAPTER 3:  ADMINISTRATION AND THE DISCIPLINE OF DIFFERENCE 
The first time I met another Orang Asli was when I worked for the British, as a porter.  It 
was the 1950s, and I was about 20 years old.  I met with Temiar, Jakun, Temuan, 
Chewong, Jahut, and others.  Before that, we were quite afraid of these other groups.  
We thought they would eat us up if they caught us!  The elderly people would tell us 
stories about these people.  We feared one another.  But anyway, I hardly came across 
any of them as I was growing up.  These were just stories we heard from the elders. 
Conversation with an elderly Seng-oi/Semai man,  
May 2003 
 
We used to live in very small groups, only about 3 to 4 houses each.  We would open a 
dry field (buka ladang), plant corn, cucumbers, tubers (ubi), rice, and so on.  We would 
hunt with blowpipes and traps.  We would catch wild pigs, the mousedeer, and deer, and 
catch fish in the river.  We still do that now, but only very little.  Now you need a license to 
set a trap.  You also cannot catch and sell animals [as you like], although you can catch 
them for your own food.  We were also told not to plant our fields any more, because we 
burn our land in order to clear the area.  They are afraid that we will destroy the jungle.  
So we have stopped that now. 
 
We didn’t have to worry so much in those days.  We were more at ease (senang hati).  
Not that everything was easy, but all we had to do was find dishes to eat with our rice 
(cari lauk).  But nowadays, we must think about all sorts of things – electric bills, water 
bills, money for our motorbike, for the driving license, and so on.  Now, we work in town.  
The Jabatan (Aboriginal Affairs Department) tells us to send our children to school, to get 
jobs in towns, to be a clerk, and so on. 
Batin of a Seng-oi/Semai village in Perak,  
telling me how things have changed since the ‘old times’,  
September 2002 
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While other ethnic groups were subject to bureaucratic procedures much earlier (introduced 
throughout the late-1800s and 1900s in order to track their movements, locations, and socio-
economic activities for the purpose of managing taxation, commodity production, and exports) 
comprehensive administration of the Orang Asli did not begin until the 1950s.  For the most part, 
the ‘aborigines’, particularly those in the deep jungle, were left to their own devices.  As noted in 
Chapter 2, it was only when they became politically significant in the fight against Communism 
that greater measures were taken to ensure their inclusion, and loyalty, as citizens.  The 
administrative watershed during the Emergency Period transformed the way the Orang Asli have 
been constituted in the nation-state.  As their personal accounts suggest, this has changed how 
they think of themselves as well as how they negotiate their lifestyles, relationships, and social 
practices. 
 
A Short History of Colonial Administration 
The British were first involved in the administration of the Federated Malay States in 1874, before 
they were so united and renamed in 1896 (de Vere Allen, 1970).  In 1919, the Malay States Civil 
Service and the Straits Settlements Civil Service were amalgamated into the ‘Malayan Civil 
Service’, and Malay civil servants were gradually (albeit selectively) included into these 
government structures.  Political power was enacted through administrative procedures, providing 
officers with the mandate and legitimacy for structuring change45.   
 
The science and scope of bureaucracy enabled power to be territorialized, localized, and exerted 
over specific spaces and bodies.  In the drawing of borders, categories and systems, the racial 
constitution of subjects was a defining feature in determining ‘just’ administration.  This powerful 
organizing principle was applied in managing social, political and economic life, for example, in 
the allocation of migrants into labour pools in the early to mid-1900s, the planning of working and 
living spaces, and in the development of government policies (Milner, 2002, 1998; Harper, 1999).  
                                                 
45 As outlined in Chapter 2, British officers had different levels of authority across the Peninsula, depending on the political 
negotiations they conducted with recognized heads of States. 
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 With significant flows of people from China, the Indian sub-continent and Europe, British 
administrators were aware of the growing anxieties of Malay communities.  They felt it their duty 
to ‘protect’ the Malays from being overrun by ‘avaricious’ immigrant communities, and a result, 
took specific measures to ensure that the ‘special position’ of the Malay natives was guarded46. 
 
The first attempt at establishing administrative contact with aboriginal groups was undertaken by 
the Perak state government, with the appointment of G.B. Cerutti as ‘Superintendent of the 
Sakais’ for the Batang Padang district (Cerutti, 1908; Jones, 1968).  Early colonial attitudes 
towards the aboriginal groups, as Iskander Carey notes, tended to waver between treating the 
‘savages’ with patronizing benevolence, and attempting to ‘protect’ them from the harshness of 
modern living (Carey, 1979; also see Jones, 1968).  As stated in Chapter 2, the ‘aborigines’ were 
seen as very different types of natives to the Malays, the latter often viewed as being more 
‘civilized’, and possessing, as Stamford Raffles expressed, “character which is congenial to 
British minds” (cited in Wright and Reid, 1912:314).  Aborigines were often cast as the pagan, 
primitive, jungle-living ‘Other’, in comparison to the more settled, visible, peasantized Malays 
(Rambo, 1988). 
 
H.D. Noone, ethnographer for the Perak Museum, was the first significant figure in terms of the 
development of aboriginal policies.  His recommendations, outlined in his 1936 report, were 
drawn upon in crafting the Perak Aboriginal Tribes Enactment Act of 1939.  It was through this 
piece of legislation that the legal concept of the ‘aborigine’ was first introduced (see Chapter 4 for 
further discussion).  Major P.D.R. Williams-Hunt was appointed as Adviser on Aborigines to the 
Federation of Malaya in 1949.  During this initial period of administration, decisions that 
concerned aboriginal groups were still considered to be State matters, and it was only in 1961, 
after the Independence of Malaya and during the war against the Communists, that the welfare of 
the aborigines was declared a Federal matter (Jimin et al, 1983).   
 
                                                 
46 For example, through the introduction of legislation to secure reservation land for the Malays in 1913. 
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 JHEOA administration of the aborigines / Orang Asli can be conceptualized in three main 
‘phases’ – pre-1960, 1960–1978, and from 1978 towards Vision 2020.  
 
The Early Years of the Department of Aborigines 
The Federal Department of the Adviser of the Aborigines, established in 1949, was the earliest 
administrative body mandated to advise the government on the position of the aborigines in 
Malaysia.  According to P.D.R. Williams-Hunt, the policy of the Department was “...not to de-
tribalise the aborigines, which would make them lose pride in themselves...”, but “to get them to 
improve their own way of living and make them proud of their race” (Sunday Mail, “Aborigine 
Handicraft are Dying Out”, 19.2.50).   
 
Advising the Government on how it should deal with the aborigines was no easy task.  As noted 
in the memorandum on a ‘Suggested Policy for Aboriginal Advancement’ dated September 1950,  
In view of the present almost complete lack of information it is extremely difficult to advise 
on advancement policy except in the broadest terms.  The Federal Department of the 
Adviser on Aborigines is charged with the task of instituting research into aboriginal life 
and custom, collating information on a Federal basis and advising measures that might 
be taken…47
 
Of great import was the basic question: who were the aborigines’?  There was a lacuna waiting to 
be filled concerning exactly who constituted ‘the aborigines’, where they were located, and what 
their origins were.  Most ‘aborigines’ had been hard to track down, escaped enumeration in 
censuses, slipped between ethnic categories, and generally confused British administrators.   
 
                                                 
47 Circular Memorandum No. 15: Some Notes on a Suggested Policy for Aboriginal Advancement, September 1950, in BA 
Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, National Archives of Malaysia, Call No: 1963/0000924.  It continues “…. It goes 
without saying that in the present emergency very little research work can be undertaken…“ 
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 The ‘aborigines’ were also not just docile subjects ready to be administered.  Previous 
engagements with government officials from other departments had already left a mark.  As the 
Chief Secretary of the Federal Secretariat noted in October 1950, 
In the past they have received little assistance from the Government and their main 
contacts with the Government through the Forest and Game Departments and the Mukim 
Penghulus have been to their disadvantage rather than the reverse…. Even now when 
the Communists are placing exacting demands on aboriginal communities the latter are 
reluctant to turn to the Government that, to their way of thinking, has treated them so 
badly in the past48.   
 
Thus, the first task of the Department was to ‘find’ their subjects; to establish basic knowledge 
about them, including their numbers, locations, and lifestyles.  It was also to design strategies to 
‘manage’ these populations, which meant devising ways of tracking, controlling and influencing 
them.   It was hoped that the efforts of the Department would result in the aborigines being ‘won 
over’ to the side of the British government so that the menace of Communism could be curbed. 
 
‘Finding’ the Aborigines:  Ethnography, Category and Belonging49
Up to this point, the topic of aboriginal lifestyles and populations had been more the 
preoccupation of anthropologists and scholars than colonial administrators.  Theories already 
abounded on the ways in which they should be classified and known.  Opinions had been 
published about their ‘racial origins’, the manner of their ‘evolution’, their ‘breeding’, their ‘stocks’ 
and ‘strains’.  However, As R.O.D. Noone, who became Adviser to the Aborigines in 1953, noted 
“(t)o trace the anthropological discoveries in the Malayan jungles from the time the British first 
                                                 
48 Letter from the Chief Secretary, Federal Secretariat, Federation of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, dated 18th October 1950 to 
State Secretaries, Settlement Secretaries and British Advisors.  BA Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, National 
Archives of Malaysia, Call No: 1963/0000924. 
49 In this section, I reconstruct the ways administrative categories were formed over who “the aborigines” constituted.  This 
does not suggest, however, that those who fell into this category did not already consider themselves to be “indigenous” 
to the land (i.e., this was not just an externally introduced concept).  The Seng-oi for example, as Juli Edo (1998:22) 
explains, claim to be mai pasak, indigenous inhabitants of Peninsular Malaysia.  However, this sense of indigeneity is not 
restricted to ‘the aborigines’ alone.  Other groups, such as (those who have become known as) “the Malays”, as well as 
some Eurasian descendants (see Goh, 2002), also claim to be “indigenous”.  However, they were not considered 
“aborigines”. 
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 began opening up the Peninsula in the 1880s is to wade through a mass of confused theorizing 
based at times on the flimsiest evidence” (Noone and Holman, 1972:6).   
 
Scholars whose works on ‘native’ communities became key texts in understanding the Malayan 
aborigines (e.g. Skeat and Blagden, 1906; Schebesta, 1927; Evans, 1937), adopted a panoramic 
gaze, surveying all that lay within the Peninsula and setting out for the reader the different 
categories/groups within which the ‘aborigines’ were placed.  The curly-haired ‘Negrito’ tended to 
be described first, followed by the ‘more-settled’ ‘Sakais’ and some mention of the ‘Proto-Malays’, 
communities that were very similar in social organization to the ‘Malays’.  Emphasis, in such 
description, was placed on ‘race’, physical attributes, ‘level’ of ‘civilization’, rituals, taboos, and 
religious beliefs. 
 
By June 1950, as documented in their “Note on Aboriginal Nomenclature”50 the Department of the 
Adviser on Aborigines had already decided upon the existence of “three very distinct racial 
groups amongst the aborigines each divided into a number of ethnic groups or tribes which 
usually possess distinctive names.”  These “main racial divisions” were noted as the Negritos 
(which he noted comprised “Malay, Semang, and Pangan”), Sakai (comprising “Malay and 
Sakai”) and Proto-Malay (including “Malay and Jakun”).  Ethnographic surveys were conducted 
by the Department with greater intensity in order to estimate population sizes and fill in gaps in 
information.  Enumerators were trained to record the reported locations of the groups they came 
into contact with, and to judge their ages, racial stocks, and ethnic groups of belonging.  As 
recorded in a Memorandum dated 25th June 1950, enumerators were instructed, 
 
If a specific ethnic group is mentioned an attempt should be made to give the group 
name – i.e. what the aborigines call themselves – if this can be ascertained but it is 
emphasized that many groups will not give their group name.  Vague general terms such 
                                                 
50 ‘A Note on Aboriginal Nomenclature’, Letter from the Adviser on Aborigines, Federation of Malaya, dated 25 June 1950, 
BA Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, National Archives of Malaysia, Call No: 1963/0000924. 
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 as “orang bukit” [person of the hill] or “orang paya” [person of the marsh] should be 
avoided…. [my emphasis]51
 
Attempts were made to devise a fixed system of categorization that would fit in with administrative 
needs52.  After much deliberation, the three ‘racial groups’ were retained, which further subdivided 
into 18-19 ‘ethnic groups’ (depending on the date of the text).  All the different groups 
encountered – with varying linguistic affinities, material cultures, economic practices, and cultural 
and social organizations – were made to fit into a fixed grid that contained these categories53.  
The present classifications used are set out in Figure 2 in Chapter 1).   
 
How were the aborigines categorized in relation to other ‘native’ populations during this period?  
This was the subject of M.V. Del Tufo (1949)’s comments concerning the 1947 Population 
Census.  As he informs us, enumerators were quite vexed about how to categorize ‘the 
aborigines’.  Great difficulty was already faced in ascertaining the precise members of the 
politically significant ‘Malays’.  The Malay populations were quite diverse, with different waves of 
immigrants crossing the seas from across Indonesia, “ethnographically indistinguishable”, as he 
writes, from the local Malays.  As such, two categories were allowed – “Malays” and “Other 
Malaysians”54, the latter referring to those with greater affinities to being called “immigrant 
Malays”, or who recognized themselves (and were recognized by others) as “Indonesians”.  While 
                                                 
51 Letter from the Adviser on Aborigines, F.M. dated 25 June 1950, BA Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, National 
Archives of Malaysia, Call No: 1963/0000924.   This desire for greater ‘specificity’ was echoed in other census forms, 
when concerted attempts were made to collect statistics related to birth and death rates, in order to correct the 1947 
Census.  An example of these exercises was one targeting the “resettled aboriginal groups in Malay kampungs” circa 
1950.  In relation to “race of group” (“race” seems to have been used interchangeably with “ethnicity”), enumerators were 
asked to “try and give the name these people call themselves – i.e. Blanas, Orang Kanar, Semai, etc., – and avoid vague 
general terms such as Sakai, Orang Bukit or Orang Darat.” (Census of Resettled Aboriginal Groups in Malay Kampungs, 
c. June 1950.  BA Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, National Archives of Malaysia, Call No: 1963/0000924). 
52 Williams-Hunt (1952) noted the complications inherent in trying to establish distinctive names for each aboriginal ethnic 
group, saying, ‘a group may have three names, one used by itself, one by which it is called by the Malays and one or 
more by which it is known to adjacent Aboriginal groups.  Furthermore, many tribes will conceal their group name to 
outsiders’ (p.19).   
53 To this day, the rationale behind this categorization has eluded the everyday understandings of many Orang Asli 
individuals, who are puzzled by what these labels mean. In my fieldwork, I have found that most Orang Asli individuals do 
not place and know of themselves through the “three broad racial groups” so inherent in all descriptions of the Orang Asli.  
Some still do not personally use the names given to their own ‘ethnic groups’, although they are aware of the need to 
identify themselves as such to others.  Yet, these terms are employed by Orang Asli to refer to other Orang Asli.  Seng-oi  
individuals for example, use the labels Jakun, Mah Meri, Temuan to refer to other Orang Asli. 
54 This should not be confused with the present use of the term “Malaysian”, which refers to one’s citizenship.  To identify 
individuals more specifically, it is common to refer to them by both ethnic group and citizenship, e.g. Chinese Malaysian, 
or Indian Malaysian. 
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 the ‘aborigines’ were returned in the 1931 census as “Other Malaysians”, in 1947 “the aboriginal 
stocks” were deemed to have “more affinity” with the ‘Malays’ than the ‘Other Malaysians’, and 
thus they were reassigned to being ‘Malay’.  Del Tufo explains additionally, that it was difficult to 
distinguish between them and the ‘Malays’ as a considerable number of the settled aborigines 
had already been recorded as Malays55.   
 
The ways in which the aborigines were constituted drew upon existing norms for establishing 
difference.  As we can see from Del Tufo’s writings, among others, the aborigines were often 
understood in relation to the more prominent ‘Mohammedan Malays’56, who were seen as being 
more civilized natives.  We also get a glimpse of how the aborigines were conceptualised by the 
Department in a memorandum entitled “Some Notes on A Suggested Policy for Aboriginal 
Advancement”, issued in September 1950.  It stated,  
The natural evolution of the 100,000 [sic] or so aborigines in the Federation of Malaya is 
to graduate from pure wandering hunting communities to shifting agriculture then to a 
more and more settled way of life until they become closely similar to the Malays, 
eventually embrace Islam and disappear into the Malay population (my emphasis)57. 
 
In an undated document (issued circa 1950), the Protector of the Aborigines of Selangor 
described the difficulties of administering the aborigines as one of “developing a backward Malay 
population”, and advocated that the Department continued its work so that “in ten years all the 
Selangor Aborigines should be firmly settled down and administered on exactly the same lines as 
                                                 
55 This highlights the ‘problem’ the Orang Asli grapple with up to today; that of maintaining a separation of their identity 
from that of Malays.  From an administrative perspective, it has been of great importance to focus on the ‘Malays’ 
because of their socio-political positioning.  This has often resulted in the ‘marginalization’ of the Orang Asli, represented 
in censuses in the ways they have been ‘subsumed’ into the ‘Malay’ ethnic category. 
56 Logan (1880) for example, writes of the “Binua tribes”, another “native race”, whose “dialects are Malay… (with) non-
Malay words”, their civilization being the “ruder Ultra-Indian and Malay kind”, their huts “ruder than those of the Malays” 
(p.86).  Ivan Polunin (1953) also writes the following, “Typical modern Malays differ from the Aboriginal Malays in that the 
former are mixed with other Malaysians from Indonesia, with Indians and Arabs and with female Chinese adopted by 
Malay families” (p.62).  Such juxtapositions (that evaluate the aboriginal groups against social understandings of ‘the 
Malays’) are repeated throughout the literature.  This is also evident in archived memorandums and letters issued by the 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs (e.g. see BA Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters (National Archives of Malaysia, Call 
Number: 1963/0000926).  This comparison is also informed by the dealings of “the Malays” with the “tribes” in question, 
and by the relationships between these two “racial groups”.   
57 Circular Memorandum No. 15: Some Notes on a Suggested Policy for Aboriginal Advancement, September 1950, in BA 
Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, National Archives of Malaysia, Call No: 1963/0000924.   
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 the Malays”58.  Thus, from an early stage, there were already ideas in the Department that 
aboriginal lifestyles were less desirable, and more ‘backward’ than those of ‘the Malays’, and that 
‘advancement’ meant gradual transformation of the aborigines to be similar in lifestyle to Malays. 
 
Aborigines and the Emergency Period 
For the purposes of security, it was insufficient to merely create categories, divisions and name 
titles for the aborigines.  The war against Communism required the movements of each person, 
including of each aborigine, to be tracked.  This was considered necessary as warfare included 
cutting supply lines to the ‘guerillas’, while keeping non-Communists fed and sufficiently provided 
for.  To this aim, identity and ration cards were issued for every person in the Peninsula.  In this 
manner, as Tim Harper writes, “the state became a presence in the lives of many Asians for the 
first time” (1999:8).   
 
For the aborigines in Perak, where the presence of Communist guerillas were strong, metal 
identity disks were provided by the state government, which detailed his/her name, registration 
number and personal particulars.  Rules were established that required that the reporting of all 
births and deaths, and metal disks were required to be returned posthumously.  ‘Tagging’ each 
and every aborigine was not an easy task, as the Adviser on Aborigines, Major P.D.R. Williams-
Hunt, notes in a Memorandum dated July 1950, when these procedures were considered for 
implementation across the Peninsula: 
The initial problem in undertaking registration of this nature is the staff required, the 
difficulty of contacting some groups and the subsequent difficulty of maintaining contact.  
Many groups in Malaya follow a wandering life and there is little doubt that there are 
many aboriginal groups who still remain unknown.  For example, no one has yet 
contacted the wild Semaq Palong in the SW of Pahang and until some of their houses 
                                                 
58 Notes from the Protector of Aborigines for Selangor, undated circa 1950, BA Selangor 70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, 
National Archives of Malaysia, Call No: 1963/0000924. 
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 were discovered by Security Forces a short time ago there was some doubt as to 
whether they existed.59
 
In order to prevent the aborigines from supporting the Communists, programmes such as 
resettlement of whole communities were also attempted, with disastrous effects.  Thousands of 
aborigines were brought out of jungles, transported to resettlement sites, and kept behind barbed 
wire.  Carey (1979) described these sites as hastily constructed villages that “resembled 
miniature concentration camps” (p.161)60.  By the end of 1953, it was quite clear that this was an 
ineffective policy.  An alternative strategy was proposed by Sir Gerald Templer to ensure their 
compliance.  He declared: “The control of the aborigines in deep jungle will be achieved by taking 
protection and administration to them rather than resettling them in new areas” (Miller, 1972:132).  
In order to cope with this reformulated mandate, an expansion and reorganization of the 
Department of Aborigines took place, with the number of officers employed growing from 10 to 
over 200 in the space of two months (Carey, 1979).   
 
Jungle forts were built, serving as posts where the aborigines could get access to schooling, 
medicines, and trade supplies (Short, 2000), which some were already obtaining through 
Communist channels.  ‘Civics courses’ were held to expose headmen to the workings of British 
government, entailing displays of fire-power, exposure to urban life, and the demonstration of 
impressive new technologies (Nicholas et al, 1989).  Radio broadcasts concerning health and 
security were made, specially directed to the aborigines, the beginning of what is presently the 
radio channel ‘Voice of the Orang Asli’ (Suara Orang Asli), FM91.1.  Intelligence networks were 
set up, and Senoi Praaq, a fighting squadron comprising aborigines, was established and trained 
to be part of the campaign.   
 
                                                 
59 The Registration of Aborigines:  A Note on the procedure Adopted in the State of Perak, June 1950. BA Selangor 
70/1950: Aboriginal Matters, National Archives of Malaysia, Call Number: 1963/0000926. 
60 According to Nicholas (1990), this project resulted in the death of about 7,000 people, and was abandoned in May 
1953.  Those that managed to escape warned their friends and family, causing greater suspicion among the aboriginal 
groups of the intentions of the government (Carey, 1979).   
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 Slowly, the multiple programmes and generous funding pumped in as part of the Emergency 
effort achieved its desired effects.  As detailed in the Report of the Standing Committee on 
Finance dated 18th August 1954, officers were to continue the task of “[gaining] the confidence 
and assistance of aboriginal groups” (Federation of Malaya, 1954b:26).  The Report estimated 
that “(s)ince December [1953] a total of about 1,600 aborigines have been definitely won over 
and are now firmly on the side of the Government, mainly in North-West Pahang and the adjacent 
area of Perak”, which was seen as being only about “30 percent of the task”.   
 
The reorganization and expansion of the Department resulted in it taking comprehensive 
responsibility for the administration of the aborigines, including their medical needs and 
education.  It became the agency through which all government initiatives for aborigines were 
implemented.  In 1961, the aborigines were made the responsibility of the Federal Government 
under the Ministry of the Interior, when they had been considered matters of state jurisdiction 
before (Jimin et al, 1983:41).  A statement released in the same year spelt out the policies that 
would be taken concerning the Orang Asli: 
they are an indigenous community whose social, economic and cultural development 
prevents them from sharing fully in the rights and advantages enjoyed by other sections 
of the population.  It is right therefore that the Government should adopt suitable 
measures designed for their protection and advancement with a view to their ultimate 
integration with the Malay section of the community (Ministry of the Interior, 1961, p.3) 
 
Activities by the Department were varied in size and scope (see Jimin, 1972), and special 
consideration was provided for the needs of the Orang Asli.  The education system it managed 
included the maintenance of schools and hostels to accommodate Orang Asli children.  The 
medical service it supervised incorporated the support of jungle medical posts, a Flying Doctor 
Service (which made it possible to evacuate patients from deep jungles), as well as an Orang Asli 
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 Hospital in Gombak61.  Its social and economic development initiatives included the construction 
of ‘model settlement’ schemes, which involved the planning and construction of home-sites, the 
clearing and planting of land, and the implementation of animal husbandry projects.  Research 
activities were supported (and monitored) in order to build more data on Orang Asli groups.  The 
Department also maintained a wireless communication network in order to keep in contact with 
administrative and medical posts in deep jungle areas62.   
 
Advancement in Times of Peace:  Modernity and Transformation for Progress 
In line with the principles of the Rukunegara and the New Economic Policy, the objective 
of the Government has been to ensure that the Orang Asli enjoy development and 
prosperity that are equitable and from there on to unite or to integrate them with 
mainstream society.  
Guidelines on the Development of the Orang Asli in Modern Malaysian Society 
(Panduan Tugas Pembangunan Orang Asli  
di dalam Masyarakat Malaysia Moden) 
Ministry of Home Affairs (1978:1, my translation) 
 
 
In 1978, a shift in policy took place with the publication of the ‘Guidelines on the Development of 
the Orang Asli in Modern Malaysian Society’, and further emphasis was placed on their socio-
economic development – specifically, their resettlement and their participation in agricultural 
projects “located with or nearby projects for other bumiputera so that the process of integration 
can be accelerated” (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1978:1).  Orang Asli have been encouraged to be 
involved in new initiatives organized by agencies such as FELDA, FELCRA and the Pahang 
Tenggara Development Authority (DARA), which have focused on developing massive projects to 
transform land into cash earning plantations.   
                                                 
61 This site, where Orang Asli from all over the Peninsula are brought together for medical treatment, is likely to be a social 
space in which the realities and significances of Orang Asli identity are experienced. 
62 More details about the Department’s activities can be found in financial budgets and reports published over the years 
(e.g. Malaysia, 1970:389-477; Kementerian Kewangan Malaysia, 1980:1269-1281, 1987:287-289).  It must be noted 
however, that a common complaint among the Orang Asli is that they have not seen the full benefits of such activities in 
terms of their economic and social well-being. 
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Administrative activities of the JHEOA for the Orang Asli continue to address a plethora of issues, 
from medical services, education, resettlement, and land schemes, to the provision of housing, 
school supplies, water, asphalt roads, electricity, community buildings and bridges.  The JHEOA 
is the only Federal body that has responsibility for a specific ethnic/racial target group, functioning 
as a ‘one stop shop’ in everyday issues.  The heavy accountabilities that the JHEOA currently 
holds not only require considerable manpower, but a wide range of skills, as it caters for 
communities facing very different needs and requirements.  Over time, some of these functions 
have devolved to other ministries, such as education (which came under the purview of the 
Ministry of Education in 1995), health, and agricultural development.  It has been contended that 
such administrative load is inefficient, unnecessary, and curtails the autonomy of the Orang Asli 
in making decisions for themselves (Nicholas, 2000).  The JHEOA represents the Orang Asli in 
official capacities, and acts as the point of connection between the Orang Asli and all other 
government agencies.  Such close management has been a point of frustration for Orang Asli 
leaders, one of whom commented to me, 
The JOA is successful in instilling paternalistic control over the Orang Asli.  Certain 
Orang Asli look at the JOA as a force that they have to listen to, that they must follow, 
and [whom] they cannot go against.  It’s ridiculous!  Even when I wanted to bring a friend 
to see a kampung, in order to study their language, we have to ask the JOA for 
permission first! (Interview, December 2002) 
 
The problems that Orang Asli have with such state-sponsored development initiatives are often 
effaced.  Contrary to explicit goals, such projects have sometimes contributed to the increasing 
deprivation of the Orang Asli (Zawawi, 1996).  Ajas of Pahang, for example, commented in a 
letter to a newspaper, 
[The] JHEOA with its regroupment schemes indirectly becomes the primary cause of 
poverty of the Orang Asli in Pahang.  Many of the RPS [Regroupment Schemes, 
Rancangan Penempatan Semula] were introduced and established in traditional villages 
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 with the destruction of fruit orchards and primary produce (rubber) which have given 
equitable returns to Orang Asli individuals without indemnity and compensation on the 
‘loss’ of their source of income…. Our resources around the village are destroyed and we 
are forced to travel far in order to find resources for livelihood which makes us roam for 
months and this is what causes the JHEOA to interpret that we always refuse 
development (Berita Harian, 19.06.1990, my translation). 
 
Studies also indicate that the RPS projects for the Orang Asli have not been as successful as 
hoped, leading to reduced health and nutrition levels (Khoo, 1977; Chee, 1995), dependency on 
the market economy, and increased proletarianization (Endicott, 1979)63.   
 
Land Matters 
For a colonised people the most essential value, because the most concrete, is first and 
foremost the land; the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity. 
   Frantz Fanon 
The Wretched of the Earth (1965:36) 
 
Land is the most important issue for the Orang Asli today, for without it, we have no 
rights.  Until now, the Orang Asli are still unprotected in this matter. 
   Majid Suhut,  
President of POASM  
Interview, July 2003 
 
We have been told for a long time that the land we live on is State land.  The OA 
themselves already say this.  Historically they have followed the customs of the land, but 
they have been brainwashed [to think it is State land].  Now we are trying to create 
                                                 
63 The frustration, ambivalence and tension with the JOA/ JHEOA is expressed in the alternative ways in which Orang Asli 
describe the Department.  Some interpret the acronym ‘JOA’ to mean Jual Orang Asli - ‘selling out the Orang Asli’ 
(Nicholas, 2002:126) and others call it the ‘Department of the Malays’ (Dentan, 2002).  
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 awareness that we are ‘indigenous peoples’; that these are our own lands.  But the 
process to know our own rights is a difficult one.  People are still afraid of the JOA, the 
police.  They want to move, but they are afraid of getting arrested.  The function of the 
authorities is not clear to them.  They only know that the police are government, and the 
government can have them arrested. 
Semai Orang Asli 
Leader of a civil society group 
Interviewed June 2003 
 
Control over customary lands and, correspondingly, over their own livelihoods and lifestyles, is 
one of the key struggles for the Orang Asli.  Operating on the legitimacy of the Torrens system of 
land tenure introduced in the late 1800s by British officials (in which all unalienated lands are, by 
default, ‘Sultanate land’), land development programmes were launched on an unprecedented 
scale in order to accelerate the extraction of resources and to push for aggressive economic 
growth.  The relationship of the Orang Asli to their customary lands changed not only through the 
resettlement programmes organized by the JHEOA64, but also as a result of State appropriation 
of land for ‘development’, purportedly in the interests of the nation65.    
 
While certain sections of ‘Sultanate land’ have been gazetted as ‘aboriginal reserves’ and 
‘aboriginal areas’, this has been a slow process, and, certainly, does not reflect actual occupation 
patterns (Williams-Hunt, 1995).  Such arrangements give the Orang Asli some rights over the 
management of the land, but these are not as secure as the status of Malay Reservation Land 
(see Chapter 4).  With the rise of capitalist modes of exchange, rapid urbanization, the expansion 
of areas deemed suitable for ‘development’, the land upon which many Orang Asli communities 
                                                 
64 As reported in the 8th Malaysia Plan, land development and resettlement projects for the Orang Asli involved about 
19,800 hectares of land and 8,100 Orang Asli families during the 7th Malaysia Plan period.  Furthermore, measures to 
“improve the welfare and economic well-being of the Orang Asli” have meant resettlement into areas developed by RISDA 
and FELCRA, training in vocational skills, and vegetable farming.  This regroupment involved 3,350 households being 
moved onto 9,939 hectares of land. 
65 While Act 134 requires that the Orang Asli be given compensation for fruit trees and housing structures in the event of 
any eviction from their villages, it (read alongside the National Land Code) does not recognise their ownership over the 
land itself, and therefore frees developers and new owners from the burden of purchasing the land at market value.  This 
changed when the Sagong Case was brought to Court, as elaborated in Chapter 4. 
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 have settled has become a prized commodity with high commercial values.  On many occasions, 
land has literally been transacted from under their feet to private developers or businessmen, 
requiring their relocation time and again.  Dispossession of Orang Asli from their customary lands 
has already occurred for projects such as the Temenggor (Tan, 1993, cited in Lim, 1997), Linggiu 
Valley and Sungai Selangor Dams, the construction of the Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
(Bunnell, 2004; Nicholas, 2003a), the development of University Kebangsaan Malaysia in Bangi, 
and the building of residential homes and commercial complexes at Bukit Lanjan.   
 
A recent concession to granting Orang Asli individuals with title to their lands is the provision of 
99-year leases according to the Group Resettlements Act.  Under the scheme, each family is 
provided with 6 acres of land for cultivation, and 10 acres of land for their houses.  However, this 
provision has been unsatisfactory to Orang Asli leaders.  As Norya Abas commented during the 
POASM Annual General Meeting in April 2004, “our identity is forever, not just for 99 years”.   In 
addition, restrictions are imposed on the management of these lands; they cannot be transferred, 
leased, or mortgaged without official permission66.  Struggles over land have also been fought 
through the Malaysian courts and, to date, decisions in two landmark cases have created some 
foundation for articulating Orang Asli land rights (see Chapter 4). 
 
‘Membangun Bersama Islam’: Spiritual Development, Integration and Assimilation 
The 1961 policy statement of the Department, quoted earlier, was not far different from the spirit 
of administration proposed in 1950, in which sensitive questions concerning cultural difference 
were implied.  Baharon Azhar, Director General of the JOA from 1969 – 1986, noted during his 
appointment that “(m)ost Malays and indeed many other Malaysians as well have been inclined to 
                                                 
66 According to conversations with older Semai villagers, the JHEOA constantly insists that they stay fixed in one location 
rather than move about.  Although it was previously common for families to tear down their house and to construct a new 
one some distance away, this practice has been discouraged.   Because of the intervention of the JHEOA, the Semai in 
Perak now live in larger villages with a greater concentration of people than they did before.  A community development 
worker of a Malaysian NGO said to me, “to the JHEOA, the Orang Asli being settled in fixed villages in a sign of progress” 
(Interview, 24.11.02). 
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 interpret “integration with the Malay section of the community” as meaning masuk Melayu or 
‘becoming Malay’, in short embracing Islam (1972:7)67.    
 
The desire to have the Orang Asli Islamizised is currently not a hidden one, although it was 
initially kept a secret for a number of years (COAC, 1997; Dentan and Endicott, 2002).  In 1983, 
the JHEOA published its “Strategy for the Spread of Islam among Orang Asli Society” in which a 
RM14,214,500 programme was discussed to achieve “the spread of Islam across the whole of 
Orang Asli society”, and “the integration/ assimilation among the Orang-Orang Asli with Malay 
society” (JHEOA, 1983).  Ten years later, in a newspaper article dated 24th July 1993, the “efforts 
of the government to Islamisize 80,000 Orang Asli in the next 10 years” were openly declared.  
Quoting the Head of Islamic Affairs Division at the Prime Minister’s Office, Zainal Abidin Abdul 
Kadir, the article reported that “until this point, around 8,000 or 10 percent of the 82,000 Orang 
Asli in the whole country have accepted Islam and this total is unsatisfactory (kurang 
memuaskan)”.  Short and long-term strategies were announced, including the placement of 
‘religious officials’ (pegawai agama) in Orang Asli villages, and the expenditure of RM20 million in 
1992 by the Special Unit for the Proselytization of the Orang Asli (Unit Khas Dakwah Orang Asli) 
for the building of community halls and religious schools in OA villages (also see Nicholas and 
Williams-Hunt, 1996)68.   
 
Islamisization is often couched in terms of being able to develop and modernize the Orang Asli, to 
improve their level of living, rather than leaving them ‘backward’.  Government activities to 
Islamisize the Orang Asli have been conducted through partnership and coordination among 
State bodies, including the JHEOA, special proselytisation agencies and State Islamic Affairs 
Departments.  As Zakuan Sawai (1996/97) records, this has included conducting Islamic courses 
in Orang Asli villages, holding Islamic classes for Orang Asli children in JHEOA schools,  Islamic 
leadership classes among JHEOA school teachers and workers, as well as communicating 
                                                 
67 He further adds, “It is largely because of this somewhat general Malay attitude to the whole problem that they often 
resent the Christian Missionaries’ proselytizing activities among the Orang Asli groups, since it is argued that such 
activities would prevent the Orang Asli from being ‘integrated’ with them” (p.7).   
68 In addition, special scholarships have been provided for Muslim Orang Asli, for example by the Majlis Agama Islam 
Negeri Sembilan (“30 peratus murid Orang Asli kandas”, Berita Harian, 31.10.1998) 
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 Islamic principles to villagers at a local level (see also Mohd Sabri, 1999/2000; Wazir, 1995).  In 
addition, proselytization activities have been carried out by civil society groups in coordination 
with State bodies (further elaborated in Chapter 5). 
 
The process of Islamisization carries meanings far beyond theological principles of faith.  This is 
especially heightened by everyday perception among the Orang Asli that to masuk Islam is to 
masuk Melayu (see Nicholas, 1996; Dentan et al, 1997; Dentan, 1997).  This conflation between 
religious and ethnic identity causes great anxiety among some individuals, particularly parents, 
who are afraid that if their children convert (for example, by marrying Malays) their grandchildren 
will, by default and inevitably, be declared ‘Malay’ to the loss of their Orang Asli identity.  This has 
been seen as a way in which the Orang Asli can be ‘colonised’.  As an Orang Asli leader said to 
me,  
They think that their religion is complete, [that] if the people convert, they can totally 
change their life.  They believe that their life will become better…. Their intent may be 
good.  They really believe that ‘Islam is the perfect religion’.  [But] from that they have the 
power to conquer other people, using religion to conquer.  In the long run, there will be no 
more Orang Asli.” 
 
A repeated theme in conversations with people is a perception among Orang Asli of being 
pressured to masuk Islam.  In the course of my fieldwork, I came across such stories again and 
again.  According to one story, members of a village were invited to a kenduri organized by “the 
Jabatan” (it was unclear exactly which one), after which, they were handed two sarongs and 
declared a Muslim.  In another story, villagers were asked to surrender their identity cards for the 
registration of some land, and then found themselves registered as Muslims.  Most of these 
stories I was unable to substantiate to ascertain their accuracy, and without first-hand observation 
I am disinclined to present these stories as ‘facts’ of what happened.  However, they are 
indicative of the indignation, feelings of outrage, and sometimes helplessness of villagers, in the 
face of the pressure to convert to Islam (also see Howell, 2002).  I have been told that some 
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 Orang Asli even ascribe to other faiths (Christianity, Bahai) in order to escape the pressures of 
such conversion (also see Benjamin, 1996; Dentan, 2002)69. 
 
‘World-class Bumiputera’ 
Thus, a collective reference to them as ‘primitive’, ‘backward’ or as having social 
characteristic [sic] which are not conducive to social development have to dropped.  For 
today, there are [a] few of them in the universities and institutes of techonology, 
bureaucrats, executive [sic], businessmen and professionals spread out in the 
government service and private sector…. 
Who are the Orang Asli 
plaque on display at the Orang Asli Museum, Gombak 
viewed December 2002 
 
…we have hardly begun to realize the full potential of Orang Asli as citizens of the 
country.  We must give them the full benefit of the best education; that they may soon 
complete [sic] with us on equal footing… 
Reasons why we need to know the Orang Asli Arts  
plaque on display at the Orang Asli Museum, Gombak 
viewed December 2002 
 
In the Malaysia Plans and in government documents, the Orang Asli are categorized as being 
bumiputera, and have been included in bumiputera schemes70. In the 8th Malaysia Plan, special 
programmes have been unveiled for the Orang Asli, for example a Comprehensive Development 
Plan under the aegis of the Skim Pembangunan Kesejahteraan Rakyat (SPKR).  The Orang Asli 
                                                 
69 It is reported that up to 1998, 2000 of the 6000 Orang Asli in Kelantan had masuk Islam, 500 of whom converted in 
1997 (“Orang Asli ikut arus perubahan”, Berita Harian, 4.11.1998).  In Selangor in 1999, 1,123 Orang Asli were registered 
with in the Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor (“Program keagamaan Orang Asli”, Minarni Mat Saad, Berita Harian, 4.3.1999) 
70 For example, the Orang Asli have been given a special allocation of RM100 million in the Amanah Saham Bumiputera 
(ASB)-PPRT scheme.  RM79 million was disbursed by the end of 1999 for 15,820 households (Economic Planning Unit, 
2001, p.60).  In the Third Outline Perspective Plan (OPP3), to be implemented from 2001 to 2010, poverty eradication 
programmes are to take on a more “target-specific approach”, with particular focus among the Orang Asli and bumiputera 
minorities in Sabah and Sarawak (Halipah Esa, 2002). 
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 are also included in several national poverty eradication schemes, such as projects under the 
Development Programme for the Hardcore Poor (Program Pembangunan Rakyat Termiskin, 
PPRT), the Integrated Development of Remote Villages Programme organized by the Ministry of 
Rural Development, and those launched by agencies such as FELDA, FELCRA and RISDA. 
 
Education has also been prioritized in the programme of progress set out for the Orang Asli.  This 
is perhaps most evident in two magazines produced by the JHEOA ‘Orang Asli Berjaya’ (JHEOA, 
2002) and ‘Orang Asli Berjaya: Edisi II’ (JHEOA, 2003) featuring ‘successful’ Orang Asli.  It does 
not take much analysis of the text of these booklets to see that the Orang Asli are encouraged to 
reproduce themselves in specific ways.  For example, they are told:  “All cultural laws (hukum 
adat) and taboos synonymous with Orang Asli society must be overcome by contemporary 
students in order to follow in the footsteps of those who have succeeded” (JHEOA, 2002, p.2).  In 
these narrations, the role of the JHEOA is put forward positively, and emphasis is placed on their 
contributions in terms of funding and support. 
 
Struggles over Orang Asli land and lifestyles, I argue, must be seen as a continuation of the 
colonial project begun by British administrators prior to Independence71, and in relation to the 
broader direction set by the Government of Malaysia for all the peoples under its jurisdiction.  The 
ambitious programmes embarked upon by the postcolonial government have required 
transformations not only of the Orang Asli, but of other groups that do not fit in with Vision 2020 
aims for the Malaysian population, including rural Malays.  Urban and rural populations feel the 
effects of such required ‘development’ differently.  In relation to rural populations, the ideals of the 
government towards Vision 2020 can be seen in a speech delivered by Dato’ Annuar Hj. Musa 
(then Minister of Rural Development) in 1995, in which he called on rural communities to “change 
their paradigm” so that they would be in line with another “transformation”.  He stated, “Rural 
                                                 
71 As Tim Harper (1999) records, colonial projects from the 1950s onwards transformed the lives rural Malays 
dramatically.  Malay villagers were resettled, ‘modern’ medical services introduced, health campaigns were launched, and 
traditional medicines with associated ‘primitive superstitions’ scorned by a growing number of ‘native’ professionals.  Mass 
education, large scale cash cropping and the spread of technology changed the demographics and lifestyles of the rural 
population.  These initiatives were to continue, as economically driven nation-building plans scripted industrialization, and 
then ‘knowledge work’, as suitable activities for modern Malaysians.   
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 transformation that is attractive, progressive, and profitable will not happen if its people are not 
dynamic, creative, and participative” (INFRA, 1995, p.8).  He further elaborated that “The new 
philosophy (matlamat falsafah baru) for rural development is to develop (membangun) rural 
people who are capable of achieving pure values (menguasai nilai murni) so that they would be 
able to use the factors of time, information and resources optimally” (my translation, p.9).   
 
As we can see in government plans and programmes, it is not in the interest of the Government 
to promote the collecting of forest produce, swidden farming, subsistence crops, or hunting and 
trapping, as viable economic initiatives for rural Orang Asli communities.  Instead, it is preferred 
that Orang Asli communities be permanently settled and working on plantations (particularly palm 
oil or rubber) extended on a large scale to traditional lands.  These are activities that may indeed 
“bring them into the mainstream of economic development”, but does not necessarily lead to their 
overall well-being.  Not only is subsistence farming on fixed plots of land unproductive over the 
long-term because of poor soil quality, palm-oil and rubber prices are subject to world commodity 
prices72. 
 
The introduction of aggressive development projects is to continue under the 8th Malaysia Plan.  
Not only has land targeted for replanting more than doubled, from 234,423 hectares to 532,354 
hectares, and land sought out for consolidation and rehabilitation been increased from 292,724 to 
422,057 hectares, but ‘new’ land will be opened, mostly for palm oil cultivation.  Targets for ‘new 
land’ have been raised to 365,269 hectares, with the Aborigines Affairs Department responsible 
for 12,774 hectares (Economic Planning Unit, 2001:208). 
 
In short, it is hoped that the Orang Asli will transform themselves, first to abandon their traditional 
lifestyles in favour of the development options already introduced for (other) rural Malays, and 
                                                 
72 The 8th Malaysia Plan states that the price of crude palm oil fluctuated from RM1,472 per tonne in 1995 to RM2,377.50 
in 1998 to RM1,000 per tonne in 2000, “due to the increase in world production and build-up in stocks as well as 
competition from other vegetable oils” (8MP, p.209).  Export earnings have been on a decline, by 3% per annum from 
1996 to 2000.  The price of rubber has also fallen, from RM3.90 per kg in 1995 to RM2.50 in 2000 “due to increase in 
production from other major producer countries and failure of the international stock piling mechanism” (p.209). 
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 eventually, following the logic of the 8th Malaysia Plan, to take their place along other Malays to 
be “world-class Bumiputera”73.  Seen through the lens of economic efficiency, this is a plan that 
makes more sense than to gazette huge tracts of valuable land as aboriginal reserves, when 
these can be used for logging, cash cropping, or as sites for commercial or industrial properties.   
 
It is important to emphasise, as Orang Asli leaders have frequently pointed out, that the Orang 
Asli are not ‘anti-development’ (see also Zawawi, 1996).   In fact, most are desirous of economic 
‘development’ that leads to their overall well-being.  However, many have long become 
disenchanted with this possibility, having experienced ‘poverty eradication’ programmes that do 
not fulfill their purposes.  “The Resettlement Scheme”, as an Orang Asli leader said to me, “is a 
social control mechanism.  They think it will solve the [Orang Asli] problem, but it solves it for the 
government, not the Orang Asli”.   
 
Conclusion 
The JHEOA and the Orang Asli can be likened to a ‘bird’ and the ‘keeper’ of its nest.  The 
birds can actually fly like other birds, if they weren’t contained in a nest by its keeper.  
The time has come when a group of Orang Asli feel that it is better that the birds just be 
released. And the nest dissolved.  The JHEOA is now 42 years old.  It has reached 
adulthood and sufficient maturity.  Sadly, it is still unproductive (mandul) and is not 
effective in protecting the rights of the Orang Asli; particularly from intense forces that 
come in the name of development. 
Majid Suhut 
Presidential speech at the 8th POASM Annual General Meeting in 1997 
(POASM, 1997a:6-7, my translation) 
 
In this chapter, I have focused on three themes which are directly relevant to the present 
experiences that Orang Asli have in postcolonial Malaysia.  The first has to do with the way in 
                                                 
73 Melayu Baru (the new Malay) is term recently introduced to refer to the entrepreneurial, middle class and hardworking 
Malays (see Shamsul, 1999), in ‘contrast’ to the racially ‘lazy’ Malays theorized by Mahathir (1970). 
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 which the ‘aborigines’ – which existed in an ‘ideal form’ in the minds of British officials – were 
‘found’, categorized, and constituted.  Through everyday administrative practices such as census-
taking and mapping, a new category of people was created in order to account for the variety of 
minority groups who held themselves (and were held) apart from the lifestyles of other ethnic 
groups.  This resulted in the melding together of communities whose members were previously 
either unaware of, afraid of, or who (even deliberately) avoided one another.  In this 
administrative manner, their lives have been tied together and their experiences systematically 
unified.  The categorizing and classification of people also provided an official conceptual 
framework through which the aboriginal groups are now known, as well as how they know about 
and refer to themselves.  This has been normalized, repeated through official accounts, and 
taken as commonsensical when referring to the Orang Asli. 
 
The second theme concerns the ownership (by proxy) and management of lands under 
administrative systems.  “Colonial intervention”, as Mohideen Abdul Kader (2000) writes, “led to 
the concentration of power over land and its uses in the hands of colonial authorities” (p.13).  
Under the Torrens system of land tenure, lands previously handed down for generations were 
commoditized in titles, becoming assets that could be alienated, transacted, and owned.  This 
system gave powers to both the colonial and postcolonial regimes to control resources across the 
Peninsula. Transformation of land use under the sovereignty of the latter quickly surpassed that 
introduced by the former.  This has resulted in the frequent dispossession and displacement of 
Orang Asli communities, their required inclusion into ‘resettlement’/ ‘regroupment’ projects, and 
the seizure of their customary lands (Nicholas, 2000). 
 
Third, I highlight that administration continues to transform and reposition the Orang Asli, moving 
them towards normative, modernist notions of ‘progress’ and ‘development’, as their lives are 
rendered calculable and comparable to other Malaysians.  Administration has been the most 
intense and direct operational mechanism for effecting such change, working through a variety of 
initiatives carried out by organisations that operate in concert.  These (continue to) include the 
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 Department of Aboriginal Affairs (Jabatan Hal-Ehwal Orang Asli, JHEOA), the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Rural Development, the Islamic Affairs Department, as well as 
‘development’ agencies such as the FELDA, FELCRA, and RISDA.  
 
Administrative aims for the Orang Asli have been made explicit over the years.  As expressed 
through the JHEOA – and repeated in the 5 yearly Malaysia Plans, newspapers, conference 
speeches, political campaigns, and numerous other government documents – the Malaysian 
government is intent on efforts to “modernize the Orang Asli… because they are considered as 
Bumiputeras that are still backward in the [sic] socio-economic standing” (JHEOA, undated).  This 
communicates a sense of their placement and displacement in the nation-state, reinscribing an 
implication of their ‘lack’ vis-à-vis others.  These arguments – which we can see expressed 
innocently in government statistics, and effected through nation-building plans that explicitly 
desire the ‘restructuring of society’ – are rooted in normative comparisons that equate and flatten 
out all citizens onto a singular, economically driven, numerically-coded base.  Such comparisons 
are also what produce Orang Asli narratives of themselves as being ‘lacking’, and wanting to be 
‘equal with the other races’.  These are hegemonic, powerful gazes upon/of self that are created, 
sustained and reinforced both subtly and overtly, and that operate such that the Orang Asli are 
disciplined and, whether consciously or not, discipline themselves to live up to notions of the 
‘ideal Malaysian citizen’. 
  
‘Modernization’ through administration, as I have detailed above, does not just include a change 
in the economic activities of the Orang Asli.  Rather, it encompasses integration into mainstream 
society, which (in a Malay-centric, postcolonial nation enraptured with ‘developed status’) 
includes their transformation into ‘ideal subjects’, based upon the economically-productive Malay 
Muslim Modern Citizen.  Orang Asli, as the quintessential bumiputera ‘unmodern’, must remake 
themselves in line with the latest nation-building plans that seek to produce the “world-class 
Bumiputera”.   Indeed, the government works hard not to ‘leave the Orang Asli behind’, and 
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 continues to strive so that they take their place “equal to other bumiputera”74.  This has meant not 
only requiring changes in their economic practices, but in their psychological, spiritual, and social 
transformation.   
 
                                                 
74 In “Musa ingatkan JOA jangan bersikap ketuanan”, Utusan Melayu, 16.09.81. 
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 CHAPTER 4:  ORANG ASLI IN MALAYSIAN LAW 
The present structures of the Malaysian legal system are the culmination of changes, 
amendments and developments over the past several centuries, since British colonial 
administrators introduced principles of English law in the 1800s.  In this period, the execution of 
these laws took into account the religions, manners, and customs of local inhabitants, giving legal 
recognition to selected customary practices (Hooker, 1976).  As the colonial government 
recognized the plurality of the peoples under its jurisdiction, it allowed/ required their identities to 
be established before the relevance and role of ‘customs’ in the colonial legal system could be 
evaluated.  Specifically, several types of identities became relevant to the legal system: those 
constructed on ‘racial’ grounds (such as ‘Chinese’ or ‘Malay’), religious grounds (e.g. ‘Muslim’), or 
on a combination of both (for example, a ‘Hindu’).   
 
In understanding the way the laws of Malaysia operates for the Orang Asli, it is useful to reflect on 
how cultural differences and ‘local’ customs have been included in legal systems around the 
world.  Jacob T. Levy (2000) argues that there are three broad ways in which customary forms of 
administrating justice (what he calls ‘indigenous law’) have been incorporated by modern nation-
states.  Each of these modes – customary law, common law, and self-government – he argues, 
operate according to different internal logics, hold dissimilar implications, and result in varying 
legal rights for indigenous people.  Customary law inclusions, he explains, happen when States 
recognize laws based on the customary rules of native populations, creating room for social 
practices to continue after colonization.  ‘Traditional laws’ are thus in operation, sitting alongside 
general laws, guiding legal decisions within Constitutionally prescribed limits.  Customary laws 
may be incorporated through the development of statutes and applied in specific cases in both 
special native courts and general courts.   
 
Common law inclusions, on the other hand, do not recognize customs as ‘laws’ in the full sense 
of the term, but give weight to them in the consideration of social situations.  That is, customary 
practices may create legal facts that trigger certain existing general laws.  As examples, 
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 customary marriages may gain legal status through the concept of common law marriage, and 
customary land rights gain legal status through the concept of adverse possession.  Levy 
explains that common law inclusions are accorded less status than customary law; for they are 
neither the recognition of customary ways of making law, nor do they focus on the content of 
customary law.  As such, native people remain subject to the same laws as other citizens of the 
nation-state, their customary practices merely given the same weight/ status as other equivalents 
in general law.  In the third mode, that of self-government, the sovereignty of indigenous/ native 
peoples is recognized, and thus they are allowed to be lawmakers.  That is, they are given the 
“right to give themselves laws rather than simply to live according to their laws” (p.306).  These 
approaches have been used in Malaysia in specifically different ways, and through separate 
mechanisms75, which I shall discuss at the end of this chapter. 
 
As stated earlier, the development of the colonial legal system in the Peninsula gave selective 
recognition to the customs and practices of distinct groups of people.  This legacy has continued 
(albeit with amendments as the corpus of law developed), and in contemporary law the principle 
of lawful discrimination operates for certain legally defined categories of people76.  This is not 
deemed to be in contradiction with Constitutional guarantees of equality before the law for all 
Malaysian citizens.  For the Orang Asli, I suggest that three types of identity definitions have 
implications for their legal position: their ethnic/racial difference, their religious ascription (in 
particular, in defining Muslims versus non-Muslims), and, because of the persuasiveness of 
international law for Malaysian legal judgments, their identification as being minority indigenous 
people according to United Nations definitions.  In the present legal system, there are three 
sources of legal rights for the Orang Asli: those provided for in the Federal Constitution, those 
                                                 
75 As Levy (2000) emphasizes, nation-states may adopt all three modes, rely more heavily on one type, or adopt various 
mixtures of all these approaches.  The self-government approach he sees to have had greater significance in the United 
States and Canada, while South Africa relies almost exclusively on customary inclusions and Australia on common law 
inclusions.  He argues that lawmakers and analysts often do not see these as being distinctive approaches, a matter he 
contends, leads to inconsistencies and incompatibilities that may inadvertently dis-privilege indigenous groups. 
76 For further discussion, see Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v. Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155, which establishes the 
principle that discrimination is permitted within clause (5) of Article 8 and Article 153 of the Constitution.  Also see Public 
Prosecutor v. Khong Teng Khen [1976] 2 MLJ 166, and Chandra Sri Ram v. Murray Hiebert [1997] 3 MLJ 240.  In the 
latter, Judge Low Hop Bing reviews various Federal and Supreme Court decisions and concludes that there is lawful 
discrimination in the Malaysian legal system. 
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 established through statutory law, and those developed under common law.  In this chapter, I 
deal with these in turn77.   
 
Orang Asli in the Federal Constitution 
A strict hierarchical ordering of texts exists in the Malaysian legal system, in which the Malay 
version of the Federal Constitution is held as the “supreme” authority (Federal Constitution, 
Article 160B).  It is to this that all political and legal developments are – in principle if not always in 
practice – required to adhere.  The Constitution sets out the roles of Federal and State 
governments, placing confines on the powers of the Executive78.  It not only divides the 
Executive, Legislative and Judiciary authorities79, but delimits the powers held by Parliament, and 
(at least ideally) regulates/ protects the freedoms of the peoples of the Malaysian nation-state.  
Because of the separation of powers, some space is constructed for the Courts to arbitrate in an 
impartial manner, among citizens, organizations, and members of the Executive.   
 
Nevertheless, there are limits on the supremacy of the Constitution.  These include provisions 
that allow for it to be amended, that is, through obtaining a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament 
and the assent of the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, and indeed, numerous changes have been made 
to its initial form in 1957 (Lee, 1995).  Furthermore, the lived reality of the Constitution, that is, 
what it means in terms of the material lives of citizens in Malaysia, requires the interpretation of 
the written text.  In this matter, judges play a significant role, particularly when these 
interpretations are contested through the courts (Tun Mohamed Suffian, 1976)80.     
 
                                                 
77 The subject of Orang Asli in the law has been discussed by Nicholas (2000), Hooker (2001, 1996), Hood (1990), Lim 
(1997), Liow (1981), Nair (2001), Rachagan (1990), Sullivan (1998) and Williams-Hunt (1995), among others.  
78 That is, the whole machinery of the government including the Yang Dipertuan Agung, the Prime Minister and his 
Cabinet, civil servants, ministries, departments, the armed forces, and the police. 
79 This allows for the Judiciary to decide upon cases where the Executive – for example, the Federal Government and all 
State Governments – are plaintiffs or defendants.   
80 As Gopal Sri Ram JCA eloquently articulated, in Repco Holdings Berhad v. Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 MLJ 681, “Our 
Federal Constitution is a living document written for all time.  Its language compresses within it ideas that are manifold 
and concepts that are multifaceted.  The task of the judicial interpreter of such a document is not to place it in a coffin and 
nail the lid but to breathe life into it and to give effect to the full breadth and width of its great language.” 
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 In the current version of the Constitution, the “aborigine” (in the Malay text, orang asli) is 
recognized as a separate legal entity from the “Malay” (Orang Melayu) and the “native 
(bumiputra) of Sabah and Sarawak” (see Appendix A for definitions).  As such, ‘aborigines’ may 
not claim rights given to ‘Malays’ and vice versa81.  The ‘aborigine’ is defined in Article 160(2) of 
the Constitution as “an aborigine of the Malay Peninsula” (my emphasis).  Apart from the 
geographical imagining of their positionality, the legal implications of this brief and tautological 
definition have been considered by several scholars.  Rachagan (1990) points out that a change 
in definition may thus be effected without the usual safeguards and procedures required for all 
other changes to the Constitution.  In addition, it places greater emphasis on the Aboriginal 
People’s Act (Act 134) definition of ‘aborigine’.  Indeed, as we can see in court judgments such as 
Koperasi Kijang Mas Bhd & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Perak & Ors [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) (hereafter 
referred to as the Koperasi Kijang Mas Case); and Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri 
Selangor & Ors [2002] 2 CLJ 543 (the Sagong Case), it was the Act 134 definition that ‘gave life’ 
to this identity.  For the Sagong case in particular, the Temuan Orang Asli who brought their case 
to court had their identity, within the meaning of Act 134, challenged82.   
 
When comparing the definitions of various indigenous groups in the Constitution (as supported by 
relevant statutes), therefore, it becomes quite apparent that they are based on different criteria.  
While the definition of ‘aborigine’ relies on the Act 134 definition, and ‘native of Sabah and 
Sarawak’ requires proof of ancestry (thus being more ‘racial’ in tone), the definition of ‘Malay’ (in 
Article 160 of the Constitution) is a purely socio-religious one (see also Mohd Salleh, 1986).  This 
has implications for the citizens of Malaysia in general and the Orang Asli in particular.  It is 
possible that individuals can be legally reclassified as ‘Malay’ when they convert to Islam, take on 
‘Malay customs’, and demonstrate a proficiency in the Malay language.  As Tun Mohamed 
                                                 
81 This was a matter emphasized in Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors [2002] 2 CLJ 543, a landmark 
case for the Orang Asli described below. 
82 Specifically, they were recognized as aboriginal Temuan people, but were challenged as to whether they still practiced 
‘Temuan culture’, as evidenced through their speaking an aboriginal language, following ‘an aboriginal way of life’ and 
adhering to ‘aboriginal customs and beliefs’, which are requirements stipulated in the Act 134 definition.  Qualifying for the 
Act 134 definition thus established the plaintiffs’ rights under statutory law.  It is interesting to note that in the Koperasi 
Kijang Mas Case, the Sagong Case, and the Adong cases (documented in Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor 
& Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418 and Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v. Adong Kuwau & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 665, administrative 
recognition of the plaintiffs by the JHEOA (evidenced through its prior dealings with them), was part of how their identity 
as Orang Asli was ‘proven’. 
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 Suffian (1976:291) explicates, “to be a Malay for the purposes of the Constitution you need not be 
of Malay ethnic origin.  An Indian is Malay if he professes the Muslim religion, habitually speaks 
Malay and conforms to Malay custom”.  In contrast to this, no one can ‘become’ an ‘aborigine’ or 
‘become’ a ‘native’ of Sabah and Sarawak by changing their socio-religious practices alone83.   
 
The ‘aborigines’ are mentioned three times in the Constitution (See Appendix A).  Firstly, the 
“welfare of the aborigines” is outlined as a “federal” subject, and therefore a matter over which the 
Federal Government has responsibility (see Article 74 and 77, Item 16; List I – Federal List, Ninth 
Schedule)84.  This means that the role of law making in relation to the Orang Asli lies in the hands 
of Parliament rather than the Legislature of any State.  Secondly, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong can 
appoint members to the Senate who “are capable of representing the interests of aborigines” 
(Article 45(2))85.  It is under this provision that the role of the Orang Asli Senator was created, 
significantly, an appointed role (see Chapter 2 for further discussion).   
 
Thirdly, the Constitution allows for special provisions to be given to all Orang Asli.  In Article 
8(5)(c), these special provisions are stated as not jeopardizing the principle of equality before the 
law.  This Article was discussed in two different significant court cases.  In Adong Kuwau & Ors v. 
Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 418 (hereinafter the Adong 1 Case), the presiding 
judge Mokhtar Sidin JCA interpreted Article 8(5)(c) to mean that “the aboriginal people of 
Malaysia [enjoy] a special position”  (p. 431).  In the Sagong Case ruling, Mohd Noor Ahmad J 
noted that this Article, along with other Constitutional and statutory provisions, supported the 
claim that both State and Federal Governments owe fiduciary duties to the Orang Asli (p.555), for 
which losses in consequence of the breach “must be made good” (p.575).     
                                                 
83 The social, political and legal permeability of Malay ethnicity creates unease among the Orang Asli, who are wary that 
ascription to Islam (with concomitant changes in lifestyles) potentially results in a change of identity from ‘Orang Asli’ to 
‘Malay’, a matter that is recognized and allowed for in the legal framework.  
84 Significantly, it is important to note that the ‘welfare of the aborigines’ under the aegis of the Federal Government does 
not extend to matters concerning land, over which State Governments continue to hold authority.  This creates legal 
difficulties for the Orang Asli in relation to land, a matter covered in greater depth in subsequent paragraphs, as well as in 
Chapters 3 and 5. 
85 In addition, he can appoint other representatives of racial minorities to the Senate, as well as individuals seen to have 
performed distinguished public, professional or social services.   
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 Absences in the Constitution 
Of great import are the ways in which ‘the aborigines’ are not mentioned, when ‘Malays’ and the 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak are.  For example, there are restrictions on Parliament as to the 
making of laws that touch upon Islamic law and Malay customs, as well as to native customs or 
laws in Sabah and Sarawak (Article 76, Article 150 (6A)), but not with regard to aboriginal affairs.  
For the natives of Sabah and Sarawak specifically, the Legislatures of the State Governments of 
Sabah and Sarawak are allowed to make laws with respect to native law and custom, as well as 
to native procedure of native courts (see Article 74(20) and the Ninth Schedule, List IIA, Item 13), 
while the legislature of States in the Peninsula, where all the Orang Asli are found, are not.  This 
has allowed the natives of Sabah and Sarawak some recognition over their customary lands that 
the Orang Asli did/do not enjoy86. 
 
As detailed in Article 89(6), both ‘Malays’ and ‘natives’ are also given special privileges with 
regard to Malay Reservation Land that the ‘aborigines’ are excluded from87.  Malay Reservations 
Land, unlike ‘aboriginal reserves’, ‘aboriginal areas’, or ‘aboriginal inhabited places’ as legally 
recognised in Act 134, are specially protected in the Constitution.  Specifically, Malay 
Reservations Land can only be de-gazetted by State Enactments passed by a two-third majority 
vote in State Legislative Assemblies and two-thirds majority vote approval by resolution of the 
Parliament (Article 89(1)), which offer these lands stronger protection88.  
 
Perhaps the most symbolically significant absence of the ‘aborigines’ in the Constitution, when 
compared to ‘Malays’ and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak alike, is Article 153 of the Federal 
Constitution, which reads,  
                                                 
86 This does not mean that they enjoy security over their native lands (see King, 1995).  
87 This was confirmed in the Sagong case, in which the judge specifically ruled that: “Article 89 when read as a whole 
does not include the aboriginal people of the Malay Peninsula because the word ‘natives’ appearing in sub-art. (6) is 
defined in art. 161A(6) to mean the natives of Sabah and Sarawak.  If it is meant to be otherwise the word ‘aborigines’ 
would have been used in the sub-art.” (p.576). 
88 Not only are ‘aboriginal reserves’, ‘aboriginal areas’, or ‘aboriginal inhabited places’ not given Constitional recognition, 
Act 134 also stipulates that they may be gazetted and that the gazettement can be revoked by State authorities (i.e. 
without the involvement of the Parliament). 
  - 78 - 
 It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position of 
the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate 
interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
 
“The aborigines” are noticeably missing in this provision, an absence repeated in State-level 
Constitutions which hold parallel Articles.  This is significant, for it is this Constitutional provision 
that is the basis for justifying positive discrimination for the bumiputera.  As discussed in Chapter 
2, this absence has created some ambiguity and debate over whether the Orang Asli are, in fact, 
bumiputera.   
 
Other Constitutional Provisions:  Religion and Property 
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in Article 3(1) and Article 11 of the Constitution for all non-
Muslims, as is freedom of peaceful assembly in Article 10(1)(b), and the right of individuals not to 
receive instruction or take part in any ceremony or act of worship other than his/her own (Article 
12(3))89.  Orang Asli who have converted to Islam become subject to Islamic law, over which the 
Legislature of State Governments have jurisdiction (Federal Constitution, Ninth Schedule, List II, 
Item 1), which is vested in respective Syariah Courts90.  In addition to this, the Constitution allows 
for State and Federal laws to be passed that control or restrict the propagation of non-Muslim 
religious doctrines among Muslims (Article 11(4)).  Furthermore, each State has laws that 
empower State Islamic Departments to regulate the activities of Muslims, a significant one being 
the observation of the fasting month, Ramadan91.   
 
Last but not least, proprietary rights are protected under Article 13, of which sub-article 1 reads: 
“No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law” and sub-article 2 reads: 
                                                 
89 In relation to Article 12(3), parental/guardian consent must be obtained for those under 18 years of age, as stated in 
Article 12(4). 
90 Islamic law, when implemented judicially, is largely confined to matters of family law and land practices.  However, there 
are socio-legal effects of Islamisization that are often not considered by Orang Asli when they embrace Islam (see Dentan 
and Endicott, forthcoming). 
91 Because Orang Asli are often mistaken as Malays due to their similarities in physical appearance, there have been 
many occasions where they were (almost) arrested by State Islamic Departments for not fasting during Ramadan.  This is 
a matter discussed in Chapter 6. 
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 “No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate 
compensation”.  These have been interpreted in recent judicial decisions such as Adong and 
Sagong to encompass the protection of ‘native title’ (further discussed below). 
 
Statutory Rights:  The Aboriginal Peoples Act  
Aborigines are human beings with human reactions, and the idea of this [1953 Aboriginal 
Peoples] Bill is to provide for their protection as human beings and not as museum 
pieces or exhibits. 
Dato’ Onn bin Ja’afar 
Speech to the Legislative Council of the Federation of Malaya  
25th November 1953  
(Federation of Malaya, 1954a) 
 
Also known as Act 134, The Aboriginal Peoples Act came into force in 1954, when war against 
the Communists was still intense92.  As outlined in Chapter 2, the loyalty of the aborigines was 
deemed crucial to the outcome of this confrontation, and measures were taken to extend 
‘protection’ to aboriginal groups.  When initial drafts of this Act93 (then known as the Aboriginal 
Peoples Ordinance) were first reviewed by the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on 
27th of January 1954, its main principle and aims were outlined as follows: 
to ensure that the aborigines were protected from unscrupulous exploitation, to safeguard 
their tribal organization and way of life from the too rapid advance of civilization and to 
remove any obstacles which might hinder their gradual advancement along the lines best 
suited to them in accordance with their changing environment. (Federation of Malaya, 
1954c:1)94
 
                                                 
92 Act 134 was later revised in 1967 and 1974.   
93 The content of the law was based on the Perak Aboriginal Enactment of 1939, which was extended, under British 
administration of the Federated Malay States, to Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang.   
94 The Select Committee comprised Onn bin Ja’afar, Bukit Gantang, H. Zainal, Tengku Muhammad, Shamsudin B. Nain, 
A.H.P. Humphreys, Ismail Rahman, and H.M. Eusoff.  Invited to the meeting was (then) Adviser on Aborigines, R.O.D. 
Noone, and the Assistant Legal Draftsman, A.M. Webb. 
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 The introduction of the Ordinance in 1954 was, as Jimin et al (1983) note, a significant milestone 
in the administration of the Orang Asli, for this was the first time that the Federal Government 
officially declared its responsibilities toward them95.   
 
In addition to giving meaning to the precise definition of ‘aborigine’ (see Figure 1, Appendix A), 
this Act gives extensive powers to the JHEOA.  For example, it has ultimate authority to decide if 
a specific individual is deemed an ‘aborigine’ (Section 3(3)), it must approve all dealings in land 
by aborigines (Section 9), it can prevent any person or class of person from entering aboriginal 
areas and reserves (Section 14), it may detain individuals in such areas which are deemed to 
conduct activities detrimental to the welfare of any aborigine(s) (Section 15), and to appoint 
hereditary headmen of aboriginal communities to office (Section 16).   
 
The JHEOA is also given powers to impose regulations on a number of practices.  These include 
those related to land use, the entry of individuals as well as the circulation of information (in a 
variety of media) into aboriginal spaces, the appointment of headmen, the registration of 
aborigines, the activities of aborigines within jungle areas, their education and employment, 
transactions of liquor, as well as the terminology by which aborigines are referred to (Section 19).   
 
Act 134 also reaffirms the role of State Authorities (State Governments) in matters relating to 
land, giving them supreme powers to gazette and to revoke land as ‘aboriginal reserve’ (Section 
7), ‘aboriginal area’ (Section 6), or ‘aboriginal inhabited place’, which is in stark contrast to the 
multiple Constitutional protections instituted for Malay Reservations Land, as described above.  
State Authorities may also order any aboriginal community to leave Malay Reservations Land 
(Section 10)96, and have powers to excise, alienate, grant, lease and otherwise dispose of land 
                                                 
95 However, the introduction of this statute is bittersweet, for it imposes many restrictions upon contemporary Orang Asli, 
even as it codifies some statutory rights for them.  Act 134 has been criticized validly and repeatedly, as being irrelevant, 
paternalistic, and restrictive.  Civil society actors have repeatedly called for its review if not outright repeal.  It is not difficult 
to see that certain sections of Act 134 create conditions in which the autonomy of Orang Asli is eroded. 
96 In the first Adong judgment, the presiding High Court Judge interpreted that: “By virtue of [section] 10 [of Act 134], the 
rights of the aboriginal peoples to occupy and/or collect forest produce overrides Malay reserve land, forest reserve or 
game reserve.  Section 10 reflects the legislature’s intention to allow the aboriginal people to lead the type of life they 
have always led, which has been nomadic and always looking for greener pastures.” (p.431).  
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 which aboriginal communities have used, with only compensation for fruit and rubber trees 
(Section 11).  
 
Nevertheless, certain protections and ‘special rights’ are offered to Orang Asli under this Act.  For 
example, they have a right to be present in lands gazetted as ‘aboriginal areas’ and ‘aboriginal 
reserves’, a right not to be excluded from schools, a right not to be obliged to attend any religious 
instruction without prior parental/guardian consent (Section 17), and not to be adopted by non-
aboriginal parents except with the consent of the JHEOA (Section 18).  Furthermore, the 
identification of the JHEOA – represented by the Commissioner – as being “responsible for the 
general administration, welfare and advancement of aborigines” (Article 4), has been turned 
around to argue that the Federal Government owes a fiduciary duty to all Orang Asli.  As argued 
in the Sagong Case, this has become a matter enforceable through the judiciary97.  
 
The ‘aborigines’ are also mentioned in other statutes, which give them special rights and 
privileges.  The Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (also known as Act 164), for 
example, allows for the marriage and divorce of ‘aborigines’ to be governed by native customary 
law or aboriginal customs, if that is their choice.  Furthermore, in the Protection of Wildlife Act 
1972, an aborigine is allowed to shoot, kill, or take protected wild animals and birds “for the 
purpose of providing food for himself or his family”, when other Malaysians are not given such 
freedoms (section 52).  Thirdly, as stated in the National Forestry Act 1984 (Act 313), aborigines 
can all be exempted from holding licenses for the removal of forest produce from certain classes 
of land (Section 40(3)).  Lastly, a certain type of aborigine (“nomadic aborigines”) is mentioned in 
the Employee Provident Fund Act 1991, which stipulates that they are, by default, not considered 
“employees”, unless the Director-General of the Department of Aborigines recommends 
otherwise.  
 
                                                 
97 Orang Asli rights under Act 134 have more explicitly demonstrated through court judgments, which I will elaborate upon 
further below. 
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 Common Law Developments 
As stated earlier, the precise definition and scope of (even Constitutionally guaranteed) rights are 
only established through specific cases, which require direct application of general principles 
established through codified laws.  In understanding how common law operates, it is important to 
note the principle of stare decisis, that is, the hierarchical system of binding judicial precedent.  In 
Malaysian law, as in English common law, the decisions of higher courts are binding upon lower 
courts, such that the Federal Court is the ultimate authority, followed by the Court of Appeal, and 
the High Courts of Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak98.  Specific contests over land are 
judged by the High Court in the first instance, and may be brought for appeal to the Court of 
Appeals and thence to the Federal Court.  Tried as civil cases, judgments in High Court are ruled 
on a balance of probabilities, with judges required to establish the ‘real’ facts of the case.   
 
In the past decade, several important cases have come through the courts, which have 
established legal rights for Orang Asli (see also Hooker, 2001; Nicholas, 2003b).  The most 
significant have been the establishment of native title and usufructury rights in the Adong Case 
judgments, and the development of these to include proprietary rights in the land, under the 
Sagong Case ruling.  These developments, which draw upon international law, I will deal with in 
turn.  This follows consideration of a less well-known case, Koperasi Kijang Mas, which 
demonstrates how Orang Asli have claimed special privileges on the basis of their identity in 
ways not possible for other Malaysians.   
 
Exclusive Rights to Commercial Activities in Aboriginal Places:  The Koperasi Kijang Mas 
Case 
The plaintiffs sought declaration that the land in question, Kuala Betis, was an ‘aboriginal area’ 
and not just ‘State Land’.  Therefore, they claimed, only ‘aborigines’ had rights over forest 
produce from that area.  They argued that the actions of one of the defendants, the Director of 
                                                 
98 These are followed by the Subordinate Courts, which, in the case of Peninsular Malaysia, are the Sessions Courts, 
Magistrates’ Courts, Small Claims Courts, Penghulu Courts.  In addition, Syariah Courts are subordinate to the Superior 
Courts (Lee, 2001). 
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 Forestry (a Federal agency), to offer the land to a private limited company (another defendant) 
was unlawful because the latter had no connection with the aborigines.  The plaintiffs argued that 
this company had therefore no right to conduct logging activities in the area.   
 
The presiding Judge, Abdul Malek Ahmad H, made these declarations and ruled that only 
aborigines, as specified under Act 134, had rights to harvest forest produce from these areas.  He 
agreed that “logging conducted by any body, organisation, foundation or representative and their 
agents that are not owned by aborigines are in violation of s. 6(2)(iv) of the Aboriginal People’s 
Act 1954” (p. 651)99.  In this court case, we see how Orang Asli have been able to claim special 
rights and privileges by virtue of their legal identity. 
 
Introducing ‘Native Title’:  The Adong Rulings 
In this court case, 52 plaintiffs of the Jakun tribe living in Linggiu Valley were displaced from their 
traditional and ancestral land upon which they foraged.  This occurred when the land was 
alienated by the Johor State Government and the Johor Director of Land and Mines for the 
building of a dam in agreement with the Government of Singapore.  The plaintiffs claimed that the 
compensation they received as recommended by the JHEOA (in accordance with sections 11 
and 12 of Act 134) was inadequate.  New judicial concepts were introduced in this landmark 
case, in particular, that of native title. 
 
The Judge laid down his understanding of ‘native title’, drawing upon precedents in the United 
States, Southern Rhodesia, Canada and Australia, stating that “it is the right of the native to 
continue to live on their land as their forefathers had done”, a right “acquired in law” and not 
based on any document or title (Adong 1, p.428).  That also meant that “future generations of the 
aboriginal people would be entitled to this right of their forefathers” (p. 430).  Specifically, he 
defined this “right over the land” (my emphasis) to include, 
                                                 
99 Article 6 (2iv) states that “no licences for the collection of forest produce under any written law relating to forests shall 
be issued to persons not being aborigines normally resident in that aboriginal area or to any commercial undertaking 
without consulting the Commissioner and in granting any such licence it may be ordered that a specified proportion of 
aboriginal labour be employed.” 
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 the right to move freely about their land, without any form of disturbance or interference 
and also to live from the produce of the land itself, but not to the land itself in the modern 
sense that the aborigines can convey, lease out, rent out the land or any produce therein 
since they have been in continuous and unbroken occupation and/or enjoyment of the 
rights of the land from time immemorial. (p.430). 
 
He ruled that compensation had to be given not just for rubber and fruit trees, as required in Act 
134, but “for what is above the land over which the plaintiffs have a right” (p.431), that is 
compensation “for the loss of livelihood and hunting ground” (p.431).  These, he established, 
were protected under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution (concerned with proprietary rights to 
land), and could not be excluded by Act 134.  Compensation was thus given for five types of 
deprivation: of heritage land; of freedom of inhabitation or movement; of produce of the forest; of 
future living for the plaintiffs and their immediate families; and for the future living for their living 
descendants (valued at RM26.5 million for 53,273 acres of land).  When this was reviewed in the 
Court of Appeal (Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v. Adong Kuwau & Ors [1998] 2 CLJ 665), the 
presiding judges upheld the decision, and reaffirmed that “deprivation of livelihood may amount to 
deprivation of life itself and that state action which produced such a consequence may be 
impugned on well-established grounds” (p.158).   
 
Proprietary Rights in and to the Land:  The Sagong Case 
Eight months before the first Adong judgment was released, a portion of land upon which several 
Temuan families lived was acquired for the construction of a portion of a highway that joined the 
Kuala Lumpur International Airport to the North-South Highway.  These families were evicted, 
with only minimal compensation given for their loss of fruit trees, crops and homes – not for the 
value of the land upon which they resided.  They brought the Selangor State Government, 
Federal Government, the highway authority and the private construction company to court, and 
argued for the recognition of native title with attendant full compensation. 
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 The presiding judge, Mohd Noor Ahmad J affirmed that the plaintiffs held ‘native title’ as 
recognised in the Adong judgements, which included usufructury rights, that is, right over the 
land, as well as interest in and to the land.  This, he decided, were proprietary rights under 
common law which were protected in Article 13 of the Federal Constitution, and thus liable for 
compensation under the Land Acquisition Act100.  Specifically, the Judge ruled 
Apart from the orang asli and the native people of the Borneo states, there are no other 
classes of people in Malaysia who occupy the said lands on the basis of customary right 
except the lands occupied under the tribal adapt in Negeri Sembilan and Malacca…. 
Thus, the Act speaks of aboriginal reserve land and aboriginal occupied land.  The latter 
refers to hereditary land or customary land (p.573). 
Therefore, when ‘native title’ is extinguished, this warrants the same compensation awarded to 
other ‘ordinary’ title holders under the Torrens system. 
 
While these developments in case law bode well for the Orang Asli, the wide powers of the Land 
Acquisition Act still permit government authorities to legitimize purchasing Orang Asli customary 
land.  As Bah Tony Williams-Hunt commented, “We cannot stop people from taking the land.  We 
may [through the Sagong ruling] get some compensation, but as long as the government says 
that it is for development, you have no say.  There must be some protection for this.”  (Interview, 
03.12.03) 
 
Going to Court:  Everyday Realities 
In discussing this case with me, leading lawyer for the Adong plaintiffs, S Kanawagi, said that 
they faced many challenges.  As the aboriginal communities for which they advocated were not 
able to bear the costs of such litigation, expenses for the first case, which took more than six 
years to fight, were borne by the lawyers (Interview, 29.01.03).  As the case was proceeding, the 
                                                 
100 He further noted, following Mabo v. Queensland [1991-1992] 175 CLR 1, that although native title was a community 
title, “individuals within the community could by its laws and customs possess proprietary individual rights over the 
respective parcels of land” (Sagong: 568). 
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 plaintiffs were pressured to drop the case in various ways outside of the court, although the 
‘messengers’ of such ‘suggestions’ often came incognito.   
 
The lawyers for the plaintiffs did not desire that this case be given great publicity.  When the 
judgment was first released, it was done without much media attention.  Furthermore, as the legal 
system was based on colonial conceptions of land, property, and ownership, arguments for 
‘native title’ required a rethinking of fundamental principles of justice.  In this case it wasn’t just 
that “(t)he Orang Asli are totally innocent, they don’t know their rights”, as Kanawagi said, but that 
the judges who presided on the cases, too, had to reassess the fundamental structures and 
premises of the post-colonial legal system, in order to decide what the rights of the Orang Asli 
were101. 
 
For the plaintiffs of the Sagong Case, the process of going to court was, as Ilam Senin noted, 
frightening and stressful for the Bukit Tampoi Temuans.  As he said, “We encouraged them to be 
brave, to stand up for their rights as indigenous people.  That gave them courage” (Interview, 
15.12.02).  One of the lawyers for the Sagong plaintiffs, Rashid Ismail noted that the legal 
process was quite unfamiliar to the Temuan people involved.  He commented, “[The plaintiffs] 
were exceptionally afraid of going to court; the environment was totally alien to them, they had not 
been exposed to that before” (Interview, 16.08.02).  This, along with language difficulties, made it 
difficult for them to extract ‘evidence’ from their own witnesses, which the lawyers needed to build 
their case.  “What we considered relevant, they did not think was relevant…. [They were also] not 
comfortable with Bahasa; they had limited vocabulary, which impeded them from fully expressing 
themselves.”  Commenting on this matter, Sharmila Sekaran, also lawyer for the plaintiffs noted,  
When we asked them ‘What are your customs?’ they replied, ‘Yes, we have our 
customs’.  In law, we are not supposed to lead our witnesses.  But they could not see the 
intent of what the lawyers were trying to do…. They don’t know what is relevant and what 
is not.” (Interview, 14.09.02).   
                                                 
101 In July 2004, the Orang Asli involved in this case made it known that the compensation they had been awarded had 
not been disbursed appropriately, and lodged a police report against their lawyer, S. Kanawagi. 
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This, she suggested, was not unrelated to the very specific format of discourse required in the 
courts, which was in disjuncture with what the Temuan witnesses were accustomed to.  “For the 
Orang Asli, their understanding is that you discuss problems.  But in court, you need ‘yes [or] no’ 
answers.  They don’t know what to say [to our questions], what is relevant.”   
 
She continued to elaborate on the everyday difficulties of bringing the case to court.   
[First,] we had to have their trust; this made it easier to deal with them.  Because they 
have a lack of understanding about the legal system, they didn’t trust the system.  [If they 
don’t trust us] they can withhold information or evidence that is crucial to the case.  
Second, we have trouble with language.  Most important information was from the older 
people, who don’t speak Bahasa.  During the question and answer sessions, the 
translator sometimes just gave a summary, or the translation is not in full.  Thirdly, we 
needed help with logistics…. [the plaintiffs] had to attend every day of trial.  Some of 
them go to work in towns because they can’t work on the land [any longer], and they 
couldn’t get leave.102
 
The judge’s role in addressing some of these communication issues was important, as Sharmila 
explained.  In this particular case, the judge insisted that the interpreters explained the 
proceedings to the plaintiffs, and ensured that they knew what was going on.  “This shows a 
consideration of them as people, upholding their dignity”, she said, which gave the plaintiffs 
greater confidence during the whole procedure.  Going to court was also a legal process not 
divorced from social and political realities.   As Colin Nicholas, who was involved throughout the 
court case (and who observed the reactions and responses of witnesses at the trial) noted, 
                                                 
102 Similar observations were held by another lawyer who has provided legal advice to Orang Asli individuals on various 
issues, including land compensation.  As he stated, “The Orang Asli are sometimes not able to take up the legal advice [I 
offer them].  They are fearful; fearful of challenging the authorities; fearful because they are not familiar with the legal 
system.  I have advised them that it is not ‘anti-government’ [to file a case] but it is asserting their rights.  The people who 
take cases to court are the ones who are more articulate, confident, aware, and have better networking.  They are familiar 
with the systems of the outside world.  [Most Orang Asli] are fearful that they won’t have the financial resources; fearful 
that they have to pay the costs for the other side [if they lose the case].  They have no confidence that they will win.” 
Speaking in particular about compensation for land taken by the Government, he says, “They think ‘it is better to have a 
bird in hand than two in a bush’, and they are happy with compensation for fruit trees.  Most people are not happy, but 
they will accept rather than fight for their rights.  Education is needed to overcome this” (Interview, 10.10.2002). 
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 certain individuals were hesitant in providing evidence for the plaintiffs, as they were government 
servants, and felt that they couldn’t say anything ‘against’ the government, which was among the 
defendants in the proceedings103.   
 
Bringing such a case to court was a learning experience for the lawyers involved, most of whom 
did not have much prior contact with Orang Asli groups.  These have also been new experiences 
for the Orang Asli plaintiffs.  The court proceedings have introduced new means by which 
defence against dispossession can be articulated, and have given Orang Asli greater confidence 
in the rights that they can enjoy in the Malaysian nation-state.  Following the Sagong judgment, 
two communities in Sabah and Sarawak brought two companies to court for encroaching on their 
customary land (IWGIA, 2003).  Back in Bukit Tampoi, where the Sagong plaintiffs resided, 
compensation for an adjacent piece of land, de-gazetted to make way for a radar site, was 




The Malaysian legal system, as I have pointed out, does allow some room for the practice of what 
Levy (2000) terms ‘indigenous law’, albeit in different ways for separate categories of citizens.  
Customary inclusions were given to Malays and ‘natives’ of Sabah and Sarawak under the 
Constitution.  Specifically, for the ‘Malays’ the legal system recognizes and allows for certain 
Islamic customs/laws to be incorporated and independently decided upon in syariah courts.  
Similarly, native customs/laws in Sabah and Sarawak are recognized and allowed judicial 
recognition through native courts.  The Orang Asli, however, have no such formal systems.  All 
laws in relation to them are made by Parliament – with the exception of land matters which are 
legislated (with some restriction) by State Legislative Assemblies – and all legal cases concerning 
their customary practices come through the regular subordinate and superior courts.  The only 
                                                 
103 Seminar presented at the National University of Singapore, October 2002. 
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 ways in which they have enjoyed any recognition of their customary practices have been through 
common law incorporations.   
 
Most Orang Asli are neither aware of their rights in the written text of the law, nor are they familiar 
with the process of seeking justice through judicial systems.    As such, they rely on interpreters 
of the law – JHEOA officials, civil society actors, lawyers, and judges – to help them with the 
everyday struggles they face.  For every successful case for land rights won through the courts, 
there have been many more incidents of evicted Orang Asli communities whose rights to land 
have not been given recognition through case law.  It has been the task of some civil society 
groups to address such imbalances – through education, organizing, and empowerment – which 
is part of my next chapter, ‘Civil Society Alternatives’. 
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 CHAPTER 5:  CIVIL SOCIETY ALTERNATIVES 
The construction of the social space termed ‘civil society’ is unlike earlier fields discussed in this 
thesis – politics, administration, and the legal sphere – as its parameters are defined by what it 
excludes, which shapes the activities of its actors significantly.  In the first section of this chapter, 
I discuss the ontological construction of this field.  In the second, I review how civil society 
activities concerned with indigenous rights in Malaysia are shaped through, and contribute to, the 
construction of Orang Asli identity.  I do this by reviewing the activities of particular organizations 
and by presenting the thoughts of civil society actors as they work to organise Orang Asli groups.  
I proceed to discuss networks and alliances that link Orang Asli groups to transnational initiatives 
concerning indigenous peoples worldwide, a concept that is gaining increasing significance both 
legally and politically.  In the third and final section of this chapter, I look at the efforts and impact 
of religious groups operating among the Orang Asli, highlighting the issues they face in relation to 
proselytization activities in Malaysia.  
 
Conceptualising ‘Civil Society’ 
Hegel (1967) proposed that ‘civil society’ be seen as the space between the family and the ‘State’ 
which serves to check that the latter does not violate the freedoms of individuals/communities.  
Gramsci suggested the need for further analytical distinction between economic organisations 
and civil society, seeing the thrust of capitalism as constituting a potent force in shaping the 
direction and aims of the former.  Gramsci warned that the workings of civil society could be 
complicit in sustaining the ideological projects of political elites, upholding rather than upsetting 
the power of dominant groups.  Others have hoped for the role of civil society to be a public 
sphere, providing a Habermasian ‘ideal speech situation’ in which participants are not hampered 
in their ability to assess situations and to enter into democratic discussions (Giddens, 1994).  
Under ideal conditions, therefore, ‘real opinions’ may be voiced, free from fear or bias.  As such, 
this social space comes under threat when strong states act to repress articulation and action.   
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 Some have drawn a distinction between civil society and civic society initiatives, the former 
constructed as being more directly engaged in establishing the status of groups through 
encounters with State powers, while the latter primarily focusing on goals that do not bring State 
actions under question.   However, if we take Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony, and 
consider Foucault (1982)’s thesis concerning ‘technologies of power’ which are precisely 
concerned with the way in which dominance is sustained through shaping the way everyday 
actors conceptualise and evaluate social ‘problems’, then this becomes a blurred distinction.  In 
other words, those who may not have overt interests in pushing for socio-political change vis-à-
vis the State may still (even if inadvertently) create social circumstances in which such changes in 
structures are wrought.  In light of these debates, I propose that all actors organized voluntarily 
outside the auspices of the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary authorities, be considered as 
constituting civil society.   
 
Civil society groups that are involved with the Orang Asli or that are led by Orang Asli individuals 
are varied in size, objectives, and location.  There are groups that are more directly concerned 
with lobbying for civil, political and legal rights; groups that are primarily concerned with 
community development activities to address socio-economic concerns; and groups whose chief 
aim is evangelism/ proselytization among the Orang Asli.  These groups often operate quite 
independently, although most groups I interviewed were cognizant of the activities and presence 
of the others.  
 
Securing Social Justice, Negotiating Orang Asli Rights 
The first documented civil society action taken by Orang Asli actors was initiated in 1973, which 
led to the formation of the Peninsular Malaysia Orang Asli Association (Persatuan Orang Asli 
Semenanjung Malaysia, POASM).  In response to a proposal by (then) Minister of Rural 
Development, Ghafar Baba, to rename the Orang Asli as Putra Asli104, 41 Orang Asli individuals 
                                                 
104 Williams-Hunt Abdullah, A. (undated) Sejarah Persatuan Orang Asli Semenanjung Malaysia.  POASM, distributed 
during the POASM Silver Anniversary, on 9th August 2002. 
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 met to formulate their response to this significant name change.  Led by Itam Wali Nawan105, this 
group eventually voted 40 to 1 in favour of retaining the name ‘Orang Asli’.   
 
The text of the memorandum submitted to the Minister106 captured key concerns of the Orang Asli 
at that time.  In particular, they articulated their resistance to the actions of non-Orang Asli in 
determining their socio-political identity, as expressed in the proposed name change.  
Significantly, the Orang Asli resisted being seen as ‘objects’, always acted upon, and desired 
greater inclusion in deciding the affairs of their own ‘community’. The Orang Asli were keen to 
establish a more stable channel through which they could represent Orang Asli interests and, to 
this end, POASM was formed on the 9th of August 1977107.  The first POASM constitution was 
written, modeled upon that of UMNO, and the first POASM Annual General Meeting was held on 
the 2nd of October 1977. 
   
To date, POASM has more than 19,650 members spread across the Peninsula, and its numbers 
continue to increase.  The language of communication is Malay, a matter of necessity because of 
the plurality of languages across Orang Asli ethnic groups108.  It is through POASM that many 
Orang Asli learn about the social issues that face their communities, and it is through POASM 
fora that such matters are discussed and some form of united response agreed upon109.  
 
                                                 
105 Itam Wali was, at that time a JOA officer, who later was to become the Third Orang Asli Senator from 1991 to 1996. 
106 Unpublished document entitled “Minit Perjumpaan Mengkaji Usul Putrasli” dated 12.10.73. 
107 A revitalization of the organization occurred in 1989 under the leadership of Bah Tony Williams-Hunt, and its numbers 
greatly increased (Nicholas, 2000:153).   
108 It is interesting to consider the role that language plays in the imagining of self identity.  During fieldwork, I encountered 
Orang Asli who felt that their home language was their ‘last frontier’ of being different, of being Orang Asli.  To paraphrase 
the words of a community worker, “We dress like the Malays, live like the Malays, do what the Malays do, and speak their 
language when we talk to other people.  Among ourselves, our own language is the way we know we are different from 
them [the Malays]”.  However, at this ‘supra-tribal’ level, the use of Malay is necessary, for it the lingua franca most 
common to all groups.  This underscores the conditions and contexts of this articulation as an explicitly national one.  
Interestingly, the choice of language among the Orang Asli reflects the sphere of engagement within which they articulate 
their thoughts.  Within their own communities, it would be pretentious to use any language other than their own.  At the 
national level, Malay is used, and for global interactions, English is necessary, which makes it challenging for Orang Asli 
to engage at international forums without the aid of an interpreter.   
109 Membership in POASM has also become a way of ‘proving’ identity as an Orang Asli.  As an individual stated to me, 
his POASM membership card became a way he proved to authorities during puasa month that he was not a 
Malay/Muslim. 
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 Bangsa Orang Asli:  Challenges in Representing Plural Interests 
Our first challenge is to form an Orang Asli community, united with the same shared 
purpose (matlamat).  It must be an Orang Asli community that is at peace, united among 
villages, territories, states and Orang Asli ethnic groups, enjoying a life that is harmonious 
based on equal rights and justice, forming a “Bangsa Orang Asli” (Orang Asli 
Race/Nation) with loyalty and dedication to its bangsa. 
Majid Suhut, President  
POASM Pehimpunan Agung Tahunan ke-13, April 2002 
(POASM, 2003, my translation) 
 
These were the words of the President at the Annual General Meeting of the POASM in April 
2002.  His word are directly reminiscent of – if not a deliberate parallel to – the speech made by 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad when he unveiled his plans for Vision 2020 and his idea of 
Bangsa Malaysia (see Mahathir, 1992, cited in Chapter 2).  In similar ways, these leaders face 
the dilemma of representing plural communities – segmented through ethnic loyalties, religious 
affiliations, and class differentials – through a singular voice.       
 
POASM has had to deal with factionalism, sometimes fractured along ‘tribal’ or sub-ethnic lines.  
Some have accused it of being ‘Semai dominated’ in the past, as many of its earlier leaders were 
Semai.  As a Mah Meri individual commented, some Semai leaders have been told “who are you 
to tell us what to do – you don’t understand our group” (Interview, 21.08.02).  According to a 
former POASM office-holder, a Semai, this has to do with difficulties in getting representatives 
from some sub-ethnic groups, such as the Batek and Che Wong.  Thus, although space has been 
created for representation by sub-ethnic groups in the organizational setup of POASM, this is 
difficult to operationalize.  In order to fill these gaps in leadership, it has been necessary for 
individuals from one sub-ethnic group to act as representatives for another group, which has not 
always gone down well.  As he articulated, “Among the Orang Asli there is racism (semangat 
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 perkauman).  There is a sense of ‘Orang Ulu’ is different from ‘Orang Bukit’, and so on.  And the 
Proto-Malays are quite critical of the Semai” (Interview, 13.08.02). 
 
Another point of division among members is the type of relationship POASM leaders want to 
establish with the JHEOA.  According to Bah Tony Williams-Hunt, President of POASM from 
1987 to 1990, some factions are more comfortable being aligned with the JHEOA and prefer to 
avoid direct confrontation with them.  Others are more willing to raise issues and to apply 
pressure on important matters (Interview, 03.12.02).  As Nicholas (2000) documents, under the 
leadership of Long Jidin who subsequently served as Orang Asli Senator from 1997 to 2003, for 
example, POASM had a more co-operative working relationship with the JHOEA.  JHEOA officers 
were invited to become associate members, and individuals from the Islamic Religious 
Department were invited to give short courses to POASM members (see also Nicholas, 
2003b)110.   
 
However, POASM has not always had a ‘smooth’ working relationship with the JHEOA.  As Majid 
Suhut, current President of the Association, points out, the association between the two 
organisations has been a varied one.  He says, 
Our relationship with the JHEOA depends on the perceptions of the JHEOA officers we deal 
with.  If they can accept our viewpoints and facts then our relationship is fine.  But sometimes 
they cannot accept what POASM says; they think they are correct.  The new officers accept 
the role POASM plays as an NGO.  It is usually the older officers – those with 10 to 15 years 
of experience – and government officers from other departments that cannot accept what we 
say.  The new officers can [more readily] accept our feedback. (Interview, 06.07.03) 
 
POASM has become an alternative body to whom Orang Asli in trouble can turn.  For example, 
when several Orang Asli individuals were brought to trial for murder in what is known as the ‘Jeli 
                                                 
110 POASM has also been seen and used as a tool for gaining political leverage, as Colin Nicholas (2000) documents. 
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 incident’111, according to a former POASM leader, the JHEOA and its lawyers advised them to 
plead guilty.  The JHEOA were reluctant to provide bail, saying that they were likely to “run (back) 
into the forest”.  As this former POASM leader stated, “the Jabatan don’t know how to think.  If 
they wanted to run away, why would they have turned themselves in?” (Interview, 13.08.02).  
Together, the (then) Orang Asli Senator Itam Wali, POASM, the Centre for Orang Asli Concerns 
(COAC) and the Bar Council, gave the suspects very different legal advice, which apparently 
antagonized the JHEOA. 
 
However, mobilizing a large number of Orang Asli for its activities has not been easy for POASM.  
Having its members distributed across the vast Peninsula has meant that organising events or 
meetings that allow for broad-based participation is logistically and economically difficult.  As 
many members live below the poverty line, and are geographically distant, challenges can be 
very basic – such as in expecting them to incur travel costs for meetings.  POASM leaders have 
also often found difficulty in reaching certain places and communities in their grassroots 
programmes.  As Majid Suhut explained to me, “Our problem is that we don’t have resources for 
the activities.  We rely on individual contributions and membership fees” (Interview, 06.07.03).  
Furthermore, he says, the work is conducted on a volunteer basis by its leaders, and can be very 
challenging.  “It takes a lot of energy; you must have mental strength.  Sometimes, you must 
leave your own responsibilities, and use your own expenses.”   
 
Some of POASM’s ordinary members have had difficulty grappling with its organisational setup.  
As a former leader explained to me, “at the village level, they don’t even know how the bylaw 
works, don’t know what the Mesyuarat Agong is for,… some don’t even know how to write, don’t 
know the function of the Pengurusi…” (Interview, 13.08.02).  In 1987, POASM was in danger of 
being disbanded as it failed to fulfill certain statutory requirements; efforts have been made since 
then to simplify the Constitution, making it less unwieldy for its members. 
 
                                                 
111 In 1993, nine Jahai men were charged and detained for the alleged killing of Malay villagers, in a dispute over land.  
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 POASM has been called upon to ‘assist’ on many issues that affect the everyday lives of its 
members.  The needs of the Community are quite varied, as Majid Suhut notes, and the work of 
POASM is wide-ranging: 
day by day more Orang Asli come to the advice of the Association.  There are some that 
come to ask [for help] because their daughter has been taken by illegal outsiders and 
there are some that come asking help on withdrawing their KWSP [Employee Provident 
Fund, Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja]  money, and so on.  There are also those that 
ask my friends and me to come to their village, to discuss specific issues.  In short, the 
work of the Association constantly increases; while our capacities are quite limited.” 
(POASM, 1997b:np, my translation). 
 
Exactly how ‘assistance’ can be mounted depends on the resources and abilities of its members.  
On some occasions, POASM have invited other NGOs and members of the media to witness 
demonstrations, lending organizational support to local protests.  On other issues, they have 
assisted by providing legal advice, sending memoranda to government agencies, and maintaining 
pressure on the JHEOA so that they act upon reported grievances.  POASM is also called upon 
to participate in dialogues organized by government bodies such as the Human Rights 
Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM), the Ministry of Culture, and the Economic Planning Unit. 
 
Indigenous Peoples of the World 
Acts of articulating and repositioning Orang Asli identity by POASM have included signifying 
practices that link Orang Asli issues to global discourses concerning ‘indigenous peoples’.  Thus, 
in POASM Annual General Meetings of the past, there have been calls for the Malaysian 
government to be a signatory to the Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
currently being negotiated.  In addition, World Indigenous Peoples Day (Hari Orang Asal Sedunia, 
HOAS) has been celebrated with great fanfare since 1998112.  This massive organizational effort 
by POASM involves bringing Orang Asli from all over the Peninsula together.  It is a festival that 
                                                 
112 HOAS celebrations have also been organized by JOAS (described below). 
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 connects them to a global community and to an international, transnational fight for rights and 
recognition.   
 
According to Amri Jamil, who served as an elected POASM Committee Member at the time I 
interviewed him, the first HOAS celebration, held in 1998, was suggested by a member who had 
come back from an international conference (Interview, 12.10.02).  This event has since become 
important in promoting the continuation of cultural forms of expression, and in encouraging 
individuals to feel proud about their identity.  HOAS celebrations are ‘Orang Asli’ in a way that 
usual, village-levels celebrations are not, for the cultural symbols employed during its celebration 
are a combination collected from different sub-ethnic groups.  Interestingly, it is through HOAS 
celebrations that Orang Asli sub-ethnic groups learn about the cultural beliefs of other groups. In 
reflecting on HOAS activities over the past few years, Majid Suhut states, “Before this, the Orang 
Asli had their own celebrations according to location and ethnic grouping, not as a collective 
whole” (Interview, 06.07.03).  With HOAS, he says, “many Orang Asli celebrate together, in unity, 
joined together… we learn about the cultures of other Orang Asli groups”.   
 
POASM leaders have emphasized the importance of autonomy and independence in organizing 
HOAS events.  As Amri explained to me, organizing events of this scale – requiring complex 
logistics, the management of large crowds, and the organization of multiple programmes – has 
became an indirect signal of the capacity of Orang Asli to achieve large goals independently, 
without assistance from ‘outsiders’.  Majid Suhut also commented, 
[HOAS] has significance to outsiders [orang luar].  They can see the uniqueness of the 
Orang Asli.  And more importantly, the Orang Asli can celebrate themselves, according to 
their own abilities [kemampuan].  It isn’t other people that arrange it for them (Interview, 
06.07.03) 
 
This sense of autonomy and independence is a matter that is emphasized by the leaders of 
another organization, Sinui Pai Nanek Sengik, SPNS, based in Kampung Chang Lama, Perak. 
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Sinui Pai Nanek Sengik – New Life, One Heart 
For Tijah Chopil – founding leader of SPNS – building local leadership and capacity for local 
action is an important goal (Interview, 14.05.03).  As she informs me, this group began as an idea 
in the mid-1980s, gaining greater momentum in 1995.  Its activities are currently focused on 
training and education, as well as building the capacity and confidence of individuals in dealing 
with social issues.  Special programmes are held for specific groups of people, including tuition 
classes for children, home teaching skills for parents, as well as annual meetings for youth and 
women.  In the past, SPNS has organized workshops on community mapping, local organizing, 
legal literacy, human rights awareness, and leadership.  Using a variety of methods, including 
drama, songs, and games, Tijah informs me that SPNS has tried to facilitate thought and 
discussion on the political position of the Orang Asli as well as the social issues facing their 
Community.  As Tijah states, “The Orang Asli don’t have enough information – what is happening 
in terms of politics, in terms of the law.”  This is a situation she is keen to change. 
 
Empowerment, independence, and self-help are principles SPNS holds on to.  As Tijah explains, 
“We don’t want to be an organization that other Orang Asli communities depend upon.  We want 
to strengthen others, to help them to run their own programmes.  We don’t want to push; our role 
is just to support them.”  She further adds,  
We must not just run to other organizations when we face a problem, and expect them to 
do everything for us.  This maintains a spirit of dependency.  The community themselves 
must do something.  So, we teach people how to organize themselves, to unite together, 
to study the problem, and to collect solid proof for action.  Our aim is to have people 
believe in themselves, to be bold, to hand in memoranda and to speak in front of others, 
to highlight when empty promises are made, to question the forms they receive before 
signing them.  We don’t need to go all the way to the Courts to fight, we start small first… 
focus on empowering people, and encouraging them to stand united.   
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 Maintaining the role of facilitator rather than director is important for Tijah.  “We don’t want them 
to depend on us for everything; we want to help them stand on their own.” 
 
SPNS is part of Jaringan Kampung Orang Asli Semai Peringkat Negeri Perak (JKOASPNP), a 
network of 19 villages in Perak.  Through this network, community workers and leaders meet to 
discuss common problems as well as to formulate joint actions.  On 1st November 2003, 
JKOASPNP submitted a memorandum to SUHAKAM to voice their concerns that their rights to 
native customary land have been, and will continue to be, violated by the Perak State 
Government.  In response, SUHAKAM High Commissioner Professor Dato’ Hamdan Mohd. 
Adnan, released a media statement reaffirming its recognition that “land rights is the most 
pressing issue faced by the Semai Orang Asli and other Indigenous Peoples in Malaysia as the 
possibility of dispossession is putting their way of life and their culture under threat.”113   
 
This media statement linked the problems faced by the Orang Asli to the rights of indigenous 
people(s) worldwide.  In the statement, Prof. Dato’ Hamdan noted: 
Indigenous people and peoples also enjoy certain human rights specifically linked to their 
identity, including rights to maintain and enjoy their culture and language free from 
discrimination, rights of access to ancestral lands and land relied upon for subsistence, 
rights to decide their own patterns of development, and rights to autonomy over 
indigenous affairs. 
He emphasized that the Semai complaints should be given attention by the State Government.  
The efforts of Orang Asli networks and groups such as JKOASSPNP in lobbying SUHAKAM, in 
participating in workshops organized by this National Commission, and in celebrating World 
Indigenous Peoples Day, have resulted in greater recognition of their rights as indigenous 
peoples within the Malaysian context. 
 
                                                 
113 SUHAKAM: Resolve Land Disputes of the Semai Orang Asli, Media Statement dated 10th November 2003. 
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 The Centre for Orang Asli Concerns (COAC) 
A non-profit organization that has consistently mounted defense of the rights of the Orang Asli for 
over a decade is the Centre for Orang Asli Concerns (COAC), under the leadership of Colin 
Nicholas.  As Nicholas states, COAC has a specific focus on helping those who want to practice a 
traditional lifestyle but who cannot exercise that choice; it is less concerned with defending the 
rights of those who live just as other Malaysians, such as those in towns or urban areas 
(Interview, 29.4.03).   
 
Part of COAC’s work has been to help communities conduct mapping exercises of their traditional 
lands, and to report on sites of cultural significance.  In addition, COAC documents and monitors 
events in relation to the Orang Asli, conducts research for Orang Asli-related court cases, and 
publishes books on the culture and lifestyles of various Orang Asli groups.  Articles written 
through COAC have regularly emerged since its establishment in 1989, powerful critiques of the 
everyday realities and penalties of ‘development’ and ‘assimilation’ that have been the declared 
objectives of the JHEOA.  COAC has also been actively involved in raising Orang Asli issues 
through transnational advocacy networks that focus on the recognition and rights of indigenous 
peoples. 
 
(Trans)national Networks and Alliances 
An important way in which Orang Asli concerns are articulated in national and international fora is 
through networks and alliances formed among non-government organizations (NGOs), 
community-based organisations (CBOs), and other indigenous peoples’ civil society groups, both 
within Malaysia and across Asia.  One of these initiatives is the Indigenous Peoples’ Network of 
Malaysia (Jaringan Orang Asal SeMalaysia, JOAS)114.  Established in 1992, JOAS links Orang 
Asli groups in the Peninsula with those of indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak.  The main 
                                                 
114 ‘Orang Asal’ is a term coined to refer specifically to both the Orang Asli and the native groups of Sabah and Sarawak.  
As Colin Nicholas explained to me, several other terms were considered and rejected (Interview, 29.04.03).  These 
included ‘pribumi’, which the Sabahan groups disliked; ‘bumiputra’, which connoted the inclusion of Malays and was thus 
inappropriate; and ‘asli’, which translated as ‘natural’.  ‘Asal’ was decided upon as it was a closer translation to ‘original’.  
Nevertheless, there were reservations concerning the term ‘asal’ as this had been the term used by the Communists to 
refer to the aborigines during the Emergency period.  
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 aim of JOAS, according to Tijah, who was Vice President of JOAS at the time I interviewed her in 
May 2003, is for grassroots communities to share information with one another.  Through annual 
meetings, communities from Sabah, Sarawak and the Peninsular States meet to discuss the 
issues that they face, and to plan joint programmes.  Their activities have included organizing 
dialogues and workshops, submitting memoranda on specific issues of concern, and celebrating 
World Indigenous Peoples Day (HOAS).  As Tijah explained, celebrating HOAS was important in 
order for the Orang Asal to “value ourselves and to gain recognition” (Interview, 14.05.03).  
Activities organized during HOAS celebrations “make issues faced by the Orang Asal known to 
the Orang Asal”.  During HOAS, “we foster spirit (menanamkan semangat) among ourselves, so 
that we love ourselves as indigenous peoples.” 
 
The Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP)115 is a transnational network that brings together 
groups from nation-states such as Nepal, India, Thailand, Philippines, Mindanao, Taiwan, 
Malaysia and Burma.  Through workshops and conferences organized by the AIPP, Orang Asli 
struggles for land rights and recognition have been mounted alongside those of indigenous 
groups who face similar challenges.  This network also serves as an access point to knowledge 
and resources that help strengthen Orang Asli participation in international dialogues.  Most 
recently, AIPP was actively involved in organising programmes to support the representation of 
indigenous groups at the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) proceedings. At the recent 7th 
Conference of Parties (COP7) to the CBD held in Kuala Lumpur in February 2004, for example, 
AIPP acted as an ‘international hub’, liaising closely with national and local Malaysian NGOs to 
ensure that the voices of indigenous peoples were heard during official meetings.  At COP7, AIPP 
organized a seminar discussion on ‘Customary Law and Sui Generis Protection of Indigenous 
Knowledge’, as well as hosted an Indigenous Peoples’ Reception in conjunction with the UNDP 
Equator Initiative Programme.  At this reception, Orang Asli representatives from groups such as 
SPNS teamed up with indigenous groups from Sabah and Sarawak to highlight the difficulties 
                                                 
115 For more information on the AIPP see Kingsbury (1999) 
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 faced by indigenous peoples in Malaysia in relation to land and commercial development 
activities.   
 
I have previously discussed how the Orang Asli, by virtue of the social construction of their 
identity in Malaysia as ‘original people’, are well positioned to articulate their struggles as 
‘indigenous peoples’ within the meaning assigned to it through global discourses about 
indigenous peoples’ rights (Bunnell and Nah, 2004).  Thus, Orang Asli have not been challenged 
on their claims to being recognized as ‘indigenous peoples’, whereas certain groups in other 
nation-states have had to struggle for such recognition (Kingsbury, 1999, 1995).  This does not 
mean that such recognition comes with the full implementation of associated rights.  As stated in 
previous chapters, ‘Malays’ have used the politics of indigeneity to argue for rights and privileges 
in postcolonial Malaysia, initiatives that are not fully extended to the Orang Asli.  Such national 
politics get played out in international fora.  Colin Nicholas notes, for example, that attempts have 
been made by Malaysian State Representatives in meetings organized by the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP) to assert that a wide range of affirmative actions have been 
planned and executed for its ‘indigenous peoples’, although these Representatives have in mind 
the Malays (Interview, 29.04.03).   
 
This does not mean that the Orang Asli are precluded from continuously asserting their problems 
as ‘indigenous peoples’ through other government channels. In Malaysia, their rights and special 
circumstances as ‘indigenous peoples’ were reaffirmed in a landmark report released by 
SUHAKAM in February 2004 entitled ‘The Human Rights of Orang Asal’ (which comprise the 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak as well as the Orang Asli).  In this report, a culmination of two 
years of consultation with various groups from the Peninsula as well as from Sabah and Sarawak, 
SUHAKAM emphasized the importance of the recognition of their rights as indigenous peoples in 
relation to land, education and autonomy.  While a common complaint among civil society actors 
is that SUHAKAM’s recommendations are frequently ignored by other government authorities, 
statements such as these signify the acceptance of Orang Asli as falling within the rubric of the 
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 concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ in global discourses, a matter that has legal and political weight 
(see Chapter 4). 
 
Benedict Kingsbury (1999) points out that minority groups have two strategies to choose from in 
order to leverage with States and elites more effectively.  The first is to join other groups to form a 
larger ethnic identity (in the context of Malaysia, the Malays).  This has been rejected by Orang 
Asli civil society leaders, for it means religious conversion, loss of cultural identity, and the further 
surrender of autonomy.  Orang Asli groups have, instead, opted for the second strategy – to join 
the international category of ‘indigenous peoples’, and through this international movement, to 
gain leverage to influence the shape of national politics.   
 
In my conversations with Orang Asli individuals, I found that those who imagined Orang Asli 
struggles in terms of the international movement of indigenous peoples used vocabularies and 
phrases that were slightly different from other Orang Asli when describing the issues they faced.  
Lands upon which they had been living for generations were described as “customary lands” 
(tanah adat), and the goals which they sought for were articulated in terms of “rights”.  When 
Majid Suhut described HOAS activities, for example, he noted: 
Part of what we emphasize in celebrating World Indigenous Peoples’ Day every year is 
the protection of our rights – rights to land, identity, and culture – as well as to champion 
the needs of the Orang Asli (Interview, 06.07.03).   
 
Among Orang Asli who have participated in fora that utilize such discourses, I found a stronger 
desire to resurrect cultural practices, to record myths and legends, to document oral histories, to 
preserve consciously inherited imaginings of the geography of the land, and to capture 
‘indigenous knowledge’ before it was completely ‘lost’, as compared to non-activist Orang Asli 
villagers.  While this merits further investigation, it is likely that joining forces with other 
indigenous groups around the world not only provide Orang Asli groups access to resources, 
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 information and funding, but also contributes to shaping the way in which they think about their 
own problems and articulate their own struggles within the nation-state. 
 
Evangelism, Proselytization, and Religious (re)Organisation 
Another type of activity among Malaysian civil society groups involved with the Orang Asli has 
been the concerted efforts by various religious groups to propagate religious beliefs such as 
Islam, Baha’I and Christianity.  These, again, are shaped through and impact upon Orang Asli 
identity quite significantly.  The adoption (and adaptation) of these three State-recognised 
religions, or ugama116, have had different and multiple levels of effects on Orang Asli – both in 
terms of their ‘supra-ethnic’ collective identity (as ‘Orang Asli’), their ‘tribal’ identity, and their 
notions of ‘self’.  As I discovered through my interviews with Orang Asli individuals, conversion to 
Islam has had the most resounding social effects, with strong distinctions made between Muslim 
Orang Asli (considered by many Orang Asli as a person who has masuk Melayu, or ‘become a 
Malay’) and Orang Asli of other religions (whether Christianity, Baha’I, or traditional, animistic 
belief systems).    
 
However, the focus of this chapter is not on the intricacies and complexities of tribal world-views 
and belief systems held by the different Orang Asli groups, for which detailed accounts can be 
found in the work of writers such as Geoffrey Benjamin (1967, 1974b), Marina Roseman (1991), 
Sue Jennings (1995), amongst others.  I am more concerned with the propogation of Islam, 
Baha’I and Christianity by civil society groups and effects on this on Orang Asli identity117.  As 
outlined in Table 5.1 there have been steady increases in numbers of converts over the past 
decades.   Religious change has been a source of concern for many Orang Asli individuals and 
groups, as this is a matter that links to broader questions concerning the preservation of cultural 
identities, resistance to perceived assimilation, and, potentially, the validity of customary claims to 
                                                 
116 Benjamin (1996) notes that the Malaysian authorities distinguish between citizens with an accepted ugama, that is, “a 
named religion, with a founding prophet, a sacred book, a clergy, and formal places of worship”, and those who have 
“beliefs” (p.37).  He points out that the Malaysian authorities tend to consider the Orang Asli as having “no religion” 
according to this definition. 
117 Analysis of the effects of different religious systems on Orang Asli identity could be more thoroughly treated by looking 
at these as a ‘religious field’, with each religion constituting a ‘sub-field’ (Bourdieu, 2005).   
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 land.  In this section, I review the activities conducted by groups propagating the three different 
religions, and then proceed to deal with the implications of such activities. 
 
Figure 4:  Percentage distribution of the Orang Asli population by Religion (1968, 1980 and 
1991). 
 
Religion 1968* 1980** 1991** 


























*  Carey, I. (1976b).  Carey estimates that of the 53,000 aborigines of the time, 1,600 embraced Islam, 700 Christianity, 
350 Baha’I. 
**Department of Statistics (1997) Profile of the Orang Asli in Peninsular Malaysia, Population Census Monograph Series 
No. 3, p. 29. 
Note:  The sharp difference in the percentages for ‘tribal/folk religion’ and ‘no religion’ between 1968 and both 1980 and 
1991 are probably due to differences in definitions. 
 
Islam 
As numerous JHEOA documents testify, Orang Asli have been encouraged to embrace Islam 
since the 1970s, with Islamisization activities intensifying in the early 1990s.  However, the 
spread of Islam has not only been confined to State-sponsored activities but is carried out by non-
government organizations (NGOs), often (if not always) in conjunction or partnership with State 
bodies.  One of those has been Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM), established in 
1960.  As Zakuan Sawai (1996/97) records, PERKIM activities have included education 
programmes targeting local populaces emphasizing the importance of their involvement in 
proselytization activities particularly in relation to converting Orang Asli groups118.  New PERKIM 
Chapters and Committees were set up in villages neighbouring Orang Asli settlements, with the 
objective of strengthening relationships between PERKIM members, local Malays, and Orang Asli 
villagers.  Programmes by these PERKIM Chapters have included fostering Orang Asli children 
                                                 
118 Three such programmes were cited as examples, e.g. one lasting for six months in Jempol, Negeri Sembilan, in 1992, 
another lasting a year in Malacca in 1994, and another than began in Pahang in 1995. 
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 (in order to give them ‘guidance’ and ‘support’ so that they succeed in their formal education), as 
well as the formation of Malay-Orang Asli working groups aimed at strengthening relations 
between these communities.  Muslim Orang Asli children have also been given funded 
opportunities to further their studies in the Institute Dakwah Islamiah (IDIP) in Pengkalan Chepa, 
Kota Bharu, Kelantan119.  As the PERKIM Honorary Secretary Haji Mohd Ghazali Abdul Rahman 
stated in a speech on 25th October 2001, the objective of converting all of the Orang Asli “is in line 
with the ambition of our government that holds the concept of Develop with Islam (Membangun 
Bersama Islam)”120. 
 
Other non-government bodies that have been involved in converting the Orang Asli include 
Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam Malaysia (YAPEIM), which has provided funds and 
prayer clothes for evangelical programmes121, Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu 
Kelantan (MAIK) and The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 
ABIM), whose members have gone to Orang Asli villages for evangelical programmes (see Mohd 
Sabri, 1999/2000), and Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia (YADIM), which organized 
workshops, courses, fora and conferences that touched on this topic.  The activities of all the 
groups propagating Islam have obtained the support (both direct and indirect) of government 
bodies, in stark contrast to groups of other faiths, who have had to maintain a low profile when 
conducting their evangelical activities. 
 
Baha’I  
As recorded by R. Ganesa Murthi (1969) in his thesis entitled ‘The growth of the Baha’I faith in 
Malaysia’, Baha’I beliefs spread from Singapore to Malaya in the 1950s and 60s.  Conversions 
took place primarily through mass teachings, and one of the groups focused upon by early 
propagators of this faith was particular aboriginal groups of the Peninsula.  As Murthi notes, the 
earliest attempts to teach Orang Asli groups were made by Mr. Yan Kee Leong in the Tapah 
                                                 
119 This writer notes that from 1984 – 1994, around 40 students completed their studies at this Institute. 52 others enrolled 
without completing their education.  Funding for this was provided by Islamic Affairs Departments at the State-level, the 
JHEOA and Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM). 
120 “Perkim gerak dakwah di penempatan Orang Asli”, http://www.parti-pas.org/kelantan/281001_be2.htm  
121 One such funding programme was the provision of RM200,000 through the Sungei Siput UMNO Branch.   
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 area.  These efforts at spreading Baha’I teachings resulted in the establishment of two centres in 
Perak: Jeram Meng Kuang, near Tapah, and Kampung Chang, Bidor.  In April 1963, an Orang 
Asli believer, Deraoh Leman, was invited to the Bahai World Congress in London, where he 
“addressed the crowd on behalf of his race” (p. 30), and by the end of 1963, around 800 Orang 
Asli in Perak alone had already embraced the Baha’I faith.   
 
The promulgation of Baha’I beliefs has not gone unchallenged in the Malaysian nation-state. 
Murthi notes that in 1964, an amendment was proposed to the section on Muslim administration 
of the Selangor State Assembly, prohibiting teachings “relating to Muslim religion contrary to 
Muslim law” (p.34).  The amendment specifically identified the Baha’I faith as falling into this 
category, which prompted great efforts by believers to prove that the Baha’I faith was a religion 
independent from Islam.  While this inclusion of the Baha’I faith was later dropped by the 
Selangor State Government, the message sent out to Baha’I believers was clear:  Baha’I beliefs 
had to be kept separate from Islamic teachings, and could not be propagated among Muslims.  
The teaching of the Baha’I faith has continued to this day, particularly among the Sengoi (Semai).  
There are significant numbers of Baha’I believers in Kampung Chang, Bidor, for example, and 
several Baha’I ‘churches’ have been established in the Perak area.  While the Baha’I Community 
is not as intensely evangelical as their Islamic and Christian counterparts among the Orang Asli, 
they still play a role in strengthening the faith of their existing believers. 
 
Attempts were made during my fieldwork periods to speak to Baha’I believers about their 
activities amongst the Orang Asli.  However, they were disinclined to discuss these matters with 
an outside researcher, and thus, coverage of activities of Baha’I groups can only be treated in a 
surface manner in this thesis.  Geoffrey Benjamin (1980) however, has provided more detailed 
notes on the spread and influence of the Baha’I faith from the 1970s to the 1990s.  He records 
that Temiars from Ulu Berok learned to follow the Baha’I faith from Semais in Bidor and that the 
first Temiar believer worked at a Baha’I centre in Tapah in the 1970s, studying under a Mr. Leong 
Choo (possibility the Mr. Yan Kee Leong noted above).  He writes that proselytizing this faith 
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 among Kelantan Temiars was conducted by Temiars only. Observing that Baha’I syncretised 
easily with existing Temiar beliefs (p.19), he also noted that the Temiars were cautious of the 
response of the JOA to their conversion.  The Baha’I faith then began to wither, a matter 
Benjamin related, among other factors, to the limited contact rural Temiars had with urban-based 
propogators of the faith122.   
 
Christianity 
As Figure 5.1 points out, there have been Christians recorded amongst the Orang Asli as far back 
as 1968.  Noone (1936) noted the work of Christian missionaries amongst the aboriginal groups.  
Means and Means (1981) write that as a result of missionary work in the 1930s there are Semai 
Lutheran and Methodist believers.  There have also been Catholic believers among Temuans for 
over a century (Borie, 1886, cited in Benjamin, 1996). 
 
Christian church-based groups have been actively involved with various Orang Asli communities 
across the Peninsula, with particular emphasis on evangelism.  Many church groups operate 
independently, visiting villages both near and far from their own geographical base, and it is 
difficult to estimate the extent and spread of these activities.  During fieldwork and through 
interviews, I observed different patterns of contact between Christian groups and Orang Asli 
communities.  The first pattern was that of periodic visits, typically once a month or once every 
two months, in which urbanite Christian groups (typically of ‘Chinese’ or ‘Indian’ ethnicity) traveled 
several hours to a village, spending between 2 hours and 1 day at a village.  When relationships 
became stable, and a ‘core group’ of believers were established, the visiting Christian group 
would put up a local house structure that served as a Church and community centre.  This led to 
                                                 
122 During my second period of fieldwork, I observed the presence of ‘Baha’I houses’ in several Semai villages in Perak – 
structures made of bamboo similar to Semai bamboo houses, but with a distinctive criss-cross weave to form its walls.  
When I questioned several Christian and Catholic Semais about these houses, I got the impression that they served as 
the equivalent of Christian churches/ centres within the village, and that urban-based Baha’I missionaries would 
periodically come to visit and to encourage believers in their faith. 
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 a different pattern of contact, which focused more on developing long-term relationships with 
Orang Asli communities123.   
 
Activities at the village level often begin with establishing kindergartens, usually based at the local 
church/community centre, aimed at developing reading, writing and mathematical skills amongst 
Orang Asli children.  Orang Asli converts are also employed to conduct Bible-study classes in 
their own villages (as well as in surrounding villages) and to act as kindergarten teachers or 
community development workers.  Christian Orang Asli leaders also encourage Christian 
community development organizations to introduce income generating projects and cooperative 
schemes in order to alleviate poverty.  In addition to such activities, attempts have also been 
made by certain Christian organizations to preserve and document the languages of the Orang 
Asli124.  
 
Lack of coordination among churches and denominations has led to rivalry and competition 
among different groups.  This has, as a side result, contributed to community fragmentation, 
particularly in villages that host more than one Christian group.  Of late, there have been 
concerted efforts to avoid quarrel among different Christian organisations125.  The Orang Asli 
Ministries Commission set up by the National Evangelical Christian Fellowship Malaysia (NECF) 
in 1995, has among its five objectives, “(t)o provide a medium for fellowship and effective 
cooperation among Orang Asli Christians…”, and “(t)o provide a medium for reducing suspicions 
and differences and to arbitrate in the event that misunderstandings arise among churches or 
                                                 
123 While this pattern of contact is increasing, it is still relatively rare.  As a community development worker observed, 
“Christian groups still tend to take a ‘shot-gun conversion approach’ rather than demonstrating long-term commitment for 
development.  Commitment is costly.” (Interview, 02.11.02). 
124 “OA Language Development: A Bridge to a Changing World” seminar held in Ipoh, sponsored by the OA Ministry 
Commission, NECF Malaysia, 23rd September 2002.  In November 2003, I met a Christian worker who had just come out 
of a workshop in which Semai Christians from different villages in Perak deliberated on how a writing system based on the 
Roman alphabet could be used for codifying the Semai language.  As she explained to me, this was no easy task, as 
Semais from different locations pronounced words differently.  Efforts were made to produce signs that would take these 
differences into account, and their work continues in order to produce a written script that can be taught to Semai children. 
125 In a meeting held on the 8th of September 1997 in Ipoh, pastors, church representatives and workers recognised the 
importance of co-operation, emphasised that unity among Christians was vital, and urged for misunderstandings to be 
cleared.  Kampung Serigala was an example cited of how quarreling or overlap in Christian work by different parties 
contributed to disunity.  In this meeting, it was also expressed that the traditions and cultures of the Orang Asli should be 
taken into consideration, and workers cautioned against the ‘colonialization of Christians’ over Orang Asli territories, and 
of ‘overspritualising’ matters. 
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 organisations involved in Orang Asli ministries” (NECF, 2001:1).  This has had varying levels of 
success over the years.  As a Christian worker commented,  
it is still hard to settle certain issues…. There are different churches, different 
denominations, different doctrines, different personalities.  Conflicts occur, especially if 
different churches work in the same area.  If one church has already been there, and 
then another comes it, [the first church] feels as if [the second] is encroaching” (Interview, 
18.8.02) 
 
Because of the legal protections surrounding Muslim identity (as elaborated in Chapter 4), 
Christian missionaries that deal with the Orang Asli are careful of their actions.  Indeed, these 
proselytizing activities do not go unnoticed.  Christians who visit Orang Asli villagers are 
scrutinised by the people with whom they work, their neighbours, by other civil society actors 
working with the Orang Asli, and by the JHEOA.  As a Christian missionary said to me (although 
without clarification of exactly who she meant), “they try every way to obstruct us” (Interview, 
16.09.02)126.  She narrated incidents where plain clothes officers (whose official identities are 
therefore masked) have questioned them on their movements, occasionally barring Orang Asli 
individuals from providing them with transport.  They are also careful about evangelizing to 
Muslim Orang Asli.  As she clarified, “we don’t go to the villages where we see solar panels.  If 
you see solar panels, you know that they are Muslim”.  Furthermore, as she explained to me, “We 
are very cautious with baptism.  We always ask them [Orang Asli converts] to sign a form to say 
that they are not Muslims.  When we baptize them, we give them a certificate with their photo on 
it.  If there are Muslims who want to convert, we don’t baptize them”.   
 
The Implications of Religious Change 
Orang Asli individuals continue to struggle over the freedom to choose their own religion.  There 
is still great suspicion among Orang Asli and civil society groups alike over activities related to 
religious conversion.  Some have expressed a concern that the promulgation of various religions 
                                                 
126 Because of family connections and my own socio-religious positionality, it was much easier for me to obtain interviews 
with Christian missionaries than it was for me to interview propagators of the Islamic and Baha’I faiths. 
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 among the Orang Asli may lead to further community fragmentation, echoing the opinions of 
earlier writers such as Carey (1970, 1976b) and Noone (1936).  Others are of the opinion that 
Orang Asli individuals should be allowed to choose what they believe for themselves127.  Indeed, 
it would be simplistic and paternalistic to argue that the Orang Asli should not be allowed to 
convert to other religions.   
 
Whatever the case, it is clear that religious conversion is a matter that is integral to Orang Asli 
identity.  Of greatest concern to the Orang Asli is the implication of Islamisization, which is taken 
to mean masuk Melayu or ‘becoming Malay’ in contemporary Malaysia (further discussed in 
Chapter 3).  The impact of conversion to other faiths is not as drastic, but still causes change and 
adaptation of identity, as this informs the practice of traditional rituals.  As a Catholic Semai said 
to me, 
We are losing many of our rituals because the Christian beliefs tell us to abandon them.  
But they don’t really understand.  Some of the practices they say are ‘black magic’ are 
not really that way, such as the role of the halak.  He doesn’t curse people, or throw 
spells on them.  But we are told not to practice these any more (Interview, 17.06.03).   
 
Negotiating whether cultural practices should be abandoned because of religious conversion is a 
tricky matter for promulgators of different faiths as, well as for the Orang Asli believers 
themselves.  In some villages, traditional practices and taboos continue to be practiced despite 
possible incongruence with world religions128, while in others such beliefs have been gradually 
abandoned over time.  Whatever the case, it is fairly consistent that converting to such religions 
has led to social change, and often to community fragmentation and strained familial 
relationships.   As the Catholic Semai (cited earlier) said to me, 
                                                 
127 In 1982, a group of Semai Christians submitted a memorandum to interested parties, the press, and politicians, 
appealing “that the freedom of religion be respected among our people and that no one be forced to accept any religion 
against one’s own wishes” (cited in Shastri, 1989:145).   
128 Tan Swu Yi (2003) provides a different argument in relation to Christianity amongst the Semais of Perak.  She argues 
that there has been “provision of the space for religious accommodation and syncretism between Christianity and Semai 
traditional religion” (p.29).  In relation to healing, for example, “the Christian concept of healing is superimposed upon 
traditional notions without a total elimination of previous notions of healing, treatment of diseases and concepts of taboo” 
(p.28). 
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 When you become Muslim, you cannot be Orang Asli anymore.  You can’t eat your 
traditional food.  They say that your traditional ways belong to Satan.  When OA become 
Christians, your whole life must be about Christianity.  You can only talk to other 
Christians.  When OA become Baha’I, they can’t get involved in politics.  You can’t do 
community work, you can’t do human rights work.  These [religious differences] cause 
fractures in the community.  They compete with one another, compete to see whose 
religion is recognized by God, who is a better person.  You cannot visit one another.  
[They want to see] whose religion is the better one. 
 
A matter of serious concern relating to religious ascription and cultural change is whether these 
transformations have an impact on customary claims to land.  Colin Nicholas, who provided 
evidence in the Sagong Case (discussed in Chapter 4), expressed concern that the 
discontinuation of traditional beliefs and practices resulting from ascription to religions such as 
Islam, Christianity and Baha’I, will threaten Orang Asli claims to land based on adat (Interview, 
29.04.03).  According to Nicholas, Orang Asli communities that argue for customary land rights 
will find it more difficult to make their case in judicial courts if they can no longer provide evidence 
of practicing ‘traditional’ customs in regard to contested lands.   
 
Conclusion 
Civil society has become the social space through which Orang Asli actors articulate their 
thoughts about the effects of State practices over their lives.  Questions concerning Orang Asli 
identity are at the core of most civil society initiatives, as this identity informs the actions and 
articulations of organizations, and in turn, is reshaped by the engagements of such groups.  As 
social change takes place, tensions arise which cannot easily be resolved.  For example, if it is 
maintained that Orang Asli individuals should be given the choice to embrace the faiths of their 
choosing, should it be that such ascription threatens their own identities as Orang Asli or 
endangers their claims to customary lands? 
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 In this chapter, I have reviewed how voluntary organizations have become channels through 
which Orang Asli leaders lobby for the rights of their own communities, as well as becoming 
significant sources of information, ideas and resources that (re)shape the way Orang Asli think 
about themselves.  While self-organising has been fraught with difficulties, Orang Asli civil society 
actors remain convinced that it is the Orang Asli themselves who need to stand up to fight for 
their own rights.  Currently, Orang Asli civil society groups are linked to other organizations in 
distant locales through the formation of transnational networks and alliances that span Malaysia 
and extend to other parts of Asia.   Their efforts within the nation-state have been strengthened 
by positioning the Orang Asli as ‘indigenous peoples’, a concept that has gained legal and 
political significance through international fora.  It remains to be seen, however, whether their 
struggles for rights as ‘indigenous peoples’ will result in greater security of land and livelihood for 
future generations of Orang Asli in Malaysia. 
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 CHAPTER 6:  BEING ORANG ASLI:  REFLECTIONS ON IDENTITY 
In this chapter, I present reflections on Orang Asli identity as narrated to me by Orang Asli 
individuals during interviews and conversations.  The purpose of these interviews/ conversations 
was to obtain information about how Orang Asli individuals made sense of their place in 
Malaysian society; to get a sense of their assumptions, judgements, and opinions, and to see 
how these related to the fields examined in Chapters 2 to 5.  Therefore, my initial questions 
tended to be broad and open-ended, focusing first on personal histories (e.g. “Tell me about your 
background”, or “Tell me about yourself, what your childhood was like”).  These were then 
complemented by more focused questions on particular themes (e.g. “What do you think about 
the Jabatan [JHEOA]?”, “What are the main issues that Orang Asli face today?”). 
 
The interactions through which I obtained these opinions were varied in context and purpose.  
Some were more ‘formal’ interviews, conducted with recognized Orang Asli spokespeople (for 
example, leaders of POASM), while others were more akin to casual conversations with villagers 
held in informal settings.  They were conducted in Bahasa Malaysia (a ‘second language’ for all of 
us), lasted between 2 to 4 hours, often continued in subsequent meetings, and took place in 
various locations – at teh tarik stalls, university halls, offices, homes, or over dinner.  Throughout 
these interviews, I tried to allow the respondents as much opportunity as possible to structure the 
interviews.  Thus, I refrained from taking a strong role in directing the flow of conversation, 
preferring instead to let issues emerge from their responses.  During all these interviews, I took 
extensive notes, paying particular attention to the exact words and phrases used by the 
respondents129. 
 
In each of these interviews, my social position and my role during the interview influenced the 
way in which the opinions were voiced.  When meeting Orang Asli individuals for the first time, I 
constantly introduced myself as a Malaysian student completing a thesis on Orang Asli identity in 
                                                 
129 The decision whether or not to use a tape-recorder was a carefully considered.  While I had the intention to provide 
close transcriptions of opinions for this chapter, I was concerned that the presence of a recording device would inhibit the 
expression of ideas.  In many of these interviews, respondents repeatedly emphasized that they did not want their 
identities to be revealed.  The opinions they voiced were also ‘sensitive’, and I did not want them to feel that the data they 
provided would be used as ‘evidence’ against them. 
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 a Singaporean University130.  Intuitively, I suspect that it ‘mattered’ that I was Malaysian, and that 
this created a bridge rather than a hindrance to their communication with me.  Occasionally, 
respondents asked why I was interested in doing academic work about the Orang Asli, when this 
tended to be of interest to ‘orang putih´(‘white’ foreigners) rather than to fellow Malaysians.  They 
expressed surprise at my choice of topic, considering this to be ‘unusual’. 
 
The ways in which my body was read – particularly in terms of my ‘racial’ identity - signaled how 
issues were positioned to me.  ‘Chinese-ness’ mattered considerably, particularly when we 
touched on matters concerning ethnic relations and religion.  Comments such as, “Oh, you are 
that Chinese girl who is doing research on Orang Asli, aren’t you”, or “You are Chinese, right?”, 
were frequently voiced.  Respondents also felt freer to express criticisms about other ‘races’, and 
tended to speak more positively about ‘the Chinese’ when describing their experiences to me.  
Similarly, the fact that I was a non-Muslim and non-Malay influenced their openness in broaching 
sensitive issues such as masuk Islam (‘becoming Muslim’) and masuk Melayu (‘becoming 
Malay’). 
 
The thoughts and ideas that I include in this chapter are not word-for-word transcripts of each 
interview conducted (although I have tried to remain faithful to the precise words/ phrases used), 
but are selections that I have chosen and organized according to specific themes.  These are 
insightful, for they give us a glimpse of the ways in which development in the fields described in 
Chapters 2 to 5 are internalized and understood by those who live as Orang Asli in the present 
nation-state.  These statements are a combination of opinions based on their personal 
experiences, as well as general comments about the Orang Asli as a whole. 
 
The individuals I quote here comprise Semelai, Temuan, Mah Meri and Semai adults, with ages 
ranging from 25 to 55 years of age.  Although many of them now study or work in Kuala Lumpur, 
they grew up in villages in Pahang, Perak and Selangor.  Thus, they are people who have ‘moved 
                                                 
130 Nevertheless, there were confusions about my identity, and some thought that I was Singaporean, possibly on the 
basis of my ‘Chinese’ identity. 
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 away’ not just geographically, but in terms of their socio-economic positionality.  Most of them are 
active in civil society groups and, as such, had already developed perspectives about the 
challenges faced by the Orang Asli131.  The melding of their different experiences – both growing 
up as Orang Asli, and as advocates of Orang Asli issues – have placed them in a position where 
they question the ‘truth effects’ of Orang Asli identity, and interrogate its everyday realities.   
 
I have assigned these voices an initial as they do not wish to be identified.  In these opinions, we 
find reflections on how they have confronted stereotypes, how they try to challenge the 
restrictions they face, and how they relate to other ethnic groups.  These individuals have also 
been open about how they deal with plurality among Orang Asli groups, how they have tried to 
confront ‘colonized minds’ among their ‘own people’, and what they think about the JHEOA.  My 
aim has been to retain the purity of what was said to me, privileging the spoken thoughts of those 
I interviewed, while keeping my own as that of an editor of sorts.  I conclude this chapter with 





There are some people who are ashamed of being Orang Asli.  They hide their identity or 
try to deny their roots.  They say “I don’t speak the language”.  They claim that they are 
not Orang Asli.  They are afraid that people will look down on them (pandang rendah); 
that adults and children will talk about them…   
[…] 
They say we are old-fashioned (kolot), that we have no knowledge, that all of the Orang 
Asli are nonsense [sic], that they don’t know anything, only know how to eat and sleep.  
Nearer [my] village (kampung), people were more racist.  Maybe it was their knowledge, 
                                                 
131 I first met some of these individuals at a dinner organized by POASM to celebrate its Silver Anniversary in 2002.  I also 
sought out particular individuals who have been advocates on Orang Asli issues for years.  Some of these already have 
their opinions published elsewhere (see Zawawi, 1996).   
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 their very limited perception.  They believed their elders.  Their elders asked them “why 
do you befriend that [Orang Asli] person?”  They think that the Orang Asli cannot be rich.  
[That they] cannot own cars and land. 
[…] 
But not all people are racist – it depends on the people, on what they think.   
[…] 
I did fight a lot when I was in school.  We formed our own clique to oppose those who 
made fun of us.  The majority of us were Orang Asli – and yes, even when I was friends 
with other races, I trusted them [Orang Asli] more than others.  I used to fight a lot! 
[…] 
When you advance, then people respect you….  Going to University is seen as a good 
thing.  They are proud of you – your future is more certain.  When a village (kampung) is 
in trouble, then they ask us for advice.  [I try to tell them] ‘if this happens, then you do 
this, if they do that, then you do this’...  They ask us to contribute the ideas, but they must 
fight the battle for themselves.   
[…] 
Some people don’t think that I am OA.  I don’t know why.  They don’t think OA can be like 
that.  They think I am pretending.  I want to go inside their heads to find out why.   
 […] 
They think that the OA are very sentimental, sensitive, good, never bad.  We [OA] must 
be more aggressive.  But the attitudes of OA are, “we don’t need to fight; to live is 
enough”.  [That’s why other people] can still tell them to go here, do this, do that, because 
the knowledge of the OA is under par.   
 
B 
I was always fighting at school.  Between Form 1 to Form 3 there were not many OA in 
my school.  The majority were Malays.  I didn’t like them – they liked to tease (ejek) me, 
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 look down on me, I felt very challenged, and I couldn’t concentrate when I was trying to 
study. 
 
This was a big issue, the racism (isu perkauman); not just a small matter.  But there were 
Malay people who were good [to us].  It tended to be specific groups that we fought with 
[and not all Malays].  In order to solve the problem, the Headmaster gathered all the 
different groups involved, and defended us [Orang Asli].  In the end, I went to a new 
school to study, but I still had problems there. 
 
C 
Some people are very proud to be Orang Asli, and some are very ashamed.  People 
think of the Orang Asli as being dirty, poor, a different class of society, at the pit, at the 
bottom.  If someone knows you are Orang Asli, you can feel disgraced, so some people, 
like those in the urban areas, don’t let others know.  As for me, I admit who I am.  I 
acknowledge it.  Why put yourself in an identity crisis? 
[…] 
Once in a while, you feel lonely.  Like an outcast.  I was the only Orang Asli in my 
matriculation course.  I sometimes felt inferior to the others, and alone as an Orang Asli.  
In school and in university, I felt that way.  This is the reason why some OA children don’t 
want to continue studying.  They feel lonely, afraid, scared that they will fail.  They feel 
that they are unable to compete, they feel pressured. 
[…] 
But you must try to position yourself in a new environment.  It cannot be done overnight, 
it is not an easy thing. 
 
D 
In towns, people have not seen Orang Asli.  They laugh. They think OA are below the 
Malays… They always make fun.  They say OA are ‘sakai’, meaning we are slaves.  
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 They say we eat pigs, monkeys, mice, and so on.  They say OA are stupid.  Even when I 
did well at school, they said I used black magic (ilmu hitam), because OA cannot be 
smart.  Every day, OA get disturbed.  If they don’t know how to reply, they just stay quiet.  
It makes me angry when they make fun of us.  I say to them ‘is this what your religion 
teaches you to do’?  I challenge them.  The feeling of shame is one of the reasons why 




It is important for the Orang Asli to believe in themselves; to be prepared, and to be 
brave.   
[…] 
I don’t want the Orang Asli to be beggars.  I want them to be independent.  I don’t want 
them to have to put on a sad face (muka kesian), to always look for the JOA [JHEOA] for 
everything, even to do their own ICs [identity cards]!  We have already put on this sad 
face for a long time.  We must have more belief in ourselves…. To have a sense of self-
achievement, so that even when other parties leave us – the JOA, other NGOs – then we 
are not in trouble.  We should still think that we can stand alone. 
 
F 
The Orang Asli are proud of their myths, but they have nothing else.  They need to be 
proud about themselves.  If you are proud about yourself, then your language, your 
customs, and so on, will not be lost.  I get angry when I see Orang Asli being proud of 
being Orang Asli without any cultural substance, and with no knowledge (ilmu).  It is like 
standing on an empty box, being proud about your nature, but having lost a belief in 
yourself (keyakinan diri). 
[…] 
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 The Orang Asli must have awareness (kesedaran), and they must have spirit (semangat).  
It is not enough to just talk.  You need to have money, to have friends, to read about the 
philosophy of other races…. Mentally, the Orang Asli are already colonized (dijajah).  
Their belief in themselves has been stolen.  You don’t need guns – you just tell them that 
they are lazy, and they weaken.  They are colonized through their minds.  
[…] 
The Orang Asli believe what you say and do.  Yet, they always feel that they are lied to, 
and that makes them disappointed (kecewa).  So, they won’t follow what you say again.  
They don’t fight.  They recognize that they are cheated, but they don’t challenge their 
circumstances, or find another way. 
 
G 
Except for those who are articulate, and who can understand the implications [of change], 
OA just try to stay out of trouble, even if they personally don’t agree with what is 
proposed.  In fact, most of the time, they don’t agree, but they don’t voice it out, and they 
don’t fight aloud.  In my perception, Orang Asli tend to avoid confrontation – among 
ourselves and with outsiders.   
 
In the past, when we had conflicts, we had our own court system.  Our way was to have a 
meeting and to discuss the issues, to use language that evades direct confrontation.  
Sometimes our meetings would last for two to three nights!  The atmosphere was very 




If the Orang Asli care about their own people, they can develop quickly.  It depends on 
the individuals; some have spirit and some don’t.  [But those who want to help] don’t have 
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 the proper resources.  Its not that the Orang Asli must leave the secular world [their jobs] 
to do it – its whether you want to [help] or not.   
[…] 
What Mahathir said about the Malays – ‘Malays forget easily’ (Melayu mudah lupa)132 – is 
the same issue for the Orang Asli.  They always depend on subsidies, always depend on 
the JOA.  They feel secure because the government is always there for them. 
[…] 
The problem with some Orang Asli graduates are that first, they don’t know the problems 
of the people; what they face.  They don’t think ‘this is my people, this is my problem’.  
Second, they mix around with their own friends, not their own people.  The more we are 
educated, the more forgetful we are.   
[…] 
The reason why graduates study is to feed themselves; to look after our own ‘rice bowl’.  
But if you want to contribute, then you can do something.  When you go back to the 
village (kampung), they respect you – you have an education and a job.  They ‘adore 
you’!  Other parents tell their children to be like you.  They see that education is linked to 
material wealth.  When they see you come back to the village (kampung), they see the 
car you drive and your possessions, that in itself makes a difference.  It shows them that 
the Orang Asli can have a real alternative.  [Orang Asli graduates] must not disappear.  
Just be there, be present; be as you are. 
 
Body Politics and Ethnic Relations 
C 
Some of my friends don’t tell other people that they are OA.  Most people assume that 
you are Malay and Muslim when they first see you.  During fasting month (puasa) – some 
people are suspicious.  I have to be a bit clever.  For example, I don’t eat openly in the 
mamak stalls; I just eat in the Chinese restaurant.  When I first started work, I ate in the 
                                                 
132 See Mahathir (2001) 
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 canteen.  The makcik [owner of the stall] didn’t want to take my money, because she 
thought I was supposed to be fasting, and she didn’t want to be a part of it. 
 
D 
During Ramadan we must puasa also.  It is quite embarrassing [when we eat]; many 
people look at me.  I have to get used to it.  I have been scolded, even!   
 
J 
In a mixed marriage, the children still refer to themselves as Orang Asli.  When we fill in 
the forms, we fill in “bumiputera” or “others”.  The name of our suku (sub-ethnic group) is 
irrelevant – hardly anybody recognizes the meaning.  In my birth certificate I am 
registered as Orang Asli. 
 
In terms of marriage, my parents let me choose freely, but they prefer me to marry an 
Orang Asli.  Because Orang Asli have the same customs, the same origins.  Their only 
worry is that we will become Malay (masuk Melayu).  In Islam, there is no turning back, 
and the next generation becomes another race.  We will change our way of life and 
beliefs.  The eating style is all different, and we cannot believe in spiritual things.  It’s 
different if Chinese and Orang Asli marry.  Even if the children are more Chinese, they 
still claim to be Orang Asli.   
 
A lot of my friends become Malays (masuk Melayu).  People [Orang Asli] look at them 
differently.  They cannot stay in the same village (kampung), the Orang Asli will not 
respect the person as an individual.   
 
In some villages, the people are so poor, and they find it so difficult to get money, that 
they just declare [themselves] to be Muslim to get some money.  The government tells 
  - 123 - 
 them that “if you convert, then you will get help – education, development…”.  In Bukit 
Lanjan some people got motorbikes.   
 
They [the Muslims who try to convert the Orang Asli] think that their religion is complete.  
If the people convert, it can totally change their life.  They believe that their life will 
become better.  Some people are not ready, but they force them anyway.  For some of 
the Muslims, their intention is good.  They believe that Islam is a perfect religion.  But 
some Orang Asli are scared.  They believe that the Malays use religion to conquer them.  
That in the long-run, there will be no more Orang Asli. 
 
Plurality among Orang Asli 
H 
We meet Orang Asli from all over the country – Selangor, Pahang, Melaka, Negeri 
Sembilan.  Even though we don’t share the same language, the relationship is good as 
long as they know that you are Orang Asli.  [This is] because they share the same sort of 
lifestyle, it feels like your own society, we have a similar background – for example, 
hunting, fishing, and so on.  Because of that we can mix with one another. 
 
A 
I feel more connected to other Orang Asli than people of other races.  I can depend on 
Orang Asli.  Just like Chinese will help Chinese, Orang Asli will help Orang Asli.  I too, if I 
help anyone, I will help the Orang Asli first.  We have our own responsibility to develop 
the OA, because we know ourselves well, we have similar backgrounds, and so on.  Our 
problem is quite the same anywhere in the Peninsula.  There are some differences in the 
way that individuals elaborate, define, and deal with the problem, but the problems are 
similar. 
[…] 
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 However, it is still difficult, because whatever sub-ethnic group we are from, we still have 
different backgrounds.  Our economic sources are different – some tap rubber, some 
work palm oil – our sources of income are from different activities, and our religions are 
different.   
F 
There is competition and fragmentation among the Orang Asli – between those who live 
in towns and those who live in villages (kampung), between those of different ethnic 
groups, between those who try to find jobs with the JOA [and those who don’t], between 
the rich and the poor, between the professionals and non-professionals.   
  
I 
The Orang Asli are not strong because they are fragmented – in terms of religion, politics, 
NGO activity…. The greatest problem is not development, but strength in unity.  We are 
not as strong as we were before.  We share the same fate but we have different dreams.  
All of us try to be heroes; we don’t want to unite together.  Religion splits us apart.  
People of one religion speak bad things about those of another religion. I am not against 
religion, but I see that it divides us. 
 
E 
There are many reasons why we are not united, that we split apart.  The first is religion.  
That creates fragmentation among us.  The second is NGOs.  They too, can create 
divisions.  NGOs need to be careful, because they can end up destroying communities 
even if their intention is good.  The third is the ruling authorities – the JOA and agencies 
such as RISDA, FELDA, FELCRA.  Their way is more subtle (halus).  For example, they 
may suggest a project to be done in one community, such as planting palm oil…  Some 
of the community want it, but some don’t…  [Thus we are divided.] 
 
F 
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 There is a difference between the OA in the fringes of the interior and in the towns.  
Some have succeeded according to education, development, and socio-economic status:  
The Jakun, Mah Meri, Temuan and Semai for example.  They are contractors, they own 
palm oil estates; they plant fruit orchards, get Pajeros; work as lawyers, doctors and 
academics…. Why do they succeed?  It is usually those who have mixed blood that 




Muslims guide the OA as the slave – you must be like this, like that.  They know that the 
OA are not clever (cerdik).  The OA think “you are majority, you are powerful; I follow 
along”.  The Malays tell them what to do, and the OA think that they are limited, [that] 
they have no power.  The Malays are the government; they [the OA] feel they have to 
listen to them.  Most OA feel the pressure to follow. 
 
Before I studied, I also went along.  The Malays guide our life to become a certain way, a 
very focused way.  We need to free ourselves from this, because the vision and direction 
of the Malays are very narrow.  They don’t give you choices; they don’t present you with 
alternatives.  They just tell you exactly what to do, and if you don’t follow, then they tell 
you the negative consequences. 
 
F 
There aren’t many who fight for power.  Most OA don’t want to be leaders.  They are 
afraid, and it is as if they have lost a belief in themselves.  Their confidence has been 
eroded.  They don’t want to take leadership positions…. They have talk, ideas, creativity, 
but they are afraid when it comes to implementation.    
[…] 
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 The mental state of the people in the interior is hard to change.  They can talk, but cannot 
do things.  They lose their spirit when they face problems.  They feel that they are not up 
to the challenge.  They are scared and fearful.  They can copy clothes, behaviours, and 
all, but they don’t yet have the strength of mind.  They feel they cannot match up.  
Mentally, they are not ready.  They are stuck in the middle, they cannot reverse after 
having moved somewhere, but they are afraid to go all the way.  They label themselves 
as lazy; they create their own myths about their laziness.  They have to start with 
themselves, not just look to others to make them advanced.   
 
J 
For me, there are two main problems which are the ‘internal problem’ and the 
‘environmental problem’. [The] Internal are more to do with self assessment, attitude, lack 
of experience, lack of skill, [being] uneducated, laziness, [having] low confidence level 
[and] motivation, [having a] subsidy mentality and no interest in their own people. 
 
‘Environmental problems’ as you know are like poverty, land, infrastructure – schools, 
houses, roads and other facilities – health and disease, school dropouts, malnutrition, 
lack of political voice, and so on. 
 
The biggest problem is actually [the] internal problem. If we can solve this, I think it is not 
a big problem anymore. The internal problems are quite similar to what Malays had but 
the second one affects the Orang Asli [more]. The first one cannot be seen, [it is] 
intangible, but the second one is tangible and the most popular one to be voiced out. 
 
I 
Why do the Orang Asli not progress?  They don’t have three things – power, knowledge, 
money.  They also like to depend on others, want to be pampered, and like to keep 
asking for things.  Furthermore, they don’t have opportunities, are not given opportunities, 
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 and they don’t take opportunities.  The world doesn’t give us success, but it does give us 




The JOA definitely have a role to play [in the lives of the Orang Asli], they have good 
objectives, and if they follow these correctly, they can make a big difference.  But the 
execution is not good – they are not efficient, they are slow.  They don’t work with or 
involve the Orang Asli.  They do things for the Orang Asli.   
 
The JOA says that OA don’t want development, but I disagree.  The government 
memutar belit (twists) the stories of the OA.  They say it is the OA that silap (make 
mistakes), that they are “the problem”.  They can say that because they are already maju 
(advanced).  But the Malays had the white men to teach them what to do so they could 
advance.  Now, the OA are in the same position as the Malays were in the 1950s.  In 
today’s case, it is the same as the relationship the Malays had with the British.  So you 
can’t say it is just the OA’s fault; it is also the Malays’ fault.     
 
JOA has money, but they don’t use it effectively.  Some people say the JOA should be 
closed, but I think that they should not get rid of it.  Just change the way they work, 
replace the management so that OA can be administrators.  The OA don’t trust other 
people.  I believe that for a people to advance, leaders from among their own people are 
necessary. 
 […] 
Management [of the JOA] is not by the OA.  There is money that is spent, but it doesn’t 
reach the people.  In 1989, six officers were charged for corruption, caught by the Anti-
Corruption Agency.   
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 The JOA wants to Islamisize the OA, although they deny it when reporters ask them.  If 
they play it right, they should not be involved.  The JOA should have a mandate for 
economics and education, but not for Islam.  I think they do this because they want to 
increase the number of OA who become Muslim.  There is a hidden agenda, a negative 
motive, in my opinion.  They want to exploit the OA, especially the smart people….  
When they become Muslims, there is a change of thought, of mindset and behaviour.  
For weddings, deaths, and so on, cultural practices change to become Muslim.  
 
The OA are afraid to break the law, so they follow.  [They are] afraid of going against the 
authorities.  If [the JOA] ask them to bury their people a certain way, they comply rather 
than resist.  PERKIM has seminars and visits to OA villages to get them to convert. 
 
I 
The problem with the Orang Asli is that they treat the JOA like their father.  They lose 
their own spirit.  Everything they need they ask the JOA – even shoelaces!  They have 
lost a belief in themselves.  They feel that they are not humans.  They don’t have their 
own values… OA must understand; must value themselves.  If you value yourself, then 
you won’t be in this position. 
 
A 
The Jabatan tells you exactly what to do, and you are just supposed to follow.  They don’t 
give me freedom to choose.  When they guide me, they don’t give me alternatives to 
choose from.  They want to guide us into what they want.   
 
The Jabatan’s concept is very narrow.  If they focus on development, then they do 
development only.  If health, then health only.  And even then, they do very little. For 
example, they only give a little money, and they talk as if it is a big thing.  In Bukit Lanjan, 
they claim that the OA are millionaires, they have bungalows, etc, but their education, 
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 their [actual] advancement is limited.  If we want a house, after a few years of working, 
we can buy our own house.  Don’t say that we are developed because we have our own 
houses.  Even the bungalows that are given to them are cheap and poorly constructed. 
 
The government system teaches us to be shy,… we feel that we are very small, very 
limited… They try to help us, but it is complicated.  They approach us as if we cannot 
survive on our own.  When they help, they don’t concentrate on giving us knowledge 
[which is more empowering].  They just give us money, food, health….  It is as if they say 
“we support you, you have to respect us”. 
 
If they really want to help, they can [but they aren’t doing it].  We [OA] have to work too.  
We should not wait to be helped.  We should not just depend on the Jabatan; wait for 
them to tell us what to do, wait for their instructions.  Always depending on them!  We 
also have our own feelings, respect.  If they [JOA] respect us, then they know how to talk 
to us.  We must think of ourselves, not only be dependent on the Jabatan…. We must 
break their control over the OA.  We should have more people in University.  In all of 
history, there have only been about 200 graduates.  The Jabatan takes a directive 
approach.  They don’t leave the responsibility on the OA.  They don’t open up the choice 
to us.  We must always remain in a dependent, leaning position.   
 
E 
 The JOA don’t educate the Orang Asli about social, political, and land issues.  Their aims 
for us are very focused.  They just want us to become Muslims (masuk Islam), to get very 
rich, to live modernised lives, and to have some education.  But these are just material 
issues. 
 
A World of Already Realized Ends:  Same Fate, Different Dreams 
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 …the dominated seldom escape the antinomy of domination.... to oppose… [is] to lock 
oneself into one’s condition of dominated..  On the contrary, to accept assimilation… 
amounts to being co-opted by the institution.  The dominated are very often condemned 
to such dilemmas, to choices between two solutions which, from a certain standpoint, are 
equally bad ones…  
Pierre Bourdieu  
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:82) 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to focus on the socio-psychological accounts of being Orang Asli 
– what it means to individuals who find themselves interpellated as Orang Asli, and how this has 
influenced the ways in which they are treated, realize, and think of themselves.  I do not assume 
these to be representative of the thoughts of all Orang Asli, but they give us clues as to the 
issues, thought patterns and concepts that are employed by social actors who grapple with the 
realities of being Orang Asli.  In their texts, we see internal struggles, tensions, ambivalences, 
and dialectics that come with negotiating this identity. 
 
In Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, social ideas are internalized such that they shape the responses 
of actors, whether or not they are conscious of these processes of learning.  Their actions, 
thoughts, and practices are therefore both ‘determined’ and have the capacity to determine, or 
alter, the social realities that they negotiate.  The opinions expressed by the Orang Asli 
individuals that I record in this chapter indicate how the Orang Asli signifying themselves, their 
struggles, their actions, the practices of the State, as well as their responses to dominant 
portrayals of who they are.  These statements are not just ‘personal’, they also indicate ideas that 
are circulated in the ‘social’ realm. As Bourdieu writes, “[t]o speak of habitus is to assert that the 
individual, and even the personal, the subjective, is social, collective.  Habitus is a socialized 
subjectivity…. The human mind is socially bounded, socially structured” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992:126).   
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 What do the statements noted above indicate about the agency of Orang Asli actors who 
negotiate their identity?  A repeated theme that surfaced in my discussions with them concerned 
the (negative) stereotypes they had to confront when in contact with non-Orang Asli actors, and 
how these became internalized and problematized by Orang Asli individuals.  This included the 
perception that Orang Asli are “backward”, “stupid” and “old-fashioned”, lacking in knowledge and 
material wealth, “at the pit, at the bottom” of society.  They are also perceived as being ‘dirty’.  In 
particular, Malay Muslims see their practices of eating “pigs, monkeys, mice, and so on”, animals 
considered forbidden (haram) for Muslims, as contributing to their uncleanliness.  In response, 
the Orang Asli are “[a]shamed”, “scared”, “fearful”, people who have “lost a belief in themselves”, 
who “lack confidence”, who “lose their spirit”, feel powerless and “stupid”.    
 
Such stereotyping and concomitant discrimination was first experienced for these Orang Asli 
individuals as children, particularly at the schools they attended, where they encountered on a 
daily basis, some for the first time, non-Orang Asli ‘others’.  Both ‘A’ and ‘B’ responded to the 
teasing they received at school by forming ‘gangs’ and fighting back (‘B’ eventually got 
transferred to another school).  Others responded the way ‘C’ did, by keeping to himself and 
focusing on his work.  Yet, as ‘C’ notes, many other Orang Asli children respond by dropping out 
of school. “They feel lonely, afraid, scared that they will fail.  They feel that they are unable to 
compete, they feel pressured”. Orang Asli children are perceived as being very “stupid”, being 
(racially?) unable to perform well.  When ‘D’ obtained good marks for an exam, he was accused 
of using “black magic”133.  As he states, “The feeling of shame”, as a result of the teasing they 
receive, “is one of the reasons why OA children drop out of school”.  Such stereotyping creates 
anxieties for Orang Asli individuals, who experience both pride and shame in their identity.  Some 
Orang Asli, as ‘A’ notes, “hide their identity” in urban areas (for example, by switching to the 
Malay language when they pass by non-Orang Asli individuals), afraid that others will look down 
on them.   
 
                                                 
133 As ‘F’ notes, when Orang Asli “succeed’, “The JOA will come and ask “are they OA or are they Chinese?”. 
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 Overcoming such feelings of shame and inferiority continues to be a struggle for most, if not all, 
Orang Asli.  One of the ways of becoming ‘on par’ with the other ‘races’ is to accumulate 
knowledge.  When ‘A’ stated “when you advance, then people respect you…”, he was referring to 
the Orang Asli of his own village, who respected him for his ability to gain university education, a 
sign of his ‘success’.  This was read as his capacity to ‘determine’ his future (“your future is more 
certain”).  He observed that he, a young Orang Asli, was deemed knowledgeable enough to be 
consulted by ‘elders’ about the problems they faced in their village.  The ‘problem’ he referred to 
was a specific dispute between the villagers in his kampung and JHEOA officials who prevented 
them from cultivating their traditional lands as they saw fit; their customary practices seen to be 
ecologically damaging.  As a person who ‘mastered’ modern knowledge, he was then considered 
to be smart enough to advise them on how they should engage with State actors.  University 
education, as ‘J’ also noted, created “respect” amongst Orang Asli villagers for them, those who 
were perceived as having ‘succeeded’.  Linked to jobs and material wealth, education was seen 
in his village as a means of creating “a real alternative”, perhaps to the dispossession and bleak 
futures they faced living in their own village. 
 
The possession of knowledge, particularly knowledge that enables the Orang Asli to function in 
modern society, is thus perceived as empowering, as a way of being “independent”. For ‘E’, 
Orang Asli having to refer to the JHEOA “for everything, even to do their own ICs” makes them 
“beggars”, constantly dependent on others for everyday matters134.  For ‘I’, asking the JHOEA for 
everything (“even shoelaces”) makes them “lose their own spirit”, “los[e] a belief in themselves”. 
The JHOEA, as the intermediary between the Orang Asli and the rest of society, become the 
‘guides’ who ‘help’ Orang Asli navigate the complexities and demands of modern administration.  
JHOEA officials thus represent the ‘face’ of the government.  It is the JHEOA who bring news of 
government plans for the Orang Asli, it the JHEOA who reinforce the laws related to everyday 
practices such as hunting, trapping, and cultivation of land, it is the JHEOA who give instructions 
                                                 
134 Dentan et al (1997) remark: “Given how extensive governmental control over Orang Asli is, it is not surprising that 
government officials, the Malaysian public, and Orang Asli themselves have come to believe that Orang Asli cannot do 
anything without the guidance and permission of the JHEOA” (p.71). 
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 about what Orang Asli should and should not do.  JHEOA officials, as ‘B’ notes, become the law.  
Fearful of “break[ing] the law”, Orang Asli follow JHEOA instructions.  It is not surprising then, that 
the encounters between the Orang Asli and the administration of the nation-state via the JHOEA 
(along with other government officers, such as police, game wardens and forestry officers; 
Dentan et al, 1997) – who tend to be Malay – become racialised; become encounters between 
the Orang Asli and “the Malays” (or “the Muslims”), as is evident when ‘A’ says that “Muslims 
guide the OA as the slave”, “[t]he Malays tell [the OA] what to do”, and “[t]he Malays are the 
government; they [the OA] feel they have to listen to them”. 
 
For ‘E’, knowledge about the ways of modern society needs to be coupled with a “belief in 
ourselves”, an opinion that ‘F’ shares.  For ‘F’ (who is currently documenting musical forms of 
cultural expression amongst different Orang Asli groups) such “belief” is based on knowledge of 
their own cultural heritage.  This knowledge is related to the Orang Asli having “awareness 
(kesedaran)”, not only awareness of their culture and history, but awareness of the “philosophy of 
other races”, so that they can understand why the other ‘races’ have ‘progressed’ while the Orang 
Asli (as ‘F’ sees it) ‘have not’.  ‘As ‘F’ states, “[t]heir belief in themselves has been stolen.… They 
are colonized through their minds”.  For ‘F’, Orang Asli need to have “strength of mind” which is 
closely related to ‘F’s earlier statement that they need to have “spirit (semangat)”.  Those who 
have “strength of mind” are those who have confidence in themselves, who are brave and action-
oriented when they face problems, who are ready to stand their ground, who feel that they are 
equal to other ‘races’.  ‘J’ also uses the term “spirit (semangat)”.  For ‘J’, who contrast the Orang 
Asli who “care about their own people” with those who don’t, the former are characterized not by 
their participation in the ‘secular world’ and their level of education but by their willingness to 
“contribute” to the fate of the Orang Asli.  He cautions against a process of “forget[ting]” 
(forgetting who the Orang Asli are and what social problems they face) which occurs “the more 
we are educated”.  It is awareness and spirit therefore that brings Orang Asli out of having 
“colonised minds”.  
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 Orang Asli individuals who do not proactively identify themselves as being Orang Asli are often 
mistaken as being Malay, and therefore, automatically, as being Muslims.  As ‘C’ notes, this 
requires them to be “clever”, especially during the fasting month of Ramadan, when officials from 
the Religious Affairs Department patrol the streets of Malaysia to identify those who do not 
observe their religious obligations.  As ‘C’ and ‘D’ (among many others) note, eating in front of 
Muslims attracts attention.  ‘C’ therefore says, “I just eat in the Chinese restaurant”135.  Being 
identified as a Malay Muslim however, extends far more than the inconveniences of being asked 
their identity during fasting month.  As described by Nicholas (1996), Dentan et al (1997) and 
Dentan (1997) amongst other scholars, it is a sensitive issue amongst Orang Asli who are keen to 
preserve a separate identity from the Malay Muslim majority (see also Nah, 2003 and Nah, 
forthcoming).  They do not want to “become another race”. 
 
Maintaining a sense of ethnic difference is practiced in a variety of ways.  ‘J’ for example, when 
filling out administrative forms, identifies himself as either being ‘bumiputera’ or being an ‘other’ 
(and then writing in ‘Orang Asli’ if space is provided for further elaboration – because “Malaysians 
don’t recognize the meaning of our sub-ethnic group if I write it down”), a practice also done by 
others136.  In order to preserve a sense of difference, parents also communicate a preference for 
their children not to marry Malays and therefore masuk Melayu, become a Malay.  As ‘J’ notes, 
becoming a Malay, either through marriage or conversion to Islam, is interpreted amongst Orang 
Asli as a way of “conquering” them, “[t]hat in the long-run, there will be no more Orang Asli”.  This 
is what Dentan and Endicott (forthcoming) refer to as ‘ethnicide’137.   
 
While the Orang Asli groups speak different languages, practice different economic activities, 
hold different religious beliefs and come from different locations in the Peninsula, there is a 
shared sense of togetherness.  ‘A’ feels “more connected to other Orang Asli”, and considers 
                                                 
135 Dental et al (1997), in relation to Orang Asli contact with Malays (not just during Ramadan), say that “Semai tend to 
cluster in particular shops where they can eat pork or drink beer in peace” (p.15).  
136 A Temuan Orang Asli also said to me, “You know, when I was applying for Singapore Permanent Residence, I was 
asked to indicate what race I was.  There wasn’t a category for Orang Asli, so I put myself as ‘Dayak’ (Interview, 
11.11.02). 
137 Although I have not elaborated about it in this thesis, Orang Asli are also conscious about their personal names 
sounding too ‘Malay’ or ‘Indian’, a matter I elaborate in Nah (forthcoming). 
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 them as having “our own responsibility to develop the Orang Asli”.  As ‘H’ notes, “it feels like your 
own society”.  When Orang Asli individuals such as ‘E’, ‘F’ and ‘I’ talk about “fragmentation” within 
the Orang Asli, they do not make allusions that some groups are Orang Asli, while others are not.  
The fragmentation is internal, within a coherent group called the ‘Orang Asli’, preserving a sense 
that the Orang Asli do exist separately from the ‘Malays’, ‘Chinese’ and ‘Indians’.  As ‘I’ opines: 
“We share the same fate but we have different dreams”. 
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 CHAPTER 7:  NEGOTIATING INDIGENOUS CITIZENSHIP IN POSTCOLONIAL MALAYSIA 
Frantz Fanon… argued that the major weapon of the colonizers was the imposition of 
their image of the colonized on the subjugated people.  These latter, in order to be free, 
must first of all purge themselves of these depreciating images. 
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition (1994:65) 
 
We can… dispose of the idea that identity is an absolute and to find the courage 
necessary to argue that identity formation – even body-coded ethnic and gender identity 
– is a chaotic process that can have no end.  In this way, we may be able to make 
cultural identity a premise of political action rather than a substitution for it. 
Paul Gilroy (1996) 
 
From pre-colonial to postcolonial rule, Peninsular Malaysia became part of a nation-state, with 
geographical borders and national imaginings that turned selected peoples into ‘citizens’ with 
differentiated rights and privileges.  The transfer of power at the moment of Malaya’s 
Independence was legitimized and executed on the basis of the ‘reality’ that communities in the 
Peninsula were separable into discrete categories according to ethnicity and indigeneity.  These 
identity categories were incorporated into legal and administrative instruments, which re-
emphasized ethnic boundaries, recreating and sustaining the material realities of identity 
difference. 
 
In this framework, ‘Malays’, recognized by the British as being ‘indigenous’ elites of the land, were 
accorded a ‘special position’ in the postcolonial nation-state, a recognition that was withheld from 
other ethnic majorities and minorities in the Peninsula.  The ‘aborigines’, who played no 
significant role in the establishment of British colonial rule in the Peninsula, were left largely to 
their own devices during the forming of Malaya.  They were neither consulted on the politico-
juridical form of the nation-to-be, nor given much thought when territories were geographically 
segmented by State and Federal borders.  It was only when they became crucial in the war 
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 against Communism that great efforts were undertaken to bring them out from the margins of 
political life to become citizens of the State.  It was for political reasons and through State 
administrative practices that Orang Asli identity was brought into being; and currently, it is as 
Malaysian citizens that this identity is most salient and continues to be necessary. 
 
The socio-political positionality of the Orang Asli – as ‘undeniably indigenous’ (despite the fact 
that the Orang Kuala and Orang Kanaq are not strictly indigenous, see Benjamin, in progress) 
and yet politically and economically marginalized – allows us to interrogate links between 
indigeneity, ethnicity, and power in postcolonial Malaysia.  I have argued elsewhere that the 
social construction of Orang Asli identity produces anxiety for ‘Malays’, for Malay claims to being 
essentially ‘indigenous’ come under questioning when Malay identity construction is set vis-a`-vis 
the Orang Asli (Nah, 2003).  Malay elites have had to defend why the Malay populations are 
granted ‘special position’ as indigenous subjects, when this appears to be denied to the Orang 
Asli, who are understood as being ‘more indigenous’ than Malays.  I argued that in order to 
grapple with this inconsistency, two main ‘projects’ are executed.  The first is primarily 
administrative.  The postcolonial government constantly demonstrates that it is pumping funds 
and resources into programmes designed to address the welfare of the aboriginal groups.  This, it 
is hoped, staves off criticism that the Orang Asli are not given the attention they ‘deserve’.  The 
second, and most significant to Orang Asli identity, has to do with the social and psychological 
transformation of the Orang Asli so that difference between themselves and the ‘Malays’ is 
minimized and eventually eradicated. That is, Orang Asli are encouraged to take on lifestyles 
associated with ‘Malays’, to adopt ‘modern’ socio-economic practices, and to embrace Islam.  
What some Orang Asli fear is that this results in them eventually disappearing altogether by their 
‘becoming’ Malays.  
 
This change is effected through ideological work.  In the light of hegemonic discourses about the 
essential good of Development in postcolonial Malaysia, the Orang Asli are produced as being 
‘unmodern’ and ‘underdeveloped’ subjects, people who are ‘uncivilized’ according to modernist 
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 indicators.  Taboos, rituals, and belief systems of Orang Asli groups are interpreted as signifiers 
of their backwardness, even as ‘impediments’ of their ability to be ‘modern’.  Orang Asli are 
constructed as being racially and culturally inferior, this ‘lack’ produced in relation to an ‘ideal 
subject’, an archetype in relation to which the Orang Asli are judged.  In postcolonial ethno-
nationalist Malaysia, this is the economically successful Melayu Baru (‘new Malay/Muslim’), the 
‘World Class Bumiputera’.  Modernising the Orang Asli is couched in terms requiring not just their 
socio-economic development, but also their religious change.  Islam, the national religion of 
Malaysia and the de facto religion of the Malays, is propagated as being a vehicle of ‘progress’, 
necessary for the civilization of the Orang Asli.   
 
When dominant ideas concerning civilization and modernization are internalized by the Orang 
Asli, this produces ambivalent responses.  There is resistance and acceptance, submission and 
subversion, ascription and denial.  On the one hand, feelings of shame arise, as they are taught 
to view their ‘traditional’ way of life as being ‘backward’ and their ‘race’ as being inferior.  These 
feelings create the habitus by which Orang Asli seek to transform themselves, so that they 
become ‘on par’ with other ‘races’.  On the other hand, Orang Asli identity is about difference, 
about cultural uniqueness and alternative ways of life, senses of self which Orang Asli individuals 
are loath to abandon.  Hence, there are strong reactions to State-sponsored modernization, 
Islamisization and masuk Melayu.  When this is resisted, we find Orang Asli individuals 
constructing their struggle by casting Malays as ‘colonizers’ and the Orang Asli as having 
‘colonized minds’.   
 
In terms of Islamisization, resistance to this is not uniform across all Orang Asli.  There are many 
who have embraced Islam, and who deal with the ambiguities of managing their identity as 
Muslim Orang Asli.  As I have argued, Muslim Orang Asli occupy a contested space, a restricted 
socio-political location that is open, in limited ways, to negotiation (Nah, forthcoming).  Some 
Muslim Orang Asli proudly retain their Orang Asli identity, arguing that religion does not, and 
should not, erode their ethnic identity.  Yet others embrace the Malay way of life altogether, and 
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 for all intents and purposes pass as Malays, and ‘are’ Malays.  The choice to ‘retain’ Orang Asli 
identity seems to be an individually-defined matter, but something that takes extra ‘work’ socially 
in order to accomplish – one has to ‘prove’ to the outside world, particularly to other Orang Asli, 
that he/she still retains an Orang Asli sense of self after he/she embraces Islam.   
 
A relatively new trend in identity making can be observed in the past two decades, which relates 
to Orang Asli struggles over rights and realities.  This is the deployment of ‘global discursive 
material’ (Bunnell and Nah, 2004) concerning ‘indigenous peoples’, in positioning and to finding 
support for Orang Asli rights to customary lands and to self-determination.  By re-signifying the 
Orang Asli and their lifestyles, civil society advocates tie the struggles of the Orang Asli with 
minority groups across Southeast Asia, as well as with those in far off continents.  The 
deployment of these discourses has been most effective in court arguments, through which the 
Orang Asli now have a form of ‘native title’ and rights to land which they were never given before.  
In addition, national and transnational alliances with civil society groups allow Orang Asli to 
strengthen their position as they continue to resist State-sponsored assimilation and try to find 
dignity in their distinctiveness.   
 
Reviewing Orang Asli Identity 
Orang Asli identity has become a powerful focal point for establishing difference.  Orang Asli 
identity is the manner in which individuals from various locations are homogenously and 
legitimately included in the mechanisms of the nation-state – the way they are politically 
included/excluded, administered, tracked and managed, recognized and defined in the law, and 
assigned benefits and privileges as members of the Malaysian polity.  ‘Orang Asli’ is the signifier 
by which aboriginal/tribal/indigenous individuals currently introduce themselves to mainstream 
others – rather than, for example, using the names of their ‘sub-ethnic’ groups, their autonyms, or 
by giving the geographical location of their home or place of origin – as this is the point of 
difference most significant for everyday realities.  More importantly, Orang Asli identity has 
become a point of unity through which individuals across the Peninsula recognize and bind 
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 themselves together with unfamiliar members of other communities.  To draw upon Benedict 
Anderson’s (1991:188) terms, a sense of ‘parallelism’ or ‘simultaneity’ exists, powerfully 
connecting distant individuals across the terrain of the Peninsula138. 
 
Orang Asli identity isn’t as straightforward as it appears in an everyday sense; that is, it is not just 
an ethnic category that cleanly separates individuals from other citizens such as ‘Malays’ or 
‘Chinese’.  On one level, as a socio-political identity, it is a collective identity in which several 
distinct minority groups of different languages, practices, and beliefs, are encapsulated, and thus, 
may be considered ‘supra-tribal’ or ‘pan-ethnic’ in similar ways to the categories ‘American 
Indians’ or ‘Australian Aborigines’.  As a signifier, ‘Orang Asli’ can also be specifically translated 
to mean ‘tribal’ or ‘aboriginal’.  As such, it refers to groups whose way of life and geographical 
imaginations are, by definition, departures from the norms of the modern nation-state (even when 
there are Orang Asli individuals who fully participate in modern civil and political life)139.  As stated 
earlier, in local and international forums which permit the utilization of ‘global discursive material’, 
the Orang Asli have been successfully repositioned as ‘indigenous people’, that is, distinct 
minority groups who struggle for their right to maintain cultural difference, to exercise control over 
their land, and to resist assimilation. 
 
Returning to Structured and Structuring Discourses 
I have attempted to show, through Chapters 2 – 5, that the (re)production of Orang Asli identity is 
a continuous project, a process contingent, emergent and never complete.  My approach was to 
de-centre this identity; discussing it vis-à-vis the social construction of other socio-political 
identities, locating it in contextualized performative acts, and examining it within broader social 
                                                 
138 In reference to Benjamin (in progress)’s arguments that there should analytical difference between indigeny, “inherited 
embodiment by place” (p.1) and indigenism, a political stance related to a broader territory (“an ‘imagined’ geopolitical 
concept defined in terms of its containing boundaries”, p.5), I suggest that asserting ‘Orang Asli’ identity is an articulation 
of indigenism, that is, it is a territory- (as opposed to place-), and politics-based identity crafted through administrative 
practices that have been internalized by Orang Asli individuals.  Nevertheless, indigeny is an important, though not 
fundamental, part of Orang Asli identity.  Having said this, there are individuals who are both indigenes and exogenes (for 
example when they live and work in Kuala Lumpur, but go ‘home’ to their villages periodically, thus maintaining their 
connection with a concrete ‘place’).  In addition, Orang Asli identity does not require an individual to be indigene; there are 
Orang Asli who were born and grew up in cities as exogenes.   
139 That is, it refers to those whose ancestors practiced a ‘tribal’ lifestyle; people who “[stood] apart from the state and its 
rulers, holding themselves culturally aloof in a “sub-nuclear” fashion” (Benjamin, 2002:9). 
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 and epistemic changes.  Throughout this thesis I have employed Bourdieu’s notion of fields and 
habitus, to examine how discourses, practices, and perceptions are systematically structured – 
and continue to structure – the way the Orang Asli are both conceptualized as well as how they 
conceptualize themselves.  The application of these concepts to the examination of Orang Asli 
identity raises some important theoretical considerations. 
 
Is the application of fields just a useful hueristic for organizing (or presenting) discourses about 
the Orang Asli, or can it function as a useful theoretical construct for analysing complex social 
realities?  It will be apparent to readers of this thesis that I have provided numerous cross-
references to indicate how I see developments in (what I deem) ‘a field’ to be link directly to 
events in ‘other fields’.  What does this indicate about the usefulness of this concept?  Does it 
suggest that the use of the notion of ‘fields’ to answer questions concerning Orang Asli identity 
requires a somewhat ‘artificial’ separation of discourses and practices?  How do we determine 
where one field ‘ends’ and another ‘begins’?  Does a particular discourse or practice fall only into 
one field, or can it be examined as a ‘development’ in another field?  In order to reflect on these 
questions, it is useful to return to Bourdieu’s articulation and defense of his concept of fields. 
 
In Bourdieu’s conceptualization, ‘fields’ do not ‘exist’ objectively, but is a concept that performs a 
particular function: it provides the analyst/ reader with a more complex and systematic ‘way of 
seeing’ (or ‘reading’) the social world that extends beyond the analysis of individual institutions, 
procedures, texts and actors, and beyond an acontextual, arbitrary or selective examination of 
discourses and practices140.  Bourdieu argues that the use of ‘fields’ allows us to avoid employing 
both an exclusively ‘internal reading’ – reading text without necessarily referring to its context – 
and a crudely formulated ‘external reading’ – relating the text to society in general terms 
(Bourdieu, 2005).  The application of the concept of fields therefore serves to guard us against 
                                                 
140 As Brubaker (2000:41) emphasizes, “the concept and theory of fields designate a set of dispositions that regulate the 
sociological analysis of “modern”, highly differentiated societies” (my emphasis).  He proposes that Bourdieu’s writings on 
habitus and fields were not aimed at creating precise concepts and definitions, but were, instead, ways of communicating 
a theoretical stance or posture for studying social phenomena; that is, to orientate readers with “a way of looking at the 
world” (p.37).  Bourdieu himself describes the use of concept of fields as a “research tool, the main function of which is to 
enable the scientific construction of social objects” (Bourdieu, 2005:30; my emphasis).    
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 focusing on the agency of actors/ institutions without considering the invisible, internalised rules 
that guide their thinking and action.  Similarly, it cautions us against the arbitrary selection of 
social phenomena to ‘explain’ a particular discourse or practice. 
 
For Bourdieu, each microcosm of social space, each ‘field’, is set within a “social macrocosm”, 
the former “a kind of small universe caught up in the laws of functioning of the larger universe, but 
nonetheless endowed with a relative autonomy within than universe and obeying its own laws, its 
own nomos – in a word, autonomous” (2005: 32, my emphasis).  The extent to which each field is 
‘autonomous’, Bourdieu points out, is therefore relative, and each field is constituted within a 
broader set of external laws.  Some fields, he argues, can become more heteronomous than 
others.  The interaction and interrelation does not mean that there is no usefulness is considering 
them ‘social spaces’ for the purposes of sociological analysis, for there are still different stakes, 
rules, regulations, authorities, forms of capital, and methods of appropriating distinction, that 
suggest they each have an internal logic.   
 
In this thesis, I argue that sufficient differences exist which justify the conceptual recognition of 
‘politics’, ‘administration’, ‘the law’ and ‘civil society’ as ‘microcosms of social spaces’ in their own 
right141.  Each field operates according to certain ‘rules’, sets different types of hierarchical/ 
bureaucratic structures, has formalized ways through which various forms of ‘capital’ are 
distributed, and functions according to logic unique to that of other social spaces.  There are 
different trajectories to the construction and development of each field, although these are deeply 
rooted in common historical events.  As the previous chapters illustrate, discourses and practices 
can be signified in diferrent ways according to the internal logic of the fields in which they are 
interpreted; they are often not ‘bound’ to just one field.  Discourses and practices may ‘originate’ 
from one field and be subsequently applied (or ‘countered’) in another field.  Each field ‘allows’ 
certain discourses and practices to be authoritative while delegitimizing others, and permits the 
deployment of representation(s) in specific ways.  When there is concordance in the ideas 
                                                 
141 Bourdieu discusses the political field in Bourdieu (2005), and the legal (or ‘juridical’) field in Bourdieu (1987). 
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 produced and circulated in these fields, these ideas become powerful, impacting the habitus of 
the Orang Asli (and shaping their social realities) significantly.  Even the struggle to challenge 
these ideas requires the Orang Asli (and Orang Asli advocates) to mount resistance in the 
language of, and by the parameters set by, these ideas.   
 
In the examination of Orang Asli identity, it is very evident that there are inter-relations between 
these four discursive fields.  Firstly, we can observe that certain actors and texts have the 
capacity to play a more influential role in the development and reification of particular 
conceptualisations of the Orang Asli, because they are held as authorities in the different fields 
within which they operate.  Actors who have ‘played well’ (who have been credentialised; or in 
Bourdieu’s terms, appropriated or conferred the required capital) in one field tend to get invited to 
participate in other fields.  They may also be purposely shut out of other fields if their opinions 
differ too greatly from others who have better ‘control’ of a particular field142.  As these authorities 
often operate in more than one field, this results in the repeated perpetuation of certain ideas 
about the Orang Asli.   
 
In reviewing developments within the four fields discussed in chapters 2 – 5, it is evident that 
there are very few Orang Asli individuals amongst the influential actors that shape discourses and 
practices about the Orang Asli, particularly in the fields of politics, administration, and the law.  
This has been a point of contention amongst Orang Asli critics, leading to the establishment of 
civil society groups that seek to challenge the hegemony of ideas, discourses and practices 
produced by influential non-Orang Asli actors who make powerful decisions that affect their 
everyday lives (see Chapter 5).  One of the points repeatedly emphasized by Orang Asli civil 
society leaders in the need to appoint Orang Asli to leadership positions within the JHEOA, and 
for the JHEOA to adopt a more consultative style of decision-making.  However, they point out 
too, that such acts should not be merely symbolic, but result in greater participation by ‘everday’ 
                                                 
142 So strong is the “authority” of certain actors in shaping accounts of what being Orang Asli means, that when 
interviewing Orang Asli individuals, I was often told “don’t ask me, ask [….], (who) knows much more about Orang Asli 
issues than I do”.  Often, they would only continue in providing their own accounts after stating “well, these are just my 
personal opinions”.  They seemed to concede authority to someone else, the “expert”, who “actually knows” the “real 
issues”. 
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 Orang Asli in managing their own affairs143.  In Chapter 2, I also describe the efforts made by 
Orang Asli to participate more meaningfully in the political field, that is, by setting up an Orang 
Asli political party, so that their aspirations can be legitimately articulated and heard.  I have also 
pointed out in Chapter 4, concerned with the legal field, that the Orang Asli have had to rely on 
‘mediators’ with specialised knowledge about legal rules in order to argue for their rights. 
 
Edward Said (1995), among other literary theorists, notes that it is not merely actors who have 
authority, for texts, too, become sources of legitimate knowledge.  Said argues that texts have the 
capacity to determine the course of discursive formations, particularly if they are oft-cited, thus 
having “distributive currency” that enables them to imprint discursive formations significantly 
(p.23)144.  It is important to note that texts can ‘escape’ the intentionality and control of authors, as 
they “can always be circulated, reproduced, cited, used in ways [authors] cannot forsee or intend” 
(Eagleton, 1996:113).  They can be applied in different ways, in different ‘social spaces’ for 
different purposes.  Texts, more than actors, depend on other agents to gain legitimacy.  They 
also function to sustain/change the authority of actors who write, rework, or use the texts in their 
social interactions.  There are varying levels of authority and relevance that texts command, and 
their influence depends on the construction and operation of the field within which they 
operate145.  Both actors and texts are constituted within fields in an indexical manner, their level 
of authority contingent on social changes.  At certain moments, they gain preeminence, while at 
other times, they lose authority, slip into obscurity, and occasionally re-emerge in importance and 
on different occasions146.   
 
                                                 
143 As a prominent Orang Asli individual said to me, when describing why he rejected an offer to be appointed to a 
leadership position within the JHEOA, “I don’t want to just be a symbol that the JHEOA can use to say that they have 
Orang Asli in leadership positions.  If I get appointed, all the people above me and below me will still the same, and the 
decisions they make will not change.  If I cannot introduce changes in the JHEOA, then I prefer not to be in it”. Nicholas 
(2000) has already taken the discussion about valid Orang Asli representation further, pointing out that Orang Asli 
representativity – being perceived to be validly representing the Orang Asli – has become a ‘resource’ for the State that 
State actors have used in order to justify their desired actions.  That is, by assigning certain Orang Asli actors and 
organizations official political representativity, State actors have tried to legitimize actions and decisions that may be in 
sharp contradiction to the needs and desires of Orang Asli communities. 
144 Said reminds us that there are at least two sorts of ‘confirmatory evidence’ that can give any representation “strength 
and authority” (p.20); that is materiality, and the referential power between texts.  
145 Within the legal field, for example, the Constitution, along with statutes and the judgments of cases (local and 
international), are placed in strict hierarchies.    
146 As it is not the main aim of this thesis to trace the genealogy of the authority of each text and actor related to the Orang 
Asli, we will only gain a partial glimpse into the indexical property of these constituents. 
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 We can see that developments in one field stimulate, shape, legitimize and even require 
developments in other fields.  For example, the political need to counter aboriginal support of 
Communists during the Emergency Period (the political field) prompted close administration of 
the aboriginal groups (the administrative field), which required the creation of law that would 
legitimize the actions of Government and that would give them necessary powers to influence the 
Orang Asli (the legal field).  Authorities in one field have also served to check developments in 
other fields.  Judgments through court cases (the legal field), for example, have resulted in 
securing Orang Asli rights to ancestral lands, which were denied by government practices (the 
administrative field).  Civil society actors have also tried to augment the hegemony of political and 
administrative elites, calling for greater autonomy and independence for the Orang Asli.  This 
illustrates, yet again, the interconnections and tensions between fields. 
 
Finally, the structural constitution of these discursive fields – that is, the stakes and rules needed 
to play the game well – require particular skills and capital that privilege the role of certain actors 
over that of others.  Most Orang Asli are unable to participate meaningfully and powerfully in 
those fields, because they do not have the ‘appropriate capital’ – the academic credentials, 
influential social connections, language skills, specialist knowledge about the rules of each field, 
secure financial standing, etc.  Thus, they have required the assistance of ‘mediators’ to 
speak/act on their behalf.  These have included politicians, Ministers of Parliament, administrative 
officials, civil society actors, social researchers, lawyers, and judges, many of whom have had to 
learn, very quickly, the specific needs and the socio-political identity of the Orang Asli.   
 
Concluding Reflections:  Learning about ‘My People’ 
During my fieldwork, I spoke to a young Orang Asli man, who spoke to me of his desire to 
‘interview’ an anthropologist who had worked with his ‘ethnic group’ for over a decade.  Well 
known among his people, this researcher was mentioned by name, and the young man said to 
me, “I’d like to ask [her] to tell me about what the older people said about my culture, so that I can 
learn what it is”.  This was similar to a comment made by another Orang Asli individual, who bade 
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 me to give him a copy of my thesis so that he could learn about the problems faced ‘by his own 
people’. 
 
To advocate on ‘Orang Asli’ issues, Orang Asli individuals have had to learn about ‘their 
problems’, ‘their culture(s)’. They have had to learn not only about how to evaluate themselves 
vis-à-vis the structures of the nation-state, but about other Orang Asli ‘cultures’, other 
communities geographically, historically and socially distanced from their own.  This learning 
takes place in an increasingly mediated form – through representations in statistics, censuses, 
research reports, academic papers, and museum displays. 
 
This research process was a journey of discovery for me, a discovery about the social realities of 
those whom I consider my neighbors.  I thought my fellow travelers would be academics and 
other researchers keen to know about ‘the Orang Asli’.  Thus, to my naïve surprise, I found that 
those who journeyed with me were Orang Asli themselves – people learning about ‘their own 
people’, so that they too, would know about ‘their problems’ and learn how to address these in 
modern Malaysian society.  Although we grew up in the same nation-state, under the same 
political regime, subject to the same educational institutions and nation-building discourses, 
hearing and experiencing the same myths, stories, and historical accounts, we might as well have 
been citizens of different nation-states, so differently are we positioned in contemporary 
Malaysian society.  It is my  hope that I have captured with some accuracy, the challenges, 
anxieties, struggles and joys that the Orang Asli presently face as they negotiate their identity in 
contemporary postcolonial Malaysia.   
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 APPENDIX A   
Figure 1:  Definitions of Identity in the Malaysian Legal System 
















“(1) In this Act an aborigine is –  
any person whose male parent is or was, a member of an aboriginal ethnic 
group, who speaks an aboriginal language and habitually follows an aboriginal 
way of life and aboriginal customs and beliefs, and includes a descendant 
through males of such persons;  
any person of any race adopted when an infant by aborigines who has been 
brought up as an aborigine, habitually speaks an aboriginal language, 
habitually follows an aboriginal way of life and aboriginal customs and beliefs 
and is a member of an aboriginal community; or  
the child of any union between an aboriginal female and a male of another 
race, provided that the child habitually speaks an aboriginal language, 
habitually follows an aboriginal way of life and aboriginal customs and beliefs 
and remains a member of an aboriginal community.” 
(2) Any aborigines who by reason of conversion to any religion or for any other 
reason ceases to adhere to aboriginal beliefs but who continues to follow an 
aboriginal way of life and aboriginal customs or speaks an aboriginal language 
shall not be deened to have ceased to be an aborigine by reason only of 
practicing that religion. 
(3) Any question whether any person is or is not an aborigine shall be decided 







““Malay” means a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually 
speaks the Malay language, conforms to the Malay custom and – 
a) was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore or born 
of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in Singapore, or 
is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or  











(6) and (7) 
“(6) In this Article “native” means –  
a) In relation to Sarawak, a person who is a citizen and either belongs to 
one of the races specified in Clause (7) as indigenous to the State or is 
of mixed blood deriving exclusively from those races, and 
b) In relation to Sabah, a person who is a citizen, is the child or grandchild 
of a person of a race indigenous to Sabah, and was born (whether on or 
after Malaysia Day or not) either in Sabah or to a father domiciled in 
Sabah at the time of the birth. 
(7) The races to be treated for the purposes of the definition of “native” in 
Clause (6) as indigenous to Sarawak are the Bukitans, Bisayahs, Dusuns, 
Sea Dayaks, Land Dayaks, Kadayans, Kalabits, Kayans, Kenyahs (including 
Sabups and Sipengs), Kajangs (including Sekapans, Kejamans, Lahanans, 
Punans, Tanjongs and Kanowits), Lugats, Lisums, Malays, Melanos, Muruts, 
Penans, Sians, Tagals, Tabuns and Ukits.  
 
Source: The Federal Constitution as at 10th September 2002. 
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 Figure 2:  ‘Aborigines’ (‘orang asli’) in the Federal Constitution 
Article 8 “(1)  All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law. 
  (2)  Except as expressly authorized by this Constitution (my emphasis), there shall be no 
discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent or place of 
birth in any law or in the appointment to any office or employment under a public authority 
or in the administration of any law relating to the acquisition, holding or disposition of 
property or the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or 
employment.  
[….] 
  (5) This Article does not invalidate or prohibit –  
[….] 
c) any provision for the protection, well-being or advancement of the aboriginal 
peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the reservation of land) or the 
reservation to aborigines of a reasonable proportion of suitable positions in the 
public service;…” 
Article 45(2) “The members to be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall be persons who in his 
opinion have rendered distinguished public service or have achieved distinction in the 
professions, commerce, industry, agriculture, cultural activities or social service or are 
representative of racial minorities or are capable of representing the interests of 
aborigines” 
Article 74 and 
77, 
Item 16, List I 
– Federal List, 
Ninth 
Schedule.   
[Article 74(1)] “Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated 
in the Federal List [List I]…” 
[List I, at Item 16 reads] “Welfare of the Aborigines” 
Note:  Article 77 states that the Legislature of a State does not have the power to make 
laws to matters enumerated in the Ninth Schedule over which Parliament has power to 
make laws. 
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